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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation examines in the conditions under which ethnicity becomes 
politicized in heterogeneous societies: how, and in what ways do political institutions 
matter? How, and what kinds of political institutions constrain or provide incentives for 
the use of ethnic identity as a primary mobilizational tool?   Many answers to this 
question focus on the role of formal political institutions (colonial, post-colonial, 
democratic transition). As in most of the developing countries, however, informal 
institutions play a crucial role in African politics. To the extent that the rules of the 
political game governing representation and access to government resources are 
determined by informal institutions (e.g., institutions of social integration), these rules 
should be central to any explanations of ethnic politicization or the lack thereof.  
 Drawing on and extending existing theories and analytical frameworks on 
formal institutions, the dissertation considers the interactive effects of informal political 
institutions on the forms and outcomes of ethnic mobilization in sub-Saharan Africa.  
The dissertation finds that informal institutions (e.g., the Sufi Orders in Senegal and 
voluntary associations in Côte d’Ivoire) and informal institutional rules (e.g., ethnic 
transcendence and ethnic balancing) can directly affect the politicization of ethnicity. 
Change in these informal institutional rules may lead to shifts in the political salience of 
ethnic identity—from low or dormant and contained to dominating the national 
discourse— altering incentives for political elites to use ethnic identity as a primary 
mobilizational tool.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
The salience of ethnicity in politics has resurfaced as an issue of major concern, 
particularly for heterogeneous societies. While war between states seems to be on the 
decline, ethnic conflict within them is on the rise.  Some early works on the social 
conflict and regime breakdown in Africa suggest that ethnicity acted as the centrifugal 
force behind such outcomes. In fact, most of the civil wars in sub-Saharan Africa have 
been attributed in one form or another to ethnicity.  Many view ethnicity as a good 
predictor of the likelihood that a country will experience ethnic conflict in the future.1  
Citing cases such as Rwanda, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Nigeria and Côte d’Ivoire, 
scholars assert that in heterogeneous societies, ethnicity will shape the main political 
cleavages, define political participation, become the axes of political competition, 
encourage ethnic voting and ethnic campaigning, and ultimately lead to ethnically 
related conflicts, civil war, political instability and even regime breakdown.2 Since 
control of the state and its resources are the focal points of competition, ethnicity 
increases the zero-sum nature of political engagement and leads to violent confrontation 
                                                 
1
 See Easterly and Levine (1997) and Collier (2000).  These scholars use a measure of ethnic plurality to 
determine which countries are most at risk of civil conflict. Easterly and Levine argue that higher levels 
of ethnic diversity encourage instability. Collier, however, posits that at higher levels of ethnic plurality, 
the likelihood of civil unrest decreases higher levels of ethnic plurality. According to Collier, the 
countries that are most at risk of civil conflict are those with medium levels of ethnic heterogeneity. A 
number of ethnic factionalization scores/ indexes have been developed for the explicit purpose of 
calculating the risk of civil conflict. These include the Atlas Narodov Mira (ELF) index and the Minority 
at Risk (MAR) dataset.  
2
 A number of scholars view ethnicity as a good predictor of support for different political parties (Norris 
& Mattes 2003; Posner 2005; Laitin 1986).   
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among groups as each ethnic cleavage seeks to dominate by neutralizing or eliminating 
rival groups.3  
Challenged by the failure to empirically account for the many heterogeneous 
countries in which ethnic cleavages do not feature prominently in the political arenas 
and have not experienced social conflict, civil wars or regime breakdown,4 scholars 
have sought to refine this argument.  The more refined version of the argument is that 
while important, ethnicity in and of itself does not cause conflict. Acknowledging that   
“[e]ven in the most severely divided society, ties of blood does not lead ineluctably to 
rivers of blood,” scholars such as V.P. Gagnon (1995) and Daniel Posner (2005) posit 
that theoretically, the conventional causal mechanism is wrong: the root cause of social 
conflicts and the disintegration of the state is not ethnicity per se, but rather the 
politicization5  thereof. When ethnicity becomes the chief mobilizational tool, the axes 
of political competition and dominates the political discourse, political instability, 
disintegration of the state, or full blown collapse and civil war inevitably ensue. The 
practice of ethnic politics sharpens divisions, exacerbates existing tensions and creates a 
cycle of violence that often undermines political stability and encourages ethnic 
conflict.     
But under what conditions does ethnicity become politicized in multi-ethnic 
societies? What are the dominant constraints on such practices?   When and why do 
political elites take advantage of their country’s ethnic multidimensionality? Under 
what circumstances does ethnic politicization become an attractive political option for 
elites, and what factors check the use of ethnicity as a political tool? By answering these 
                                                 
3
 See Laitin (1986); Horowitz (1985); Chabal (1993).  
4
 For example Senegal, Tanzania, Cameroon, Mali, Burkina Faso and Benin.    
5
 See Posner(2005); Gagnon (1995) 
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questions this dissertation offers an account of the conditions under which ethnicity is 
likely to be politicized in ethnically diverse societies, highlights some incentive 
structures that systematically influence ethnic politics, and helps to explain the cross-
country variation in ethnic politicization that we observe throughout Africa.  
This dissertation builds on some of the general assumptions in the vast literature 
on political life regarding various developing countries, specifically in sub-Saharan 
Africa. Following the trend established by Laitin (1986) and Posner (2005), this 
dissertation considers the impact of colonialism on ethnic politicization. Key to their 
analyses is the notion that the salience of ethnicity is significantly determined by the 
colonial institutions that developed in particular countries.  The underlying assumption 
is that institutions provide the context in which political actors define their strategies 
and pursue their interests.  
A country’s institutional setting helps to define the constellations of incentives 
and constraints faced by political actors and individuals. More specifically, the colonial 
administrative, labor and land policies shaped individual preferences and interests. The 
repertoire of interests in turn influences an individual’s political choices and behavior. 
For these scholars, the likelihood that individuals will invest in their ethnic identity and 
that political elites will view ethnicity as a meaningful mobilizational tool may be 
discerned from colonial institutions since it is these institutions that have played the 
central role in shaping the politics in former colonial societies. Under the right 
conditions, these incentive structures contribute to the peaceful integration of ethnic 
groups into national politics 
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Like these scholars, I argue that there is a definite link between colonial 
institutions and ethnic politicization. The dissertation shows, however, that the debate 
should be taken beyond the conventional French versus British dichotomy as the 
institutional legacies of colonialism produced divergent administrative and political 
institutions not only among countries with different colonial rulers, but also those with 
the same colonial rulers. This is significant in meeting the empirical challenge of 
providing an explanation for divergent outcomes among countries with similar colonial 
rulers. By moving beyond the broad differences among the various colonial institutions 
direct rule versus indirect rule- this dissertation indicates that while historical legacies 
may seem (and are often presumed to be) similar in terms of the importation of 
administrative structures, political organization, political ideologies and labor policies, 
how these factors were instituted on the ground varied significantly, even among 
countries with the same colonial ruler.  
 These differences in the administrative structures, political organization and 
labor policies, I argue, have significant consequences for the incentives and/or 
disincentives and consequently, the likelihood of ethnicity being politicized.  In fact, my 
empirical data from the field research in Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire indicate that 
differences in the colonial administrative, land and labor policies led to differences in 
the types of and the manner in which informal institutions emerged, evolved and 
operated.   These institutions have, in turn, shaped the expectations and behavior of the 
people in each country. They have defined the incentives for individuals to invest in 
their ethnic identity and for political elites to use ethnicity as a mobilizational tool.  
 
5 
 
Another important departure from the general literature is that rather than focus 
on the historical development of formal state institutions such as different electoral rules 
at the national level, this dissertation focuses more on societal-level institutions, 
particularly informal institutions— “institutions of social integration”—that developed 
as intermediaries between the colonial state and local society.  By focusing on the 
societal counterparts to the state colonial legacies, this dissertation helps to identify and 
outline the conditions under which ethnicity is likely to become politicized more 
specifically. It directly bridges the gap in the existing literature in explaining why, 
despite formal institutional changes, particularly from single to multi-party rule, some 
countries have not experienced ethnic politicization. The answer, I argue, lies with the 
informal institutional rules established by the informal institutions such as the Sufi 
Orders in Senegal, voluntary associations in Côte d’Ivoire and hometown associations 
in countries like Nigeria and Ghana.  
These institutions developed as a result of colonialism. As intermediaries 
between the colonial state and the society and later the post-independence state and the 
society, Sufi Orders and voluntary associations established the rules of the political 
game as far as whether, and the extent to which, ethnicity became politically salient. By 
setting forth rules (albeit informal ones) about ethnic transcendence or (as in the case of 
Côte d’Ivoire) relatively balanced ethnic representation and access to public groups, 
informal institutions such as the Sufi Order and voluntary associations determine the 
salience of ethnic identity and therefore, the incentives for political elites to view and 
use ethnicity as a mobilizational tool. What is more, this dissertation indicates that in 
the case of Senegal formal institutional change does not necessarily destroy informal 
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institutions. This, I submit, suggests the need to look beyond formal institutional change 
to account for shifts in the salience of ethnicity and the use of ethnicity as a 
mobilizational tool.   
This dissertation proposes an analytical framework that addresses the criticism 
that institutional legacies of colonialism “cannot account for variation among or within 
territories colonized by the same European power.”6  By uncovering the role of informal 
institutions such as the Sufi Order and the Voluntary Associations in the respective 
countries, we begin to shed light on the important question of why ethnicity is more 
politically salient in Côte d’Ivoire than in Senegal. Uncovering the rules of the game 
governing political participation, access to government resources, land rights and 
citizenship also indicates the need to look beyond formal institutions as key explanatory 
factors for ethnic politicization and conflicts in sub-Saharan African. 
This finding has implications for our understanding of when, and what kinds of 
institutions matter. It shows that political outcomes in Africa are largely conditioned by 
societal-level factors, that informal institutions play a more significant role in African 
politics than many previous accounts have suggested, and that existing accounts that 
focus exclusively on the role of formal institutions at the national-level, tell only part of 
the story.  Another implication is that the argument makes it possible to generalize 
about the conditions under which ethnicity becomes politicized.  
 This dissertation argues that it is these societal level informal colonial 
institutional legacies that are the key determinants of whether ethnicity becomes 
politicized. The main argument is that ethnic affiliation becomes the axis of political 
competition not because of change in formal institutional rule as Posner (2005) asserts, 
                                                 
6
 Boone (2003:16). 
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but rather because of shifts in the informal institutional rules, particularly those 
regulating the rules of engagement in the realm of political representation, access to 
public resources, land rights and citizenship rights.  Much of the variation we observe in 
the politicization of ethnicity across sub-Saharan Africa may be attributed to this factor. 
 Like much of the work that tries to explain ethnic politics, ethnic conflict or 
ethnic politicization, the literature on Africa focuses on formal institutions and other 
state-level variables to explain political outcomes within and across African countries. 
Scholars have focused on the effects of colonial legacies, particularly the effects of the 
importation of administrative ideologies and structures from colonial metropoles; the 
role of religion, religious differences and divides, or changes in formal institutional 
rules, particularly the shift from single-party to multi-party rule and democratization. 
These variables have been advanced to explain cross-country differences in ethnic 
conflict, ethnic politics or the politicization of ethnicity. While this dissertation also 
focuses on cross-country variation in the politicization of ethnicity, it identifies a 
different casual relationship. I argue that variations in ethnic politicization are 
determined by shifts in the informal institutional rules; variations in ethnic politicization 
and the salience of ethnicity are products of political bargaining and redistributive 
functions that occurs within African societies between the state, political leaders, 
informal institutional networks, and ethnic groups.  
 
Informal Institutional Change and Ethnic Politicization in sub-Saharan Africa 
Throughout sub-Saharan Africa, there are significant variations in the salience 
of ethnic identities as well as informal institutional networks and rules that help to 
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regulate against politicization. These informal institutional configurations, and by 
extension, their rules, help to explain why the use of ethnicity as a mobilizational tool 
have varied so much.  While it is fairly well established in the state/society relations 
literature that informal institutions such as hometown associations, voluntary 
associations and Sufi Orders  play a crucial role in African politics, there has been little 
or no attempt to examine their effect on ethnic politicization. Changes in informal 
institutional rules tend to be overlooked as a source of the differences in ethnic 
politicization or ethnic conflict throughout Africa. Rather, as mentioned above, much of 
the scholarship on ethnic politics in sub-Saharan Africa has emphasized the importation 
of foreign administrative structures and ideologies from colonial powers or change in 
formal institutional rules as key determinants of variation in instances of ethnic 
politicization in Africa south of the Sahara.  
This dissertation offers an alternative approach.  It focuses on the role and 
impact of informal institutions on ethnic politicization using the comparative case-study 
approach.   Analyses of colonial conquest, administration, the post-colonial and post-
independence period, and the politics of regime consolidation since the 1950s reveal 
considerable variations in the capacity of, and the manner in which, informal 
institutional configurations manage ethnic differences and constrain the politicization of 
ethnic identity. This has led to calls for research that focus closely on informal 
institutions.7   
In an attempt to bridge this important gap in the literature and increase 
understanding of the conditions under which ethnicity becomes politicized more 
generally. The main argument of the dissertation is that informal institutions play a 
                                                 
7
 See Helmke and Levitsky (2006).  
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much more significant role in African politics than is generally acknowledged. How 
power and politics are negotiated and distributed among various ethnic groups  and how 
these imbalances are institutionalized in sub-Saharan Africa are largely determined by 
societal-level  informal institutions such as Sufi Orders in Senegal and voluntary 
associations in Côte d’Ivoire .  These institutions, more so than formal institutions, 
shape expectations, define the incentive structure and influence the strategic choices 
that individuals, ethnic groups and political elites make.  Consequently, shifts in the 
informal institutional rules may significantly change public expectations and shift the 
incentive structure — so much so that ethnic identity becomes an attractive 
mobilizational tool for political elites— for political elites to make ethnic appeals.  
 This dissertation builds on the insights on the political importance of informal 
institutions from the scholarship on democratic governance and state-society relations in 
Africa by extending the discussion of their implications beyond concerns for democratic 
consolidation, to the impact that change in these institutional rules may have on ethnic 
politicization and ethnic conflict.  Given the prevalence of informal institutional 
networks operating as intermediaries between the state and society, particularly as 
conduits for the redistribution of governmental benefits throughout Africa, there is 
much to be said for examining the question of the conditions under which ethnicity is 
likely to become politicized by focusing not so much on formal institutional rules, but 
more so, on the rules (albeit informal ones) that really matter.   
 North argues that while the general assumption is that life is ordered by formal 
rules, actions are in fact guided more by informal constraints, such as “codes of 
conduct, norms of behavior and conventions” (North 1990:36). Arguing that formal and 
10 
 
informal institutions should be regarded as opposite ends of a continuum, and that the 
latter are at least as important as the former, North defines institutions as: “the rules of 
the game in a society, or more formally… the humanly  devised constraints that shape 
human interaction.”8  Despite this wider, more encompassing definition and assertions 
that informal institutions may be the more important of the two, the use of institutions 
as independent variables in the comparative politics literature focus almost exclusively 
on formal institutions, especially those that relate to electoral systems and 
democratization.   This dissertation is premised on the idea that such analyses could 
help to explain why the salience of ethnic identity and instances of ethnic politicization 
vary so much across the African continent.   
  The research findings are striking. Changes in informal institutional rules 
governing political representation, power-sharing, and resource distribution, have 
significant implications for the incentive structure9 and consequently, for ethnic 
politicization.  This dissertation shows for example, how in the case of Senegal, 
institutional configurations such as Sufi brotherhoods help to transcend historic ethnic 
and religious communities, thereby providing an institutionalized and pragmatic basis 
for the idea of   national citizenship and cross-cultural tolerance that blocks the use of 
political appeals to cultural differences as a mobilizational tool. And, with the patronage 
ties of the respective brotherhoods forming the social base of the political parties and 
the Sufi brotherhoods dictating the terms of social and political interactions, the Sufi 
Orders indicate that institutions of social integration may indeed constrain ethnic 
politicization. 
                                                 
8
 North (1990:3). 
9
  In terms of elite strategic choices and people’s incentives to respond to ethnic politics.  
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The approach produces an account of colonial legacies, and post-colonial institutional 
changes much like those of scholars such as Atul Kohli (2004) and Posner (2005), with 
the notable exception that rather than focusing on formal institutions at the state level, 
this dissertation considers the counterparts at the societal level- colonial legacies, and 
change in informal institutional rules. To the extent that political representation and 
access to government resources are determined by informal institutional rules those 
rules will be central to any explanation of ethnic politicization or the lack thereof. 
Change in informal institutional rules may lead to a shift in the political salience of 
ethnic identity―from low or dormant and contained to dominating the national 
discourse―and the incentives for political elites to mobilize using ethnic identity a 
primary mobilizational tool.  
 Faced with change in the Ivorian land policy from “the land belongs to he who 
cultivates it” to needing proof not only of one’s natural birth registration, but also proof 
that both parents are also natural born citizens, a northern Ivoirian Muslim would begin 
to compare her (and by extension her group’s) relative access to political presentation 
and access to government resources with those of other ethnic groups (Baoulé, Bété, 
Krou, and Christians). Finding evidence of political inequality against northern Ivoirian 
Muslims in general, she may become more likely to respond to appeals by political 
elites who seek to highlight the grievances of her ethnic group. She may also align 
herself with political party that, while not making explicit appeals to ethnic differences 
or related grievances, directly opposes the new changes to the informal institutional 
rules.  
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This dissertation also shows that while formal institutional rules governing 
political competition in Senegal changed (particularly from single to multiparty rule) in 
1981, the general expectations of the public and the incentive structures have remained 
relatively unaltered. This, I argue, is largely due to the fact that there have been few 
changes to the structure or importance of the informal institutional configurations of the 
Sufi Order. Consequently there have been few changes to the institutionalized rules 
governing political representation and access to government resources or the likelihood 
of political elites making appeals to ethnic identity.  
The implication here is that as long as the pan-ethnic, inclusive and transcendent 
institutional configurations of the Sufi Orders continue to determine the rules of the 
political game, the likelihood of Senegalese political elites using ethnicity as a 
mobilizational tool also remains low.   Conversely, where the actual rules being 
followed are established by informal rather than formal rules, changes to the former 
(particularly those governing political representation, resource distribution, land tenure 
and citizenship) may significantly alter the salience of ethnicity and public expectations 
of relatively balanced ethnic representation and access to public goods, as well as affect 
the overall incentives for political elites to use ethnicity as a mobilizational tool.  
 The assertion that change in informal institutional rules offers a stronger 
explanatory power for the variation in ethnic politicization across sub-Saharan Africa 
than accounts that focus on formal institution is built on well-established empirical 
accounts depicting the extent to which uncodified rules shape the behavior and 
expectations of the people in African societies. The state-society relations literatures 
offer rich analyses of how factors at the societal level (such as the redistributive 
13 
 
networks of the Sufi Orders in Senegal) influence political outcomes.  These analyses 
indicate that in general, the actual rules of the game (that is, the institutionalized, 
societally embedded rules) to which the public and political elites adhere and develop 
expectations are not those that are formally established.  Rather, they are long 
established, deeply rooted, societally embedded rules that remain uncodified. In her 
depiction of the importance of informal institutional rules in society Catherine Boone 
(2003) wrote: 
There is often acute disjuncture between the formal rules that define institutional 
structure and functions, and the real politics of how government agencies work. 
[Individuals] who advocate reforms that will “get institutions right” ignore this 
at their own risk…Informal power relations, communal divisions or solidarities 
and underlying economic arrangements can constitute real  parameters of 
institutional change and choice. 10   
   
As the chapters that follow will indicate, changes in informal institutions 
regulating political representation, access to state resources, land tenure and citizenship 
rights may lead to significant increases in political inequality, ethnic and regional 
disparities and ethnic based grievances, which in turn shifted the salience of ethnic 
identity-from dormant and contained to dominating the national political discourse-and 
the incentives for political elites to mobilize using ethnic identity as a primary 
mobilizational tool.  Catherine Boone aptly reminds us that “[t]heorists and practitioners 
need analytical frameworks for describing differences in …African contexts and for 
hypothesizing about the sources and effects thereof” (Boone 1990:7).  The proceeding 
chapter constructs an analytical framework and proposes a theoretical account of the 
conditions under which ethnicity is likely to become politicized. It is objective of this 
dissertation to offer a better understanding and an alternative account of the cross-
                                                 
10
 See Boone (2003:4-5). 
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country variations in ethnic politicization and ethnic conflict in Africa. The dissertation 
meets this objective by identifying and assessing: (a) the actual rules of the game 
pertaining, in particular, to the distribution of resources and land and citizens’ rights,  
that shape people’s behavior and expectations (that is,  how they developed and their 
importance relative to political stability and social cohesion within a particular country); 
and (b) how these informal rules and change therein, affect the incentive structure― 
whether ethnic identity is likely to: (i) remains socially but not politically salient; (ii) 
become or remain politically salient but dormant or contained; or (ii)  become the 
primary mobilizational tool for political competition.    
Like formal institutions, informal institutions provide common knowledge about 
the incentives faced by everyone in a society. Consequently, change in informal 
institutional rules governing access to state resources or land tenure policies can affect 
whether, and the extent to which ethnic identity becomes politically salient or the 
primary means of political mobilization. Posner asserts that prior to delving into the 
issue of why political actors embrace or seek to mobilize on the basis of ethnic 
affiliations, one must “first account for why some identities are understood to be 
meaningful candidates for mobilization and others are not.”11  Posner is right.  Chapter 
Four focuses entirely on this issue.   
The chapter uses process tracing and indicates that ethnic identities may be 
traced to specific colonial institutions, particularly those related to administration. The 
chapter also shows that colonialism resulted in the rise of informal institutional 
configurations that often operated as conduits of the state.  Rules (albeit informal ones) 
developed to govern issues such as political representation, power-sharing 
                                                 
11
 See Posner (2005: 6).  
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arrangements, access to state resources, land tenure and citizenship rights. These rules 
have persisted since 1960 in the case of Senegal and until recently (in the post- 1993 
era)12 in the case of Côte d’Ivoire.  
Chapter Five further details the persistence of these institutions throughout the 
post-independence era and considers how the nature and functions of these informal 
institutions help to accentuate or attenuate ethnic differences. The chapter directly 
addresses the claim that religion, in particular a Muslim/Christian divide, effectively 
accounts for instances of ethnic politicization or non-politicization.  The chapter shows 
that while religion is indeed important in shaping behavior and influencing the capacity 
for collective action, it does not determine political actions.  It argues that the likelihood 
that ethnicity will become politicized is dependent not so much on religious differences, 
but rather, on whether, and to what extent the informal institutional networks and 
informally institutionalized rules accentuate or attenuate ethnic differences.  Islam is 
able to mitigate ethnic politicization in Senegal, not because of the religious doctrine or 
theological foundations, but because of the extent to which the religious structures gave 
birth to informal institutions that: (a) attenuate ethnic differences; and (b) serve as an 
effective counterweight to the state, in terms of goods provisions.  
Chapter Five also shows that the real problem in Côte d’Ivoire is not religion per 
se. Rather, unlike Senegal, the informal institutions that developed in Côte d’Ivoire 
during the late-colonial and post-independence periods provided governmental 
resources primarily on the basis of ethnic and ethno-regional differences. The result is 
                                                 
12
 Following the death of President Houphouët-Boigny in 1993, political competition in the country took 
on a decidedly ethnic tone. By 1995, the dominant issue of Ivorian politics was ethnic affiliation. The 
situation resulted in a coup d’etat in December 1999 and the onset of a civil war which has left the 
country dived into two distinct administrative units—the government controls the South and the rebels 
control the region north of Bauké.   
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that unlike Senegal, these informal institutional configurations of voluntary associations 
accentuated ethnic differences and made ethnicity politically salient.  To be clear, the 
argument here is not that high salience levels will result in ethnic politicization. Rather, 
the argument is that ethnicity is more likely to become politicized in those countries 
where ethnicity is more salient than in societies where it is not. Thus, while higher 
levels of political salience in Côte d’Ivoire meant that there was a larger possibility of 
ethnicity being politicized than in Senegal, it is possible for political salience of 
ethnicity to remain low and dormant over long periods of time.  
Chapter Six directly addresses the question of how institutional change can 
result in ethnic politicization. This chapter challenges the general assumptions in the 
comparative politics literature that ethnic politicization results from, and therefore, may 
be explained by shifts in the electoral system or the shift from single to multiparty rule. 
The chapter offers a comparative analysis that traces the shift in incentives and the 
politicization process in Côte d’Ivoire from 1960-1993 and 1993-2007.  
The case explorations indicate that ethnic affiliation became the axes of political 
competition in Côte d’Ivoire when it did, not because of  democratization or regime 
change, but because of changes to long established and institutionalized rules governing 
political representation, power-sharing, resource distribution and land tenure and 
citizenship  rights. These changes significantly altered the political representation, as far 
as relatively balanced ethnic representation, land tenure and citizenship rights, leading 
to claims and counter-claims of ethnic biases and preference, mobilization and counter-
mobilization and ethnic outbidding.  The chapter also provides an explanation for how 
and why institutional change occurs.  In particular, the dissertation addresses a central 
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question that is often left unaddressed in works on institutionalism- how can individuals 
initiate change in a context that is determining their behavior? In other words, how can 
actors change the very institutions in which they are embedded?    
 The countries studied in this dissertation were selected because of the variation 
in ethnic politicization. Given their disparate experience with ethnic politicization,13 the 
Senegal-Côte d’Ivoire dyad presents an opportunity for understanding the conditions 
under which political elites politicize ethnic differences and the factors that prevent 
them from doing so.  Despite an ethnically diverse population, ethnic differences have 
not been a major feature of Senegal’s political discourse. Rather, as indicated in the last 
elections in 2000, political competition in Senegal is staged at the level of the nation-
state.    
Conversely, since 1993 political competition in Côte d’Ivoire has been based 
largely on ethnic identity as Ivoirian political elites have increasingly used the ethnic 
card to secure their hold on power. President Bédié for example, in an effort to secure 
his electoral victory in the 1995 presidential elections, introduced the concept of Ivoirité 
(or Ivoirian pride),14which excluded principal political opponents such as Alassane 
Ouattara from the political decision making process. Like Bédié, Guei and Gbagbo have 
continued to interject the notion of pure versus circumstantial Ivoirians into the Ivoirian 
political discourse. Subsequently, not only has Ivoirité come to dominate Ivoirian 
                                                 
13
 Despite its ethnic diversity Senegal (North of the Gambia) has had little experience with ethnic 
politicization. Côte d’Ivoire has been experiencing ethnic strife and politicization since the mid-1990s. 
14
 The concept of Ivoirité has been around for some time, primarily since the 1960. It was reportedly 
coined by Houphouët-Boigny as a means of promoting Ivoirian pride and nationalism. Since the mid-
1990s, however (particularly after the death of Houphouét-Boigny), the concept took on a different, more 
acerbic meaning and was used as the criteria for distinguishing between a “true” Ivorian citizen and 
distinguish between “true” Ivoirian citizens and others.  Given its implications on political representation, 
citizenship and land tenure rights, the question of Ivoirité has dominated much of the national debate in 
the post-1993 era.  
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political arena, overshadowing the politics of the nation-state, it has been the primary 
source of the recent civil war in the country.   
The variation in the political salience of ethnicity between the countries begs for 
explanations as to why ethnic politicization occurs in some ethnically diverse societies 
but not others.  Why have Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire had such different experiences 
regarding ethnic politicization despite the many structural and historical similarities? 
Under what conditions are ethnic conflicts constructed?   This question lies at the heart 
of contemporary theoretical and policy debates about ethnic conflicts in sub-Saharan 
Africa. 
 
 
 
The plan of the Dissertation 
   
    This dissertation is organized in three parts. Part I, comprised of chapters two 
and three, offers a detailed discussion of the literature related to ethnicity, ethnic 
conflict and democratization. It also describes the research design and methodology.  
Part II, comprising chapters four and five, describes and explains why, given the 
colonial legacies and institutional continuity in the post-independence era, ethnicity 
became politically salient and, therefore, more likely to become politicized in some 
countries but not others.   
 Having established the nature of the Senegalese and Ivoirian political landscape, 
Part III addresses the central question of the dissertation: under what conditions are 
political elites likely to use ethnicity as a mobilizational tool?  Chapter Six offers an in-
country comparative analysis over time that directly addresses this question. The 
chapter focuses on the leadership of Ivoirian leaders, Houphouët-Boigny (1960-1993) 
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and Bédié (1993- 1998). The chapter offers a comparative analysis of the proportional 
representation of the various ethnic groups in the top government positions, the 
legislature and top-level economic organizations under the two leaders Here, the chapter 
shows that shifts in the incentive and the politicization process in Côte d’Ivoire are 
directly related to the changes in the informal institutional rules governing political 
representation, access to state resources, land tenure and citizenship rights. The chapter 
also shows that focus on formal institutions, particularly shifts from single-party to 
multiparty rule, does not adequately account for ethnic politicization in Côte d’Ivoire. 
The implication, which is further explored in Chapters Seven and Eight, is that much of 
the variation in the use of ethnicity as a mobilization tool that we observe across sub-
Saharan Africa may be explained by change in informal institutional rules.  
 Part III therefore tests the explanatory power of the argument of the dissertation 
by going beyond the cases of Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire. Chapter Eight considers the 
cases of Casamance15 and Cameroon. Chapter Nine offers a conclusion of the findings 
of the research project and implications for future studies. The empirical material 
presented in this dissertation shows that there is a need to consider not just state- level 
variables but also counterparts at the societal-level. This is particularly true of African 
societies and developing countries more generally, where the rules of the game that 
guide political behavior are often not formally established but rather, people’s 
expectations and incentives are largely influenced by informal institutional rules.   
                                                 
15The Casamance is located in the southern regions of Senegal. The territory is literally separated from 
the rest of Senegal by another country—the Gambia. While part of Senegal, for the purposes of this 
dissertation Casamance is treated as a single case.  Besides being geographically separated from Senegal 
north of the Gambia, the region has had spells of ethnic related violence and experienced outright ethnic 
conflict since the early 1980s. Treating the Casamance as a single case should provide insights into the 
conditions under which ethnicity becomes politicized.  As a regional case, the Casamance is also a good 
test-case for the argument the dissertation advances.    
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Defining the Concepts 
 The politicization of ethnicity occurs when ethnic differences (identities, 
language, origin, and religion), tensions or conflicts are brought into the political arena,   
thereby creating a domestic political context where ethnicity is the only politically 
relevant identity.  Ethnicity becomes the central focus of political debates and the 
primary subject of “political discourse.”  Political policies, platforms and campaigns are 
no longer staged at the level of the nation-state, but based more on ethnic pluralism.  
Scholars such as Boubacar N’Diaye claim that by injecting the poisonous concept of 
Ivoirité into the Ivoirian political discourse, Bedié awakened the demons of xenophobia, 
regionalism, tribalism and religion intolerance, which played a significant role in the 
demise of democracy in Côte d’Ivoire (2001:106).    
The salience of ethnicity refers to the extent to which political competition is 
affected by ethnically related differences (language, religion or origin). That is, the 
extent to which party alignment, political cleavages, political campaigns and the 
political policies are influenced by ethnic differences.  And, political elites refer those 
who regularly and substantively affect national political outcomes. They include high- 
ranking government officials, legislatures, opposition party leaders and active officials. 
Nancy Bermeo (1992) points out that the stability of a political system depends greatly 
on the actions and decisions of political elites in power or who hold top-level positions. 
Non-elites include all of the actors involved in establishing the functioning of informal 
institutions.  
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CHAPTER TWO  
 
 
 
 
Ethnicity, Ethnic Politics and Ethnic Conflict  
 
 
Introduction 
 
 This dissertation is interested in variations in ethnic politicization and seeks to 
account for when and why ethnic affiliations become the axis of political competition 
and conflict. This chapter focuses on how earlier analysts have accounted for or 
explained such variations: How have these differences been explained? Why does 
ethnicity become politicized in some contexts and countries but not others?  From 
existing studies it is possible to distill explanations for politicization from three major 
areas: ethnicity and democratization, ethnicity and ethnic conflict and the role of 
political elites.   
 
Ethnicity and Democratization 
The reigning presumption within the democratization literature is that ethnic 
diversity is a major source of conflict and is directly related to political instability and 
conflict in sub-Saharan Africa. Perhaps the most influential claim and the main message 
of Donald L. Horowitz’s book on ethnic conflict, is that “ethnically plural societies face 
a host of pathologies that render them especially prone to conflict and democratic 
instability.”16   Presumably, ethnic divisions threaten the survival of democratic 
                                                 
16
 See Horowitz (1985).   
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institutions. They encourage clientilism17 and neo-patrimonialism, which have adverse 
effects on the judiciary, the election process and political parties. For instance, Kanchan 
Chandra (2005) argues that ethnic outbidding18 is one of the chief mechanisms linking 
ethnic divisions to political instability in the region. Ethnic divisions inevitably give rise 
to one or more ethnic parties which, in turn, infect the rest of the party system and 
create a “spiral of extreme ethnic bids that destroy competitive politics altogether.”19   
Similarly, Horowitz (1985) explains that when elections are held in ethnically 
heterogeneous societies, the numerically larger group tends to win. To maintain a hold 
on power, the winners extract state resources for their own ethnic group to the exclusion 
of other groups and facing prospects of permanent exclusion, the loser will have no 
reason to continue the electoral game and will be more likely to seek non-democratic 
means of gaining political power. While this does not automatically lead to political 
instability, it makes the chances of successful democratization efforts and democratic 
survival slim.  
While ample evidence is provided by cases such Rwanda, Sudan, Côte d’Ivoire 
and Nigeria, the claim that ethnic composition has an inherent impact on the odds of 
political stability has not gone unchallenged.   Youssouf Diallo (2005), for instance, 
                                                 
17
 There different variations of clientilism,but they all involve a mutually beneficial exchange between 
a patron and clients. The central idea that political power would come from direct, personal exchanges. 
According to Lindberg, “patron-client relations are primarily about providing material resources in 
exchange for personal loyalty” (Lindberg 2003: 123-4). 
18
 Outbidding occurs when two or more parties compete for the same ethnic group by using increasingly 
extreme ethnic appeals.  Essentially, moderate parties are vulnerable to accusations that they have 
sacrificed the group’s interests if they fail to pursue maximal policies on divisive inter-ethnic issues, like 
distribution of patronage resources, jobs, national language policies, and so forth.  As parties compete for 
an ethnic group, they take increasingly extreme positions in order to present themselves as the true 
defenders of the group’s interests.  This undermines moderation and increases inter-group tensions. See 
Horowitz (1985:356-357). 
19
  See Chandra. (2005:235). 
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asserts that ethnic diversity is not necessarily a source of instability.20 Similarly, 
Gagnon states that “ethnicity …in and of itself does not determine policies.”21 What 
matters is whether ethnicity becomes politicized. In essence, it is not ethnic diversity 
per se, but rather the politicization of it that matters for political outcomes.”22 
Politicization exacerbates existing ethnic tensions, sharpens divisions, creates a cycle of 
violence among various ethnic communities, and ultimately undermines political 
stability.  But, under what conditions does ethnicity become politicized?  
Institutional theories suggest that the institutional configuration of democracy 
matters.  Institutionalists argue that not only do institutions shape leadership and 
popular choices, but also, democracy is more likely to survive if political institutions are 
crafted in such a way as to avoid the obvious pitfalls of competitive, electoral politics. 
Di Palma (1990) points to an important interplay of institutions and agency in his work 
on democratic survival and stability.  Others, such as Arend Lijphart, have examined the 
political management of cultural cleavages through institutional engineering (1977) and 
the effect of institutional design on the quality and success of policy outcomes (1999). 
  In his examination of the relationship between institutions and ethnic politics in 
Africa, Posner (2005) found that institutional design affects the selection of cleavages 
for the purpose of political mobilization.23 Still others have engaged in more narrow 
debates about the impact of parliamentary and presidentialism on ethnic cleavage (Linz 
1978, 1990, Valenzuela 1992, Shurgart and Carey 1992, Stepan and Skach 1993, 
Mainwaring 1993, Kenney 2004)  
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 See Diallo (2005:10-12).  
21Gagnon (1995:166).  
22
 See Posner (2005); Gagnon (1995).  
23
 See Posner (2005). 
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Lijphart’s theory of consociations or consensus democracy is particularly 
relevant here. This theory suggests that by facilitating cooperation and compromise 
among political leaders and maximizing the winners, consociational systems allow 
separate groups to co-exist peacefully despite deep ethnic divisions.  Consociational 
theories also suggest that proportional, rather than majoritarian electoral systems are 
more likely to facilitate accommodation between diverse ethnic groups, making them 
more likely to remain stable.  Majoritarian systems tend to exclude smaller parties from 
securing a place in the legislature, thereby perpetuating the logic of ethnic exclusion and 
paving the grounds for ethnic conflicts.   Majoritarian systems are also believed to 
encourage political polarization. The connection between polarization and the 
breakdown of democracy is made most explicit in the article: “Polarization, 
Fragmentation and Competition in Western Democracies” by Giancomo Sani and 
Giovanni Sartori (1983).24 These authors argue that countries with deep social cleavages 
are more prone to political instability or democratic breakdown than those with low or 
cross-cutting cleavages.  
One of the primary assumptions in the literature on polarization is that ordinary 
citizens are responsible for democratic breakdowns, as individuals are more attracted to 
extremist movements than to moderate and democratic ones.25  In his seminal essay on 
the breakdown of democratic regimes, Linz wrote: The fall of the …system is usually 
the result of a shift in loyalty by citizens of weak commitment, by the apolitical, as a 
result of a crisis of legitimacy, efficacy and effectiveness. If these citizens have not 
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 Sani, G. and Sartori, G. (1983:337).   
25
 See Lipset (1969). 
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shifted their allegiance, the previous rules would have been able to resist change.”26    
Challenging this view however, Bermeo asserts that, “[i]f we look beyond the 
relatively well-known cases of Italy and Germany to the whole set of ill-fated interwar 
democracies…[w]e learn that popular support for unambiguous anti-democratic parties 
varied greatly within the democracies that collapsed, and that citizenry played a much 
more peripheral role in the dismantling of democracy than the Fascist cases would lead 
us to believe.”27  The blame, Bermeo insists, lay, if not wholly, then at least partially 
with political elites.  According to Bermeo, with few exceptions, the interwar regimes 
broke down either because political elites deliberately chose to disassemble them, or 
because political elites inadvertently took actions that led to the regime’s demise.  
That an important relationship between elite choice and political outcomes exists 
has long been established.28 In a study of the Wiemar Republic almost three decades 
ago, Linz (1978) made the case that the decisions of the political leadership are 
especially critical for political stability and/or demise.  According to Linz, while the 
naming of Hitler as the chancellor had something to do with  the ordinary citizens, the 
fact that 76 percent supported the Weimar coalition at the outset of the republic in 1919 
leader suggests that the Nazis  lacked sufficient electoral support to assume power on 
their own.  Had it not been for the decisions of small reactionary elite who mistakenly 
saw the Nazis as a positive counterweight to the Left, democracy may have survived in 
Germany beyond 1932.  Linz (1978, 1994), and later Huntington (1991) and Bunce 
(2002) conclude that at the basic level, democracy cannot survive unless elites or state 
leaders see it as the only game in town. 
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 Linz (1978:44).  
27
 Bermeo (2003).  
28
 See Linz (1978), Stepan and Skach (1992), Huntington (1991), Bermeo (1992).  
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A number of studies have focused on the level or strength of elite commitment 
to democracy in newly democratizing countries. The idea is generally that instances of 
strong elite commitment to democracy are good indicators of success at 
democratization. The stronger the elite commitment to democracy, the more likely 
democratic stability will be achieved.29  While it is intuitively logical that the stronger 
elite commitment to democracy the better the chances of sustaining democratic stability, 
as Rustow (1976) and Nancy Bermeo (1992) point out, this is not necessarily the case. 
Both scholars argue that democracy may be pursued, in spite of a lack of, or in the 
presence of, weak commitment to democracy. According to Bermeo, “elites may come 
to tolerate and advocate liberal democracy, not because they come to see intrinsic value, 
but because they come to believe that the alternatives are even less desirable.”30    
 Similarly, Dankwart Rustow states that, democracies can be built by people 
who are not truly democrats. Circumstances may force, trick, lure or cajole non-
democrats into democratic behavior. Circumstances can force political elites to change 
their beliefs about the merits of non-democratic forms of rule and support democracy as 
a lesser evil.31    According to Di Palma, a skillful craftsman can persuade entrenched 
regimes that their ultimate security lies with democracy by allaying the fears of 
competing groups, putting together pacts, or adopting a variety of strategies to promote 
democracy.  Furthermore, a strong hegemon can play an important role in persuading 
reluctant dictators to follow the democratic path.32 
                                                 
29
 There are number of studies that are based on barometric measures of elite commitment to democracy 
throughout Africa which is often used to determine, explain or indicate potential for democratic stability. 
See for example, Afro Barometer: http://www.afrobarometer.org/abseries.htm,. Also, see  Hennie Kotze 
and Carly Steyn (2004)  
30
 See Bermeo (1992). 
31Rustow (1976) cited in Bermeo (1992).   
32
 See Di Palma (1990).   
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Notably, none of these arguments undermines Linz’s statement that elites must, 
at the very least, see democracy as the best alternative. They do however raise important 
questions about the role of elites in the breakdown or persistence of democracy in 
particular countries. Within the sub-Saharan context, the pertinent question becomes 
what roles do elites play in determining political stability and political outcome?  More 
specifically, what factors influence and/or constrain the choices that elites make?   
An influential argument advanced by Karl and Schmitter (1991) is that 
historically-created structures have confining conditions that can “restrict (or in some 
cases enhance) the choices or range of options available to decision-makers…and can 
even pre-dispose them to choose a specific option.”33   This perspective has led to an 
impressively large literature on colonial legacy; its effects on political stability, 
democratic transitions and survival, especially in relation to elite choices. 
 Postulating that the institutional legacy available to successor regimes will 
favor the process in some countries more than others, Weiner (1987) points out that the 
British colonial model of democracy has been more successful than other colonial 
models in sustaining democratic institutions in newly independent countries.  According 
to Joireman (2001), this is so because British rule is more open to political participation 
or self-administration than French rule.  Presumably, once the institutional framework 
for democracy is established, it helps to create conditions for its own persistence.   
While scholars such as Steven Fish and Robin Brooks (2004) dispute the claim 
that colonial heritage has an effect on democracy’s prospects,34 Michael Bratton and 
Nicholas Van de Walle (1994) argue that the degree of competition and political 
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 Karl and Schmitter (1991: 274). 
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 See Fish & Brooks (2004).  
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participation allowed in pre-transition systems can in fact affect post-transition 
experiences. Marc Howard makes a similar claim for post-communist countries.35   
According to George Philip: “[t]he fact that regular and contested elections have 
changed the formal rules of the game has not always prevented pre-democratic means 
of organizing power from putting on “alternate shows in town…[p]re-democratic modes 
of political behavior can survive democratization.”36  
While the literature in general points to a number of variables37 that might help 
to explain cross-country and cross-regional variations in political outcomes in sub-
Saharan Africa,  systematic comparison of all sub-Saharan countries across a number of 
criteria, prior to and since transition, as suggested by theories of political and 
democratic stability is entirely beyond the scope of this project. Rather, the study will 
focus exclusively on ethnicity.  Specifically, under what conditions is ethnicity likely to 
be politicized?   
   
The State of the Literature on Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflict 
 The salience of ethnicity in politics is largely attributed to primordial (Horowitz, 
1985; Conner, 1972) and biological (Van den Bergh, 1981) differences. The assumption 
is that the basis of electoral choices is symbolic or emotive. Horowitz (1985) argues for 
instance, that ethnic groups have particularly strong emotional and symbolic appeals 
that inspire their political actions.  According to Easterly and Levine (1997), “higher 
levels of ethnic diversity encourage poor policies, poor education, political instability, 
inadequate infrastructure, and other factors associated with slow growth” (1997, p. 
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 See Marc Howard (2003).  
36
 George Philip (2003: 14). 
37For example economic development and performance. See Przeworski et al (2000).  
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1205).   Conversely, Sambanis (2001) points out that, primordial identities such as 
religion, ethnicity and language are present even when a group is not politically active. 
Since ethnicity is not static, as not only can ethnic identities change over time, but also, 
individuals tend to have multiple identities:38 under what conditions does a particular 
ethnic identity become more politically salient than others?    
   Operating on the assumption that ethnic groups and identities do not become 
politically salient unless triggered, Robert Bates (1974) developed and advanced a 
“materialist” approach to the question.   According to Bates, the answer lies with the 
usefulness of ethnic divisions for extraction of resources. As he explains it, ethnic 
differences create ready-made axes of political competition. “[I]n competition for power 
and benefits of modernity and the prestige it confers, politicians will stimulate the 
formation of competitively aligned ethnic groups.”  Bates wrote:  
Ethnic groups persist largely because of their capacity to extract goods and 
services from the modern sector and thereby satisfy the demands of their 
members for the components of modernity. Insofar as they provide these 
benefits to their members, they are able to gain their support and achieve 
their loyalty. 39 
 
The idea depicted here is that in a quid pro quo relationship between voters and political 
elites, loyalty and electoral support along ethnic lines are traded for the promise of 
material gains. 
 Both Posner (2005) and Chandra (2005) espouse this view.  Posner (2005) 
asserts that ethnicity is crucial for the distribution of patronage as ethnic affiliation 
provides credible information about what groups stand to benefit, if a given party or 
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 For example; Black, English speaking, Christian and Jamaican. 
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  See Bates (1974:471).  
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candidate wins the election.40 Chandra (2005) makes a similar claim with regard to 
ethnic cues acting as information shortcuts about who will benefit from a given 
politician’s policies. According to Chandra, the perception among most multi-ethnic 
sub-Saharan African societies is that having a political representative from one’s own 
ethnic group will yield greater benefits in terms of public goods and other material 
gains. As such, Chandra posits, voters in ethnically diverse societies tend to favor 
politicians of the same ethnicity.  
 A somewhat implicit presumption is that ethnicity is politically salient because 
it is a viable mobilization tool. As readymade axes of political competition, ethnic 
groups can be effectively mobilized to support a particular party or individual candidate 
on the promise of providing material benefits.   This assumption is very popular among 
contemporary works.  The problem with this perspective however, is that it bears 
distinct elements of determinism. The assumption that voters will only trust their co-
ethnic groups to deliver material benefits creates a sense of inevitability that is highly 
misleading.   
Political analyses indicate that there are countries, such as Senegal and Benin, in 
which ethnicity is not a prominent feature in the political arena and access to political 
and economic benefits does not depend on ethnicity, despite the presence of highly 
mobilizable ethnic cleavages (Galvan 2001; N’Diaye 2001).  In his analysis of public 
goods provision in Tanzania and Kenya, Edward Miguel (2004) observed that while 
ethnically heterogeneous areas in Kenya provided fewer public goods to their 
inhabitants than homogenous areas, this is not true of neighboring Tanzania.  Similarly, 
Pippa Norris and Robert Mattes (2003) find that while ethnicity is an important 
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 Posner (2005:, 104). 
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predictor of party support in countries such as Zambia and Malawi, no such effect was 
found in Mali or Tanzania.41  Moreover, Rene Lamarchand (1972) pointed out more 
than three decades ago, that there is no reason to expect that political use of ethnicity 
and patronage have to go hand in hand. Conversely, patronage networks can be created 
along economic positions or interests rather than ethnic affiliations.  Posner notes for 
instance that even in multiethnic societies patronage might run along class lines rather 
than ethnic affiliations.42  According to Lemachand, patronage ties can also create 
competing loyalties, which could undermine ethnic identities.43  Englebert (2000: 67) 
supports this argument and points out, “African politicians usually do not simply favor 
their own ethnic group but build networks of support and alliances across ethnic, 
regional …or other cleavages,” which is often the case when they want to win elections.  
Although these authors indicate that ethnic difference does not necessarily 
become the political axis in all cases, and that mobilization can occur along lines 
besides ethnic affiliation in ethnically diverse societies, little has been done to explain 
the disparity across cases.  Also, while most scholars seem to agree that political elites 
play a critical role in whether or not ethnicity becomes politically salient, the question 
of the conditions under which political elites choose to politicize ethnicity and 
conversely, the factors that constrain such tendencies is never quite addressed. Given 
that political elites44 are the primary decision makers and policy engineers, the issue 
seems to be as much about elite behavior as it is about the role ethnicity in sub-Saharan 
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 Case study analyses consistent with these findings include: Deborah Kaspin (1995) for Malawi, Dennis 
Dresang (1974) for Zambia, Daniel Posner (2003, 2005), for Tanzania see Goran Hyden (1992). 
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 Posner (2005), points to cases such as the Tanzania where it is impossible for any politician to make a 
career by appealing to ethnic identities.   
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 Lemarchand  (1972).  
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 By which I mean high-ranking state officials, opposition and party leaders, and members of parliament.   
32 
 
Africa.  Indeed, as  Gagnon (1995) states, although “ethnic[ity] is founded upon 
historical and cultural realities; [ethnic] identities do not become politically salient 
unless they are triggered, often by elites who seek to use these identities in order to gain 
political power.” 45    
 
Conclusion 
 Two key points emerge from the above discussion of the literature: (a) 
institutions matter; and (b) political elites play a crucial role in the politicization of 
ethnicity and ethnic conflict. Incentives generated by institutional rules influence the 
decisions and choices that political elites will make in terms of using ethnic identity as a 
mobilizational tool.   Much of the scholarship is, however, focused on formal (often 
state-level) institutions. Little consideration is given to informal societal-level 
institutions such as religious brotherhoods, home-town associations and voluntary 
associations, particularly as their interaction with the forms and outcomes of ethnic 
mobilization. This gap has significant implications for our understanding of the 
conditions under which ethnicity become politicized and institutional analyses on sub-
Saharan Africa.   
 Indeed, scholars such as Joel Migdal (1988) , Michael Bratton and  Nicholas 
Van de Walle (1994) among others,  point out that as in many parts of the developing 
world, the  real rules governing the political rules of the game in sub-Saharan Africa are 
often not those that are formally established and/or codified.  Rather, they are governed 
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by unwritten, informal institutional rules.46 Research focusing on formal institutions 
may miss many of the underlying incentives and constraints on political behavior.   
 Rather than focus primarily on the role of formal institutions such as electoral 
rules and colonial administrative institutions and policies, therefore, the dissertation has 
sought to incorporate informal institutions into existing institutional analytical 
frameworks.  This accomplishes two things. First, it broadens the theories and tenets 
generated by institutionalism. Second, it identities key factors in the story of ethnic 
politicization and ethnic conflict that have remained largely unexplored and 
unaddressed in extant literature.   
While this dissertation considers the role and importance of colonial institutional 
legacies, therefore, it focuses less on the relationship between formal colonial political 
institutions and more closely on the emergence and persistence of societal-level 
informal institutions out of the colonial experience and interaction between these 
informal institution and forms of ethnic mobilization.  In doing so, the dissertation finds 
that shifts in informal institutional rules may change the political salience of ethnic 
identity (for example, from low or dormant and contained to dominating the national 
discourse), thereby altering incentives for political elites to use ethnic identity as a 
primary mobilizational tool. Arguably, this is a significant contribution to recent 
theoretical advances within institutionalism.  The implications of these findings extend 
far beyond institutional analyses on sub-Saharan Africa; they are applicable to studies 
on the developing world more generally.  
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 This is often true of political rules regarding the salience and use of ethnic identity as a mobilizational 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
 
Methodology 
 
 
Introduction 
 
While the theoretical literature on ethnic conflict and ethnic politics suggests 
that ethnic politicization is the norm in sub-Saharan African countries, empirical 
evidence suggests otherwise. Instances of ethnic politicization are more varied than 
generally depicted in the current scholarship, particularly ethnic politics in Africa.  One 
of the main reasons for this overgeneralization is that scholars typically investigate 
cases where an outcome is known to have occurred.  Another reason is that these studies 
tend to focus on a particular country.  Although Collier et al. (2004: 87) note that such 
research strategies provide “a better opportunity to gain detailed knowledge of the 
phenomenon under investigation,” they also help to paint a picture that is often 
misleading and unrepresentative.   
 Indeed, while recent work on the outbreak of ethnic conflict in Côte d’Ivoire 
reinforces the notion of widespread ethnic politicization throughout sub-Saharan Africa, 
a survey of the continent indicates that there are many countries where ethnic identity is 
not politicized or politically salient. In countries such as Senegal, Tanzania, Benin, Mali 
and Cameroon for example, ethnicity is not a prominent feature in the political arena. 
Indeed, despite the presence of highly mobilizable ethnic cleavages in these countries, 
access to political and economic benefits is not determined by ethnic affiliation (Galvan 
2001, N’Diaye 2001).  In his analysis of public goods provision in Tanzania and Kenya, 
Miguel (2004) observed that while ethnically heterogeneous areas in Kenya provided 
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fewer public goods to their inhabitants than homogenous areas, this is not true of 
neighboring Tanzania.  Similarly, while Norris and Mattes (2003) found that ethnicity is 
an important predictor of party support in countries such as Zambia and Malawi, they 
found no such effect in Mali or Tanzania.47  
One of the most glaring realities of politics in Senegal observed during my visit 
at the height of the presidential electoral campaign in 2007 was the relatively low levels 
of political salience of ethnic identity. Campaign appeals almost never evoke any real 
sense of ethnic or party loyalty. My interviews with political party representatives and 
other Senegalese clearly revealed a lack of tension or conflict among the various ethnic 
groups. While there are important splits on many fundamental issues, such as religion 
and language, disagreements have rarely resulted in ethnic violence in Senegal.  
The various ethnic groups in Senegal thoroughly coexist and interact. My 
overwhelming impression was that while on a day-to-day basis ethnic stereotyping was 
widespread, and, in fact, a large proportion the conversations among Senegalese 
reference qualities and defects attributed to individuals on the basis of his or her ethnic 
origin, such practices were not readily observable at the official level. Rather, at the 
official level, ethnic identity is rarely considered for official appointments, job 
placements and/or promotions. Ministers, civil servants and clerks are appointed 
without regard to their ethnic affiliation. Since 1960 for example, elected members of 
government have been ethnically diverse. My interviews with political party 
representatives and other Senegalese also revealed a lack of ethnic based constituents. 
The lack of any formal party base or official constituents was particularly striking.  
                                                 
47
 Case study analyses consistent with these findings include: Deborah Kaspin (1995) for Malawi, Dennis 
Dresang (1974) for Zambia, Daniel Posner (2003, 2005), for Tanzania see Goran Hyden (1992). 
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Individual parties distributed political flyers pin-pointing their respective political 
agendas and platforms, however, campaign appeals almost never evoked any real sense 
of ethnic or party loyalty. In fact, I left Senegal with the distinct impression that 
ethnicity played a minor role (if any at all) in Senegalese politics.  
My more extensive field research in Senegal from July 2007—January 2008 
provided other important insights. First, the assumption that patronage and the political 
use of ethnicity go hand in hand is significantly flawed. Patronage networks can, in fact, 
be created along economic lines and might run along class lines rather than ethnic 
identity. 48  Also, patronage ties can create competing loyalties which could undermine 
rather than accentuate ethnic identities.49   
An important implication of these empirical observations concerns 
methodology, in particular, the conventional treatment of cases such as Senegal and 
Tanzania as deviant cases, outliers and anomalies.  Empirical evidence of non-
politicization in sub-Saharan African countries other than Senegal and Tanzania raises 
question about the oft-cited methodological justifications50 for their exclusion from 
conventional comparative analyses. Evidence of variation in ethnic politicization among 
sub-Saharan African countries suggests that a significant question needs to be 
addressed: What accounts for the variation in the political salience of ethnicity and 
ethnic politicization in sub-Saharan Africa? Why does ethnic politicization occur in 
some ethnically diverse societies but not others?   
                                                 
48
 It is fair to point out here that Rene Lemarchand (1972) made this point more than three decades ago- 
one of the few scholars to take this position at that time. In his recent works Posner has demonstrated that 
even in multiethnic societies, patronage ties may run along class lines and other non-ethnic cleavages.48  
49
 See Lemarchand (1972).  
50
 One of the chief cautions against methodological pitfalls is claiming too much from the study of 
deviant cases. Deviant cases are generally less helpful in advancing theory, particularly as their deviance 
may result from the combined effects of many weak variables or variables relevant only for the outlying 
case itself. 
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To address these questions, I used a comparative study of two countries similar 
in several important ways but vary in ethnic politicization. Following Robert Putman’s 
maxim that “the prudent social scientist, like the wise investor, must rely on 
diversification to magnify the strengths, and to offset the weaknesses, of any single 
instrument” (Putnam,1993:12), I drew from multiple data sources including interviews 
(elite and non-elite), newspaper publications detailing with legislative and presidential 
electoral campaigns (1965- 2008), archival and official legislative documents, survey 
data on public perceptions of the role of political elites and ethnic politics, government 
census (particularly data on ethnic compositions and standards of living) and; recorded 
and transcribed political speeches by political leaders and/or party officials.    
 The following pages outline the primary research strategies that I used for data 
collection and analysis in this dissertation.  I also discuss some of the methodological 
issues and obstacles encountered while conducting the field research.   
 
The Dependent Variable: Measures and Indicators 
 The dependent variable in this study is ethnic politicization. The politicization of 
ethnicity occurs when ethnic affiliation becomes one of the main the axes of political 
competition and conflict.  In other words, ethnicity becomes politicized when tensions 
or conflicts created by differences in identities, language, origin, and religion are 
brought then into the political arena, thereby creating a domestic political context where 
ethnicity is the most (if not the only) politically relevant factor.   Ethnicity becomes the 
central focus of political debates and the primary subject of political discourse. Political 
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policies, platforms and campaigns are no longer staged at the level of the nation-state, 
but based more on ethnic politics.        
 Since one of the objectives of this dissertation is to gauge the effects of 
institutions and changes in institutional rules on the politicization of ethnicity, it is 
imperative that any impact on the salience of ethnic identity (i.e., increase or decrease) 
is taken into account. This is not to say that political salience is being used as a proxy 
for ethnic politicization. While there is evidence of this practice in the current 
scholarship on ethnic politics and ethnic conflict, empirical evidence indicates that this 
is not necessarily the case. For example, while political support has been largely based 
on ethnic affiliation in Côte d’Ivoire, the political salience of ethnic identity remained at 
relatively low-levels for a relatively long period of time-from 1960-1993.   
 The assumption here is that shift in the salience of ethnic identity alters the 
likelihood that political actors will use ethnic identity as a mobilizational tool. If 
increase in the salience of ethnicity occurs we would expect political elites to make 
ethnic appeals so as to maximize their voter appeal.  There is little consensus as to 
when ethnic divisions are politically salient. According to Horowitz, “where parties 
divide exclusively along left-right lines or along non-ideological lines determine by 
patronage patterns, that is an excellent identification that ethnic divisions are not 
salient” (Horowitz, 1985:303). The empirical evidence indicates that this is not 
necessarily so. For instance in Côte d’Ivoire, parties organised along the left-right 
spectrum so as to maximize their voter appeal, with ethnicity being a salient political 
issue.   
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For the purposes of this research project therefore, the salience of ethnicity in 
electoral politics is measured in several ways, including the existence of ethnic parties, 
political discourse and ethnic voting. Horowitz suggests that ethnically based parties are 
those that “derive their support from an identifiable ethnic group (or groups) and serve 
the interests of that group.”51 As such, this study considers whether political parties rely 
disproportionately on electoral support from a particular ethnic group.  Additionally, I 
examined political campaign literature including newspaper reports on political rallies, 
party manifestos, electoral posters, flyers, party memos, agendas, directives, party 
rhetoric and speeches, for evidence of public appeals to ethnic identity.  I focused on 
both the legislative and the presidential electoral cycles from 1960-2008.   
 I also examined analyses of campaign messages in the local media, which 
provided a window into the messages that parties provide to voters.  As Chandra (2005) 
notes for instance, discourse analysis of campaign, rather than the content of their 
manifesto in election campaigns, may lead to the inclusion of parties that (based on 
their party manifesto and interview responses) may otherwise be excluded from this 
category. If parties were deriving their support from a specific ethnic group, this should 
be reflected in the political discourse. If however, a party is making implicit ethnic 
appeals, this should be indicated by the nature of its support base.52      
 
 
 
                                                 
51
 Horowitz (1985:291). 
52
 Chandra (2005) 
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Case Selection Criteria 
The African continent represents a vast area of the globe and consists of fifty-
four countries. 53 These countries are remarkably diverse on a number of indicators 
including language, culture, economic development, political institutions, political 
economy, and history (ancient and modern).  To minimize the number of cases I follow 
the most common trend of focusing on a particular region54 and eliminating countries of 
vastly different histories. Specifically, I have chosen countries that: are ethnically 
diverse, were governed by the same colonial ruler, similar electoral systems, have 
experienced transitions from single-party to multi-party rule in the last 30 years, have a 
similar ethno-regional divide, have about the same standard of living and have had 
different experiences with ethnic politicization.  Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire fit these 
criteria (see Table I).  
Among the possible cases,55 the Senegal-Côte d’Ivoire dyad presents an 
interesting opportunity to conduct a comparative study explaining the cross-country 
variation in the politicization of ethnicity in sub-Saharan Africa. Both countries are 
former colonies of France.  Both countries have been independent since 1960, and 
although (unlike Côte d’Ivoire) Senegal experienced multiparty rule prior to 1990, the 
two countries adopted the semi-presidential system of government (modeled after the 
French) at independence.  Both countries also became single-party post-colonial 
governments soon after declaring independence in 1960 and both rely on a primary 
agricultural export economy. 
                                                 
53
 Africa is about three times the size of continental United States of America.  
54
 This is one of the most frequently used categorizations upon which analyses and discussions are based. 
Scholars tend to focus on or develop their expertise on regional politics: West Africa, East Africa, 
Southern Africa and Central Africa.   
55
 All sub-Saharan African countries, that is.  
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Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire also shared a number of social, historical, political 
and demographic features. Both countries, for instance, ranked in the low-to-medium 
categories on human development indicators during the 1990s early 2000s.56 The cases 
are even more similar on other, more significant social indicators of development. The 
life expectancy at birth is 56.6 years in Senegal and 55.5 years in Côte d’Ivoire.  The 
population in each country grew at a rate of 2.5 percent in Côte d’Ivoire and 2.5 percent 
in Senegal between 1990 and 2004.  Urbanization grew at a rate of 5 percent and 3 
percent respectively over the same period and the rate of adult literacy, which has a 
bearing on political participation and efficacy, is 51 percent in Côte d’Ivoire and 57.9 
percent in Senegal. 57    
TABLE I 
Summary of the Similarities of West African nations Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire 
 
 
Senegal Côte d’Ivoire 
 
Colonial History Ruled by the French  Ruled by the French 
Recent  
Political History 
Established single-party government 
immediately after independence 
Established single-party government 
immediately after independence 
 
Electoral System Semi-Presidential: French model Semi-Presidential: French model 
Democratic 
Transitions 1982-2000 1990- 1999 
 
Location West Africa West Africa 
 
Ethnic Diversity Yes Yes 
 
Economy GNP/capita:  $520 (1998) GNP/capita: $700 (1998) 
 
Life Expectancy  56.6 years (1990) 55.45 years (1990) 
Ethnic 
Politicization No Yes 
Sources: Europa World Yearbook, CIA World Factbook and World Health Statistics 
The two countries exhibit several overt characteristics some of which are 
divergent, but do not impact the study (see Table II). First, each country has a relatively 
                                                 
56
 World Bank reports (2005).  
57
 See CIA Factbook (2008) 
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large Muslim population. While Senegal has a more significant Muslim/Christian ratio 
than Côte d’Ivoire, in both cases the Muslim population tends to be regionally separated 
from the Christian population. In fact, the cases share an important ethno-regional 
characteristic—each country has a relatively large Muslim/north, Christian/south divide.  
The countries also differ in overall size and population. 
 
TABLE II 
Summary of characteristics of Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire 
 
 
Senegal 
 
Côte d’Ivoire 
 
Population Population of  12 million Population of 17 million 
 
Size  322,460 square kilometers58 196,190 square kilometers 59 
Ethnic 
Composition   
12 ethnic groups (generally 
classified into 5 principal groups) 
 
60 ethnic groups (generally classified into 5 
principal groups) 
Religion  
 
94 percent Muslim; 5 percent 
Christian ; under 1 percent animist  
40 percent Muslim; 30 percent Christian; 30 
percent animist 
Ethno-religious 
divide  Muslim/North; Christian south  Muslim/north ; Christian/south  
Sources: Institut Nationale de la Statistique du Sénégal,  CIA Factbook, Sénégal,  Les Ethnie et 
La Nation and Europa World Yearbook 
 
 Second, Côte d’Ivoire has a significantly larger number of ethnic groups than 
Senegal but when classified, each country has an approximate 5 principal divisions (see 
Table III).  The largest ethnic group in Côte d’Ivoire is the Akan ethnic group, which 
constitutes 42.1 percent of the total population. The second largest group is the Gur, 
which makes up 17.6 percent of the population while the northern Mandé are 16.5 
percent and the southern Mandé are about 10 percent of the country’ total population.  
The others (about 5 million or 2.8 percent of the total population) are non-Ivoirian 
                                                 
58
  Comparatively, Côte d’Ivoire is nearly the same size as New Mexico.  
59
  Comparatively, Senegal is slightly smaller than South Dakota.  
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Africans; a third of these are immigrants from Burkina Faso, and the rest from Ghana, 
Guinea Conakry, Mali, Nigeria, Benin, Senegal, Liberia and Mauritania.60 In Senegal, 
the largest group, the Wolof, make up 43 percent of the population. The Peul and 
Tukuleur constitute 23 percent, the Serer 14 percent, the Diola 5.5 percent and the 
Manding under 5 percent61.    
TABLE III 
Ethnic Groups in Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire 
 
Country/ 
Ethnic Group 
 
 
 
Number (X 1000) 
 
 
Percentage 
 
Senegal 
    Wolof 
    Sereer 
     Peul 
     Manding 
     Diola 
     Other 
 
12, 000 
5,196 
1,764 
2,856 
600 
660 
924 
 
 
43.3 
14.7 
23.8 
5 
5.5 
7.7 
 
Côte d’Ivoire  
Akan  
Gur 
N. Mandé 
S. Mandé 
Krou 
Other 
 
 
 
17,000 
7,157 
2,992 
2,805 
1,870 
510 
 
 
 
42.1 
17.6 
16.5 
10 
11 
3 
Sources: Institute Nationale de la Statistique du Sénégal, CIA Factbook, Côte d’Ivoire 
 
The cases of Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire 
The sharp changes in ethnic politicization over time in Côte d’Ivoire made it a 
particularly valuable case for this study.  Prior to the 1990s, Côte d’Ivoire was 
renowned for its economic prosperity and political stability.  Scholars and analysts 
frequently referred to Côte d’Ivoire as the “beacon of political stability and economic 
                                                 
60
 Institut Nationale de la Statistique, Abidjan, 1998.  
61
 The Senegalese National Institute of Statistics, Dakar.  
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prosperity” in Africa; it was one of the few sub-Saharan African countries that had 
seemingly successfully avoided succumbing to the trap of ethnic politics (Le Vine, 
2004).  How can a country that many proclaimed a model of political stability and 
development in sub-Saharan Africa suddenly become enthralled in ethnic politics?  
In the context of a single case analysis, Côte d’Ivoire greatly informs the 
question of how ethnicity becomes politicized in heterogeneous countries over time.  
However, the recent outbreaks of civil war and political instability in Côte d’Ivoire also 
allows for an empirical analysis of the whether there is indeed a strong relationship 
between ethnic diversity and conflict in the West Africa as many scholars purport.  
While instances of ethnic politicization in countries such as Liberia, Sierra Leone and 
Guinea-Bissau suggest that the answer is a firm yes, a closer survey of the region 
reveals that contrary to the dominant view in recent political science discourse, the 
political salience of ethnic identity has remained relatively low in a number of West 
African countries, including Senegal, Mali, Cameroon and Burkina Faso.   
The variation in the political salience of ethnicity among the countries begs for 
explanation. Why does ethnic politicization occur in some ethnically diverse societies 
but not in others?  Why have Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire had such different experiences 
regarding the ethnic politicization despite having so many structural and historical 
similarities?  Suggestions from the existing literature on ethnicity, ethnic politics and 
ethnic conflict include factors such as colonial experience as an independent variable. 
The common assumption is that countries with the same colonial rulers also have 
similar institutional legacies and therefore, should have similar post-colonial 
trajectories. As former colonies of France with differing experiences with ethnic 
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politicization, the cases of Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire suggest that the issue is not that 
simple.    
 A comparative analysis of these two countries makes it possible to move the 
colonial legacy argument beyond the British/ French or direct/indirect rule dichotomy 
that characterizes much of the historical institutionalist approach to the question.  This 
in turn allows us to more precisely isolate the conditions under which ethnicity is likely 
to become politicized. The dissertation shows, for example, that the historical and 
political processes of state building experienced on the ground in Senegal and Côte 
d’Ivoire were vastly different despite having the same colonial ruler. These differences 
profoundly shaped the types societal institutions that developed in each country. The 
rules established by these societal institutions have had a profound effect on the salience 
of ethnic identity in each country.  
A comparative analysis of these societal institutions (institutions of social 
integration) also allows us to assess existing theoretical arguments in the scholarship. 
Besides the colonial legacy argument, I specifically address the prominent claim that 
ethnic politicization results from shifts in formal institutions, particularly from single-
party to multiparty rule. Using process tracing and comparative case study analyses, I 
examined the effects of the formal institutional change on ethnic politicization in each 
country and checked the findings against the predicted outcomes advanced in literature. 
The study indicates that shifts in formal institutional rules such as the transition from 
single-party to multiparty rule, do not necessarily result in ethnic politicization. 
Exclusive focus on formal institutions as explanatory variables, therefore, can be 
misleading.   
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Applied to cases such as Senegal and Cameroon, for example, the formal 
institutional argument would lead one to expect the transition to multiparty rule to result 
in ethnic politicization in these countries. To date, ethnic identity has not become a 
prominent feature, or the dominant axis of political competition, in either country. What 
these studies missed is that, in many cases, the institutional rules of the political game 
that drive public expectations, political calculations and the incentive to use ethnicity as 
a mobilizational tool, are the informal rather than the formal institutional rules.  
To the extent that the rules of the political game governing representation and 
access to government resources are determined by informal institutional rules, these 
rules are central to any explanation of ethnic politicization or the lack thereof. Change 
in these informal institutional rules may lead to shifts in the political salience of ethnic 
identity-from low or dormant and contained to dominating the national discourse- 
altering incentives for political elites to mobilize using ethnic identity as a primary 
mobilizational tool.  
Also, while the timing of the  politicization of ethnicity Côte d’Ivoire during the 
1990s at first seemed to reinforce the argument that there is a strong relationship 
between the shifts in formal institutions (from single-party to multiparty rule) and ethnic 
politicization, a closer examination reveals that ethnic politicization was due more to 
changes in the informal rules (including ethnic balancing and the agrarian policy that 
“the land belongs to whomever cultivates it”) governing access to political goods, 
representation and land and citizenship rights.  
 In sum, the cases in this dissertation have helped to generate an alternative 
explanation and argument for why ethnicity becomes politicized in some countries but 
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not others. Besides pointing to flaws with the dominant approaches, the cases point to 
alternative factors that explain how, and what kinds of institutional rules affect actors’ 
incentives to use ethnicity as a mobilizational tool.   
 
 
Importance of the research Question  
The question of the conditions under which ethnicity becomes politicized in 
multi-ethnic societies is significant for a number of reasons. First, there is a need to 
address the dominant assumption in current political science discourse that individuals 
will mobilize along ethnic lines wherever such identities exist.  The cases of Senegal, 
Cameroon, Tanzania, Mali, Burkina Faso and Benin offer empirical evidence that this 
assumption is fundamentally wrong.  While ethnic identity does feature prominently in 
the politics of some sub-Saharan African countries, it does not feature prominently in all 
of them.  Other than highlighting the important point that there is in fact variation in 
ethnic politicization in sub-Saharan Africa, research on why ethnicity becomes 
politicized in some countries but not in others can do a lot to expand our understanding 
of, and abilities to explain what triggers ethnic politicization, the conditions under 
which ethnic politicization becomes an attractive political option for elites and the 
factors that constrain the use of ethnicity as a political tool. Specifically, understanding 
the impact of political institutions (both formal and informal) on ethnic politicization in 
will be central to comprehending sub-Saharan Africa’s (and other regions’) prospects 
for political stability and development.  
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By uncovering the conditions under which ethnicity is likely to become 
politicized in multi-ethnic societies, the dissertation stands to make a significant 
contribution to the scholarship on ethnic politics and ethnic conflict. The research may 
also have practical implications for heterogeneous countries more generally.  Political 
analyses indicate that if not checked, conflicts can be contagious and can quickly spread 
throughout a region or, as in the case of sub-Saharan Africa, across regions; however, 
policy prescriptions for how to address the problem can hardly be effective unless 
scholars have a thorough grasp of the conditions that are conducive to the politicization 
of ethnicity by elites and/or the factors that constrain such practices. 
 
 
Research Design 
This dissertation is conducted largely as a qualitative study with particular 
attention to comparative case study analyses and process tracing. To examine the 
question: under what conditions does ethnicity become politicized in heterogeneous 
countries, I use a comparative study of two countries—Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire— 
alike in several important ways but different in the political salience of ethnic identity 
and ethnic politicization.  Building on earlier scholarship by Laitin (1986), Posner 
(2005) and others, that institutional rules do matter for the study of ethnic politics, I 
intend to examine whether, and to what extent, informal institutional rules matters for 
ethnic politicization.  
First, while the dominant trend in the political science scholarship is to focus 
almost exclusively on formal state-level institutions like Kohli (2004), I considered the 
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role and impact of societal-level institutions such as the Sufi Orders in Senegal and 
voluntary association in Côte d’Ivoire on the political salience of ethnic identity and 
ethnic politicization. To uncover the development of these institutions of social 
integration, I delved into the colonial history of each country.  I examined the 
interactive effects between the Sufi Orders (in the case of Senegal) and voluntary 
associations (in the case of Côte d’Ivoire) and the forms and outcomes of ethnic 
mobilization.  Specifically, I considered how the rules established by these societal-
level institutions shaped the political salience, and use of, ethnic identity as a 
mobilizational tool in each country.  
Next, I examined the argument that ethnic politicization may be explained by 
shifts in formal institutional rules, in particular, shifts from single-party to multi-party 
rule. I identified ethnically diverse countries in West Africa that have undergone 
transitions and assessed whether the transitions have indeed resulted the increased 
political salience of ethnic identity or ethnic politicization. My first point is that 
contrary to the dominant perspective in the recent politics science discourse, shifts in 
former institutional rules do not necessarily result in ethnic politicization. I hypothesize 
that non-politicization may be explained by the persistence of the institutions of social 
integration such as the Sufi Orders and by extension, their rules of ethnic transcendence. 
Despite changes to the formal institutional rules governing electoral competition, the 
political salience of ethnicity remained relatively low because the influence of the 
institutions of social integration persist, as do their rules of ethnic transcendence.  
To test this hypothesis, I examine, whether ethnic politicization was preceded by 
significant changes to the informal institutional rule in Côte d’Ivoire. Drawing on 
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Langer (2005), I checked for evidence of sharp changes to the practice of ethnic 
balancing among political representatives. 62 I also examine the agrarian policy of “the 
land belongs to whoever cultivates it.” The findings suggest that changes to informal 
institutional rules may have stronger explanatory power than shirts to formal 
institutional rules.  
  Another key requirement of this research project that made a qualitative 
approach desirable was the need to conduct field research. While quantitative 
approaches can be useful in providing information on research questions on ethnicity 
and ethnic politics, these data are most helpful when used to complement in-depth case 
studies.  For example, while Minority at Risk (MAR) data set classifies electoral 
activities on the basis of ethnic group identification, and classification of groups as 
electorally active or inactive supposedly is based on information that records electoral 
activity of the most widely supported organizations or political parties  representing 
groups interests within the state, not all such organizations  are recorded. Also, some 
information about electoral activity is coded as missing, which raises concerns about the 
frequency of over-reporting and/or under-reporting. These are significant concerns 
because electoral activity as an indicator may constitute serious impediment to making 
reliable causal inferences.  
The Afrobarometer also conducts survey research. However, in the case of Côte 
d’Ivoire in particular, such research data are unavailable. In some cases, the country was 
not among those selected for survey research due to political instability and safety 
concerns. About the only way to generate data therefore, was to conduct field research 
that allowed for the collection of documentary evidence, discourse analyses and direct 
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 Here I use a 
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observations. In-depth, open-ended interviews about the role of ethnicity in political 
affairs generally produce much more nuanced and full understanding than some 
quantitative analyses can produce. Direct observations of political rallies and candidate 
speeches greatly informed the analyses in this study.  
Another advantage to using a qualitative research design is that it allows for 
refinement of the data collection methods, indicators and analyses during field research. 
For instance, I was able to refine interview questions and data gathered in Côte d’Ivoire 
on the basis of the information and data generated in Senegal, the initial research site.  
Because of this flexibility, the data gathered are richer and emphasize many of the same 
independent variables. These have allowed for more systematic comparative analyses.   
 
 
Case studies  
Given the underlying objective of advancing understanding of, and more 
precisely identifying the conditions most conducive to the use ethnic appeals, the need 
to conduct case study research as a core aspect of this dissertation is distinct.  The case 
study approach has long been utilized as a primary research tool by anthropologists, 
sociologists and political scientists. Robert Yin defines the case study research method 
as an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life 
context (Yin, 1984:23). Specifying context, particularly within a comparative 
framework, requires detailed and in-depth analyses. Thus, where context matters case 
studies more so than the largely variable-concerned quantitative approaches, are a more 
suitable method.    
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Qualitative research is not without limitations and/or problems.  A chief concern 
for research that based on small-n studies and that is not based on random samples and 
statistical control is generalization. In general, the more cases a theoretical approach can 
explain the stronger its explanatory power. Some generalization of the finding of this 
research project is possible however. For example, we can generalize that informal 
institutions play a critical role in ethnic politicization.  Furthermore, insights derived 
from the in-depth case studies contributed to a better understanding of the conditions 
under which ethnicity become politicized in sub-Saharan Africa.   
Indeed, the case study approach provided a mode of inquiry for in-depth 
examination of events that enabled me to tap diverse data sources and employ multiple 
methods of data collection. The data collected for this dissertation span time,63space and 
individuals.  To ensure overall reliability and confidence in the findings and analysis of 
the dissertation, I also analyzed multiple data sources including newspaper publications 
detailing electoral campaigns (1960s- 2008), archival and official legislative documents 
and survey data on public perceptions of the role of political elites and ethnic politics.   
 Data and methodological triangulation also ensured that the analysis in the 
dissertation accurately depicts or reflects the realities on the ground in the countries 
examined.  I was also able to refine some of the interview questions and the data I 
gathered in Côte d’Ivoire on the basis of the document analyses and interview accounts 
I received at the initial research site—Senegal. I focused a lot more on gathering 
information on the role of religion in Côte d’Ivoire than I previously intended.  Also, I 
uncovered vast and rich formation on the historical development and political 
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 In fact, the dissertation covers three different time frames:  the late-colonial to early post-colonial 
periods (1930s to 1960), the post-independence era (1960-1990) and the democratic transition period 
(1990s - present).  
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importance of voluntary associations as redistributive intermediaries during the field 
research in Côte d’Ivoire.  Upon my return to Senegal, I expanded the research on the 
historical development and the redistributive role of the Sufi Orders.   
  
 
 
Data and Sources 
 
 Like most qualitative studies, this dissertation relies on data generated from 
interviews, survey data, observations and documents (including archival and official 
documents and newspapers).  Data for the dissertation were gathered in the course of 
eleven months of field research in Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire (July 2007-June 2008). 
Research was conducted for the most part, in the largest urban centers in each country- 
Dakar in the case of Senegal, and Abidjan in the case of Côte d’Ivoire.  These cities 
represent the commercial and administrative centers of each country. Political elites 
tend to reside or at least hold offices in these major cities, and are arguably more 
accessible for interviews.  These cities are also homes to the largest universities and 
access to public records and documents.  While some may view conducting research in 
Côte d’Ivoire as problematic given the state current civil war there, the conflict is 
largely confined to the northern regions of the country and posed few problems for data 
gathering. Abidjan is located in the southern region of the country and miles from the 
foci of the military action.   
The study relies on data from a wide host of primary and secondary sources. 
During the initial portions of each field work session, I focused mostly on documentary 
and archival sources. Other than my interviews, much of the primary sources came from 
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archival research conducted at the National Archives of the Republic of Senegal, in 
Dakar, and the Legislative Archives and the Documentation Center of the Chamber of 
Commerce in Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire. I relied on newspaper articles that offered 
coverage of legislative and presidential elections (1965-2008); government census 
(particularly data on ethnic compositions and standards of living) and; recorded and 
transcribed speeches by political leaders and/or party officials.  I also obtained some of 
the documentary pieces on political speeches and rallies in rural parts of the country 
from the film archives of the national television stations (the RTI in Côte d’Ivoire and 
the RSTI in Senegal).   
During the last three months of field work in each country, I focused primarily 
on conducting interviews. All interviews were semi-structured. This allowed for 
changes in the ordering of questions to reflect the flow of conversation and the 
introduction of new issues. Also, the questions were mostly open-ended, which 
generated a wealth of information and anecdotal stories that I probably would not have 
been privy had the interviews been structured differently.   
 I conducted a total of 92 interviews during the field research—47 in Dakar, 
Senegal and 45 in Côte d’Ivoire. The study population included political party leaders 
and /or top officials, professors at the local university and colleges, journalists of some 
of the major newspapers and other media sources, and students attending the major 
university and colleges. In addition to elite interviews, I conducted interviews with non-
elite citizens about the factors that inform their choice of political leader, the role of 
ethnicity in their choice of political leaders and the role of religion.  
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 Originally, the goal was to interview (random) non-elite citizens in ethnically 
diverse cities.  However, because of the recent political instabilities in Côte d’Ivoire64it 
was best to limit the study population to university and college students.   Doing so 
reduced the safety risks. Also, as I anticipated, the university students were more 
forthcoming and open about their views than the average citizen. Côte d’Ivoire has three 
autonomous universities, two of which are located in Abidjan: the University of Cocody 
and the University of Abobo-Adjame. An advanced Teacher Training College is also 
located in Abidjan. The study includes expert interviews with university professors, 
journalists and newspaper editors and lawyers.   
 To identify key themes for data coding, I analyzed the full transcript of each 
interview and made continuous comparison. This ensured equivalence in issue coverage 
and the approach to questioning.
 The dissertation is also based on an assessment of existing secondary sources of 
empirical data and literature on Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire. Sources for this study 
include studies on colonialism, colonial administration, electoral politics, 
democratization and political transitions.  I consulted studies by historians, sociologists, 
economists and political scientists throughout the course of the research project. Two 
secondary sources that included sections on the early history of the Côte d’Ivoire are 
Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff’s French West Africa and Robert W. July’s 
(1974) A History of the African People.  In the case of Senegal, I consulted Martin 
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 At the time of the field research here, the northern regions were still under the control of rebels. 
Although I was able to secure passage to this region, I was forced to go through a security check-point 
complete with armed members of the Forces Rebels (Rebel Forces). While I was able to meet with 
members of members of the UN Peacekeeping Core in Baouké, warnings against asking politically 
charged questions were heeded. Some of the more important observations from this visit nonetheless 
informed the research.   
56 
 
Klein’s (1968) Islam and Imperialism in Senegal; Cruise O’Brien’s (1971) Mourides of 
Senegal and Lucy Behrman’s  (1975) outstanding Muslim Brotherhoods and Politics in 
Senegal.   
TABLE IV 
Interview Groups in the two study cites 
Dakar  Abidjan 
 
Interview Groups 
 
1. Members of the Senegalese 
legislature, political party 
leaders and /or top ranking 
officials.  
2. Professionals: university and 
college professors at the 
University of Cheik Anta Diop 
and the Institute for Teachers; 
journalists of major 
newspaper/media organizations 
and lawyers.   
3. Students (University and 
college Students).  
 
 
 
 
Interview Groups 
 
1. Members of the Ivoirian 
Legislature, government 
officials and political party 
leaders and/or top ranking 
officials.  
2. Professionals: journalists of 
major newspaper/media 
organizations; University and 
college Professors at University 
of Abidjan, Cocody, University 
of Abidjan Bouaké and  
University of Abobo, Ajame, 
and the national Institute for 
Teachers. 
3. Students: University Students 
 
  Recent literature on Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire is copious and varied. Aristide 
R. Zolberg’s One-Party Government in the Ivory Coast is the best known and most 
detailed source on recent Ivoirian politics. Other analytical studies of Ivoirian politics, 
both pre-colonial and postcolonial, include Christian Potholm’s  (1970) chapter in Four 
African Political Systems— “The Ivoirian Political System”; Paul David’s (1986) La 
Côte d’Ivoire ; and Martin Staniland’s (1969) “Single-Party Regimes and Political 
Change:  The P.D.C.I. and Ivory Coast Politics.”  Other articles on contemporary 
Ivoirian politics include Richard Crook’s (1997) article “Winning coalitions and ethno-
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regionalist politics: The failure of the opposition in the 1990 and 1995 elections in Cote 
d’Ivoire” in African Affairs and Catherine Boone’s (2003) Political Topographies of the 
African State.  
Literature that deals extensively with the nature and extent of Houphouët-
Boigny’s political leadership include Robert Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg’s (1982) 
Personal Rule in Black Africa. Another article of note, which deals in great depth with 
the Ivoirian political transition, is Tessilimi Bakary’s “Elite Transformation and 
Political Succession.”  Perhaps one of the best sources for a critical assessment of 
Houphouët-Boigny is Laurent Gbagbo, a government opponent, whose book, Côte 
d’Ivoire: Economie et société à la veille de l'Indépendance (1940-1960), examines the 
events and conditions that brought Houphouët-Boigny to power. 
Some of the most valuable analyses of local politics and political issues were 
written by government agencies, government-funded research institutes, and non- 
government-funded research institutes (NGOs) and monitoring agencies operating in 
each of the countries studied.  These include research centers at the Université de 
Cheikh Anta Diop and Université d’Abidjan (Faculté des Sciences Economiques), the 
Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA), 
Center of Research and Action for Peace (CERAP). 
I also consulted the works of multilateral institutions and think tanks associated 
with democratization in Senegal and the conflict in Côte d’Ivoire. These include 
International Crisis Group, the World Bank, Institute for Security Studies, CERAP, 
African Assembly the Defense of Human Rights (RADDHO) and the United Nations 
Peacekeeping Office (UNOCI). Other sources include scholarly analyses, electoral 
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posters, and public rhetoric by high-ranking state officials, survey data, unpublished 
works, conference research papers and online journal articles.     
National newspapers provided critical accounts and pieces of information to this 
research. In the case of Senegal, Le Soleil is the main daily newspaper and is state- 
owned.  Le Soleil is also accessible online in English as well as in French.  Other 
independently owned Senegalese newspaper sources included: Afrol Senegal news 
archive, African Confidential, Senegal Post, Sud Quotidien, Walfadjrii, and PANA (Pan 
African News Agency). All of these were accessible via the internet.   
Côte d’Ivoire also has a number of newspaper sources, about half of which are 
state-owned and half privately owned. They include: Fraternité Matin (state-owned 
daily), Notre Voie ( daily, owned by the FPI , Le Patriote (opposition daily),  Soir Info 
(private daily), Le Jour ( private daily), 24 Heures ( private daily), Le Front ( private 
daily) and  L'Inter ( private daily national).  In Senegal, much of the older editions were 
found in the national archives. In Côte d’Ivoire, le CERAP was a fortuitous find. The 
library hosted at this location carried national daily newspapers dating back to the early 
1960s. Many of the copies that were no longer available for public viewing at the 
university or the legislative achieves were well preserved and accessible at CERAP.   
 For the most part, I focused on the coverage of the legislative and presidential 
electoral campaigns since the early 1960s. Like the interview data, I then identified key 
themes for data coding. The data were then incorporated into the analysis of the study.  
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Measurement and Other Methods Issues 
 There are many methodological challenges to collecting and measurement of the 
sort of empirical data considered in this research project.  Collecting data across 
countries with different data gathering and administrative norms can prove problematic, 
especially data comparability across time and across countries. It helps that the chosen 
cases have a lot in common. This makes it easier to decide which factors to hold 
constant, for example colonialism, and to design more targeted interview questions that 
may better isolate the specific factors that explain extant differences.  Also, since I 
conducted research in Senegal first, I used the data generated in this case to inform and 
guide data collection in Côte d’Ivoire.  A return to the initial research cite in Dakar 
allowed me to make some adjustments in data gathering  based on information 
generated in Côte d’Ivoire.  
 Collecting data on informal institutions proved particularly problematic.  There 
is little consensus as to what constitutes an informal institution. Some researchers 
(Ostrom 1990, Pretty and Ward, 2001) define informal institutions as community-based, 
local, and social or grass-roots institutions, such as micro-credit schemes and groups 
formed for the purpose of managing common pool resources.  In this view, informal 
institutions differ from formal institutions in that the latter are imposed from above by 
the state, whereas the former are developed from the bottom up by the community.  
North (1990) defines institutions as: “the rules of the game in a society, or more 
formally, [they] are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction.”  He 
also defines informal institutions are “rules and procedures that are created, 
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communicated, and enforced outside the officially sanctioned channels.”65 Drawing on 
analogy of rules in sports, North notes that  written rules of a sport are analogous to 
formal institutions, whereas unwritten codes of conduct, such as an acceptance that it is 
unacceptable to kick an opponent in  the head, are analogous to informal institutions.    
  Despite the fact that North (1990) drew distinctions between formal and 
informal institutions, and even argues that informal institutions may be the more 
important of the two, the empirical proxies used in the comparative politics literature 
focus almost exclusively on formal institutions, especially, those which relate to 
electoral systems. This may simply reflect the fact that formal institutions may be easier 
to measure than informal institutions.  However, just because they may be difficult to 
measure, does not mean that they are unimportant. According to North (1990: 36) “it is 
much easier to describe and be precise about the formal rules that societies devise than 
to describe and be precise about the informal ways by which human beings have 
structured human interaction. But, although they defy, for the most part, neat 
specification and it is extremely difficult to develop unambiguous tests of their 
significant, they are important.”       
 My strategy for dealing with this problem was to document the verbal 
descriptions and articulations of normative beliefs about ethnic-balancing, ethnic 
coalitions and ethnic transcendence and land tenure.  Interviews and observations, and 
everyday conversations, highlighted the rules. For example, many interview participants 
spoke of the ethnic balancing between the various ethnic groups in Côte d’Ivoire as 
something that was understood as a normal aspect of post-independence political life. 
As one respondent explained, “we remained a country at peace for so long because 
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everyone had a share in the goods that Côte d’Ivoire had to offer; even the immigrants. 
No one felt threatened and well all existed peacefully...that is until recently.”66 He was 
relaying the rule governing political participation and access to public goods and 
emphasizing the boundaries regarding ethnic considerations in Ivoirian politics.   
 Quantitative data on the practice of ethnic balancing of political representation, 
notwithstanding the formal adoption of the winner-takes-all electoral rule, also helped   
to verify existence and salience of such rules. Also, to analyse these unwritten and 
informal institutions, I assessed the actual rules of the political game.  If these rules 
drive expectations and shape political behaviour by creating and influencing the 
incentives, I consider them informal institutions.  This approach differs from some of 
the existing approaches that consider informal institutions in terms such as social 
capital. Pretty and Ward (2001:211) for instance, view informal rules as social capital, 
which they define as “relations of trust, reciprocity, and exchanges; common rules, 
norms and sanctions; connectedness and networks and groups.”  Rather, I attempted to 
ensure comparability by using a working definition and measurements that could be 
valid across cases, space and time.    
Also, on the issue data reliability, I analyzed accounts, reports, assessments and 
descriptions of the variables and relationship considered in one or both of the case, 
gathered data from a host of different sources and verified. Confidence in descriptions 
or related accounts is achieved when those stories or descriptions are recounted by other 
observers or other analysts.  One of the ways I sought to get around the challenges of 
collecting reliable data on respondents’ ethnic affiliations and attitudes about ethnicity 
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and politics was to phrase questions requiring ethnic affiliations in as uncharged a 
manner as possible. For example, rather than asking a direct question of what ethnicity 
does one belong, which carries with it the assumption that this is how individuals 
identify or see themselves, questions instead were posed as follows:  “I have spoken 
with  many (Senegalese and Ivoirians) and they have all described themselves in 
different ways. Some people describe themselves in terms of their language, religion, 
gender, race or ethnic group, and others describe themselves in economic terms such as 
a farmer, a merchant, a lawyer or a doctor. Besides being (Senegalese or Ivoirian) 
which specific group do you feel you belong to first and foremost?”  Part of my strategy 
for dealing with issues concerning the fact that person asking the questions is female 
and a foreigner, was having a local (university student- male and older) accompany me 
to the interviews. I was able to gain a lot of cooperation because of this set-up. 
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Part II 
 
Introduction to Part II 
Accounting for variations in ethnic politicization in sub-Saharan Africa 
 
This study develops and constructs an argument to account for when and why 
ethnic identity becomes politicized within the context of sub-Saharan Africa. The 
explanation offered here builds on observations that political behavior is strongly 
influenced by incentives, which are themselves created via institutions. In the case of 
sub-Saharan Africa, it has been shown in the literature that in many instances, the rules 
that determine the boundaries of political incentives are not necessarily those that are 
formally established. These institutions will influence whether or not ethnic identity 
becomes politically salient. I argue that where the rules to which society adhere are the 
informal rules; these are the rules that will significantly affect whether ethnicity gets 
treated as a mobilizational tool.  Thus, where institutional rules foster ethnic 
transcendence, ethnicity is less likely to become politicized.  
This section develops as follows: Chapter Four demonstrates that while both 
Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire are former colonies of France and were a part of the same 
administrative unit—the French West Africa—colonial policies and administration on 
the ground differed considerably. The colonial experience in turn affected the kind of 
societal level institutional configurations (e.g., voluntary associations in Côte d’Ivoire, 
hometown associations in Nigeria and the Sufi Orders in the case of Senegal) that 
emerged in each country.  For example, ethnicity became politically salient in Côte 
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d’Ivoire and Nigeria, but not in Senegal. While countries may indeed have had the same 
colonial rulers and therefore, similar colonial experiences, the institutionalization and 
microscopic experiences may vary considerably and consequently, the political or 
structural impacts and general trajectory of two countries with similar colonial legacies 
vary significantly.  I argue that these differences help to explain the variations in the 
nature and capacity of the informal institutions that emerged in each country, which—
given their differential effect on the salience and use of ethnic identity in the 
postcolonial era—may help to account for the variation in ethnic politicization we 
observe across sub-Saharan Africa.   
 Chapter Five outlines the manner in which these redistributive institutions work, 
particularly in the post-independence period. In Senegal resources were distributed on a 
pan-ethnic basis while in Côte d’Ivoire, resources were distributed largely on the basis 
of ethnic affiliation. Framed within the context of the theoretical debate about the 
relationship between religion and ethnic politicization, this chapter indicates that while 
important, religion per se does not influence ethnic politicization.  The chapter shows 
that the persistence of the Sufi Orders and voluntary associations, even after 
independence, significantly influenced the political salience and use of ethnic identity in 
Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire. In the case of the former, ethnicity continued to lack 
political salience, while in the case of the latter ethnic identity continued to be 
politically salient, albeit at very low levels.  
 More importantly, this chapter shows that while ethnicity was more salient in 
the case of Côte d’Ivoire, ethnicity remained largely non-politicized in both countries 
for very long periods. One explanation (which is explored in more details in Chapter 
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Six) is that in both cases, informal institutions governed the political use of ethnic 
identity. In the case of Senegal, the Sufi Orders established the rule of ethnic 
transcendence. As redistributive intermediaries between the state and society, religious 
Marabouts were able to attenuate ethnic identity and establish a rule (albeit an informal 
rule) of ethnic transcendence in Senegalese politics over time.  While the voluntary 
associations accentuated the salience of ethnicity in Côte d’Ivoire, informal rules such 
as ethnic balancing and the agrarian policy of “the land belongs to he who cultivates it” 
proved to be significant constraints against the use of ethnic identity as a mobilizational 
tool –at least until 1993. Changes to these rules in the post-1993 era, has significantly 
undermined and eroded the rule of having relatively balanced political representation 
and land and citizenship rights. Consequently, ethnic identity has dominated the 
national political debate and become one of the primary axes of political competition.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Colonial Legacies and Ethnic Politicization: Insights from Senegal and Côte 
d’Ivoire 
 
Introduction 
 
This dissertation seeks to account for the conditions under which ethnicity is 
likely to be politicized in ethnically diverse societies. It builds its explanation around 
accounts of the benefits and non-benefits that political elites receive from making 
political appeals on the basis of ethnic differences.   Since both Senegal and Côte 
d’Ivoire are former colonies of France, the chapter focuses on the colonial legacies of 
each country, particularly in terms of administrative structures, political institutions and 
social and economic policies. As Stephen Gellar pointed out in 1976, when analyzing 
non-western societies under the aegis of colonialism, special attention should be given 
to the significance of the colonial context itself (Gellar, 1976:6).  This chapter does this 
by delving into Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal’s colonial history to identify the colonial-era 
policies, rules, and regulations influenced how Senegalese and Ivoirians think about 
their nation’s ethnic landscape.  
 Tracing the origins of contemporary ethnic identities to the institutions of 
colonial rule is not novel. In fact, the notion that the importance of ethnicity was created 
or heightened under colonial rule is largely accepted by scholars.  The emergence of 
Hindu, Muslim and Sikh identities is largely associated with British census-taking in 
India, while the Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda and Burundi are the product of Belgian 
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and German colonial practices. 67  In his 1986 book, Hegemony and Culture, Laitin 
explains why, despite both tribe and religion being socially salient cleavages in 
Yorubaland, tribe is politicized and religion is not. In his 2005 master-piece Institution 
and Ethnic Politics in Africa, Posner effectively traces the origins of contemporary 
Zambian ethnic identities to the institutions of colonial rule. According to Posner 
(2005), tribe and language came to be viewed as natural, potential building blocks for 
political coalitions in post-colonial Zambia because these were the distinct dimensions 
of ethnic identity generated by the colonial rulers.    Institutions of the colonial-state 
generated incentives for people to actively identify themselves in terms of one particular 
ethnic dimension, depending on their political attractiveness or unattractiveness.  
 Following such scholars as Laitin (1986), Posner (2005), Migdal (1988) and 
Mandani (2001), I argue that colonialism plays a significant role in determining whether 
or not ethnicity becomes politicized. Colonial rule (whether British, French, 
Portuguese), defined the institutions (such as the Sufi Order in Senegal or voluntary 
associations in Côte d’Ivoire, or  hometown associations in Nigeria)68 that emerged and 
in turn narrowed the set of options open to elites in post-colonial politics. My approach 
departs from the standard accounts in several ways. The first and most obvious is that 
my discussion of colonial legacy does not operate within the context of the 
French/British rule dichotomy. This chapter shows that although the colonial rule 
established a kind of generalized mode of control in Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire, policies 
and institutions were often adjusted to fit the specific goals and interests of the colonial 
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power as well as the realities of the individual countries.69 Consequently, countries with 
similar colonial rulers may exhibit differences in the salience of ethnicity depending on 
the particular institutions policies adopted during colonial rule.70  For example, while 
the colonial experience in Senegal led to the relative unimportance of ethnic affiliation 
as a key social, economic or political marker, in the case of Côte d’Ivoire, colonialism 
led to the emergence of two distinct dimensions of ethnic identity: tribe and religion.  
 The policies of the colonial state in Côte d’Ivoire generated incentives for the 
people to actively invest in and cultivate the social distinctions as defined by the state.  
Conversely, the colonial administrative structures and policies in Senegal created a 
scheme of social categorization that was based on citizenship rather than ethnic 
affiliation.  As citizens, individuals (limited to those born in one of the Four 
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 The French ruled Senegal for much longer than they did in Côte d’Ivoire. This is consequential because 
sixteenth-century French colonialism in Senegal (particularly the political goals and economic interests) 
differed from nineteenth-century French policies in other West African countries. Indeed, although the 
French had contact in other areas of West Africa throughout the seventeenth-century, their focus was 
mostly on Senegal. One could argue that the French colonial project began in Senegal; more specifically, 
in St. Louis where the French established trade port in 1659.   During the initial phases of the colonial 
project, the French promoted the policy of assimilation, whereby the colonized countries would be 
extensions of the metropole or “mere provinces overseas” (Boahen, 1986: 123).The early attempts at 
assimilation resulted in the establishment of four communes in Senegal, where assimilated Africans could 
represent the government in France. By the nineteenth-century the original objectives of the French in 
West Africa changed from establishing settler colonies and the policy of assimilation to economic 
interests and the extraction of resources.  Scholars such as Boahen (1986) attribute the change in colonial 
policy and approach to the increased competition from other European countries in the Scramble for 
Africa and the Atlantic Slave Trade. As the competition for colonies increased, the French became less 
interested in establishing settler colonies and became driven by commercial interests. The consequence 
was that in countries such as Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire, the colonial administration, policies and political, 
social and economic institutions differed significantly, despite having the same colonizer.    
70Atul Kohli (2004) allows for this in his account of the British colonial legacies in India and Nigeria. 
Examining why some developing countries have been more successful at facilitating industrialization 
than others Kohli finds that the impact of colonialism is significant. According to Kohli, colonialism, 
especially in the fist half of the 20th century, defined the state institutions (e.g., the civil service, central 
government and bureaucracy and tax collection) that emerged in developing countries and in turn molded 
their economies in the second half of the 20th century. To account for the variation in the level of 
development between Nigeria and India, Kohli finds that patterns of colonial state formation and 
administration may differ significantly, even for countries with the same colonizers.    
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Communes71), regardless of ethnic affiliation or race, were allowed to actively 
participate in the political system, were given access to a system of French laws, codes, 
and courts for both civil and criminal affairs, and were protected against colonial 
administrative abuse. Since citizenship (and not ethnic affiliations) brought higher 
status and privileges to Africans who possessed it, the incentives for Senegalese were 
not so much to build political identities around tribal membership and language group, 
but rather to be considered citizens.  
Also, as the case explorations below indicate, one of the consequences of 
differing colonial policies in the two countries concerns the institutions, particularly the 
social institutions, that emerged in each country. I show that unlike in Côte d’Ivoire, 
colonial rule in Senegal resulted in the emergence of informal institutional 
configurations such the Islamic Sufi Brotherhoods.  The destruction of pre-colonial 
political institutions brought on by the French conquest resulted in the rise in the 
influence of Islamic religious brotherhoods nationwide. Both the French state and the 
society became reliant on these Islamic Brotherhoods as redistributive intermediaries: in 
exchange for state goods, religious Marabouts encouraged individuals to produce export 
products and pay taxes. In turn, the Marabouts redistributed the goods extracted from 
the state to society.  Being pan-ethnic, inclusive and universalistic in nature, these 
religious brotherhoods have provided an institutionalized and pragmatic basis for the 
idea of national citizenship and cross-cultural tolerance that have effectively blocked the 
use of political appeal to cultural difference as a potentially profitable or attractive 
mobilization strategy choice for political elites. 
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The colonial policy of co-opting these religious orders in order to advance 
French peanut production-based export economy in Senegal also affected the 
development of political parties and the party structure. Party leaders and political elites 
became dependent on religious Marabouts to garner political support among the public.  
This generated disincentives for party leaders and political elites to use ethnic identity 
as a mobilization tool.  The argument may be summarized as follows:  colonialism → 
direct rule → sufism (and the four communes) → ethnicity “expunged” from 
commonsensical assumptions about politics →party System → post-colonial non-
politicization.  
  
 
 
 
Colonial Legacies 
 
Scholars attribute the political and developmental problems in Africa to a 
number of factors. Chief among these are corruption and colonial legacies. While there 
are in fact debates about the extent to which colonial legacy helps to explain many of 
African political and developmental problems, there is a general consensus that, 
whether indirectly or directly, colonialism has had a significant impact on Africa’s post-
colonial development. In his 1986 book, Hegemony and Culture, Laitin examines the 
question of the impact of colonialism on ethic politicization in West Africa. More 
specifically, Laitin sought to explain the non-politicization of religion in Yorubaland in 
Nigeria. Both tribe and religion are socially salient cleavages in Yorubaland, but tribe is 
politicized and religion is not. According to Laitin, the key independent variable 
explaining this outcome is the ideological hegemony instituted by the colonial state. 
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British colonialism in Yorubaland adopted a system of indirect rule which created a 
common-sensical world in which tribe was real and religion was not.  Consequently, 
long after the departure of the British, the Yoruba organized their politics on the basis of 
tribe rather than religion. In essence, the simply bivariate correlation unearthed by the 
book is: Colonial Hegemony → Post-colonial Politicization of a Cleavage. 
In his 2005 masterpiece, Institution and Ethnic Politics in Africa, Posner showed 
how, in the case of Zambia, tribes from communities with fluid boundaries and varying 
degrees of internal cohesion became more territory bound and standardized in their 
social and political organization under British colonial rule. British colonial 
administration imposed a more rigid form of expressly tribal organization that allowed 
village, lineage and clan loyalties to become important parallel bases of Zambian social 
and political organization. 72  According to Posner, the standardization and tribalization 
of rural administration [in Zambia] was a momentous first step in the construction of the 
tribal dimension of Zambia’s post-colonial ethnic cleavage structure. It was by 
organizing local administrative activities around tribal units that incentives could 
emerge for Africans to invest in their tribal identities rather than simply accept or allow 
them to wither away.73 As Posner points out however:  
Tribal and linguistic identities came to be internalized by Zambians not simply 
because they were employed as units of administrative categorization by the 
colonial government. These identities “took” because a wide range of formal 
institutions-including land tenure regulations, labor policies, civil service hiring 
practices, local government structures,  and even the organization of the judicial 
system-created incentives  for Africans to invest in their identification as tribes-
people and language-speakers.74 
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Migdal (1988) also notes that by making crucial economic and political 
resources available to some but not to others in the local colonial societies through 
specific policy decisions, colonial rulers greatly influenced ethnic politicization in 
African societies.  Colonial policies permitted or encouraged the creation of a firm base 
of social control for particular indigenous leaders and their social organizations. For 
example, colonizing rulers could give preferential access to resources to many local 
indigenous leaders, each of whom could establish social control in only a circumscribed 
part of the society. For the indigenous society, differences in privileged access to 
resources proffered by the colonial power had prolonged effects. They determined who 
could offer components as people sought to reconstitute viable strategies of survival-
organizations broad and strong enough to be incipient states or scattered local 
organizations that could never hope to achieve countrywide control.75  
Although there are many cases of ethnic conflict whose origins can be traced to 
colonial rule, political analyses indicate that not all countries with a legacy of 
institutionalized ethnic preference have experienced ethnic politicization.76 This 
suggests that while institutions can lead to the emergence of ethnic politicization, 
sustained relevance may depend on post-independence institutions (formal and informal 
institutions).  Such a conclusion would not be entirely off-mark. It would nonetheless 
ignore an essential point: while countries may indeed have had the same colonizers, the 
colonial policies and administration may have differed significantly.  Consequently, the 
political or structural impacts of colonialism and the general trajectory of countries with 
the same colonizer may also vary significantly.  
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Yet, much of the discussions on the effects of colonialism operate within the 
broader frame work of the British/French, direct rule/indirect rule dichotomy. For the 
most part, studies have focused on the impact either of British colonialism (more 
specifically, indirect rule), or the impact of French colonialism (particularly, direct rule) 
on ethnic politicization.  More recently, there have been questions as to whether 
differences in colonial rulers matter significantly in explaining patterns of ethnic 
politicization in post-colonial Africa.  A number of scholars have made the case that 
indeed, instances of ethnic politicization in post-colonial African societies are greatly 
affected by whether the colonial rulers were British or French, Portuguese or Belgian. 
Bratton and Van de Walle (1994) assert that this is particularly true as each colonial 
power had a specific administrative model–the French generally used direct rule and the 
British used indirect Rule.  According to Mahmood Mamdani (2001): 
[i]t is Belgian reform of the colonial state in Rwanda], the decade from the mid-
1920s to the mid-1930s that constructed Hutu as indigenous Bantu and Tutsi as 
alien Hamites. It is also Belgian colonialism that made for a political history in 
Rwanda different from that in standard indirect rule colonies, like Uganda and 
Congo, in tropical Africa.”77 
  A number of Africanists make the claim that instances of post-colonial ethnic 
politicization are more common in former French colonies than among former British 
colonies. The key explanation, according to these scholars, is that direct and indirect 
rule institutionalized very different states and thereby differentially affected 
postcolonial political development. The French imposed a uniform centralized French 
administration in their colonies, whereas the British opted for indirect rule and made use 
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of local authorities.  Some scholars posit that the utilization of local chiefs and leaders 
under the system of indirect rule by the British to some extent assuaged local 
authorities.78 Since individuals tend to be ruled by members of their own ethnic group, 
their political demands are unlikely to be about ethnic identity. Because of the history of 
self-rule, ethnic violence is unlikely to develop in countries with a legacy of in-direct 
rule. Countries with a legacy of direct rule face longer transition periods at 
independence and are more likely to experience cultural conflict.79   
A study by Blanton, Mason and Athow (2001), which examined whether 
colonial heritage might matter for predicting conflict risk in Africa, found however that 
there are substantially different systems of ethnic stratification in former British and 
French colonies. The “indirect, descentralized rule of the British fostered an unranked 
system of ethnic stratification, while the French style approximated a ranked system” 
(Blanton, Mason and Athow, 2001: 473).  Since unranked systems foster competition 
between ethnic groups which can readily spiral into conflict, former British colonies 
have experienced more ethnic conflict than former French colonies (Mahmood, 2001).  
A number of scholars have taken a quantitative approach to the question of the 
effect of colonial legacy on political development and ethnic politicization by 
comparing the instances of political stability and ethnic conflicts in former British and 
French colonies.80 The conclusion from these studies is that there are no substantive 
differences in the instances of ethnic politicization between former British and former 
French colonies. In other words, ethnic politicization is no more likely to occur in 
former French colonies that in former British colonies.  While the utilization of local 
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chiefs and leaders under the system of indirect rule by the British to some extent 
allowed for the an easier task of self-rule at independence and the system of direct rule 
by the French meant that a longer transition period was needed for French colonies after 
independence, there are no significant differences among former British, French 
colonies or Portuguese cases.   
Laitin’s 1986 work reinforces the assertions that differences in colonial rulers do 
not matter significantly in explaining patterns of ethnic politicization in post-colonial 
West Africa. Testing his hypothesis developed from Yorubaland (a former British 
colony) in the case of Benin (a former French colony), Laitin argues that Benin 
“demonstrates the power…of the model of hegemony” (1986:165). Consequently, the 
pattern of politicization in post-colonial politics can indeed be explained by the pattern 
of politicization adopted by colonial rule.   Laitin has come under heavy criticism for 
exporting a model developed from a case study of a former British colony to a former 
French country without regard for significant differences that would have to be held 
constant in both countries in order for the findings in the case of Yorubaland to be 
corroborated. Colonial ruler, duration of colonial rule, history, ethnic demography, 
economy, political leadership and institutional structure, are some of the factors that 
needed to have been held constant in order to ascertain whether Benin corroborates the 
model suggested by the case of Yurobaland.  
Yet, as the cases of Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire indicate, there are differences in 
outcomes that need to go beyond the broader framework of the British/French colonial 
rule dichotomy. Indeed, far less explored and inadequately explained is what factor or 
factors accounting for variations in outcomes among countries with the same colonial 
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ruler.  While colonial powers generally employed and applied specific colonial models 
(direct rule or indirect rule for instance) to their colonies, could it be the case that 
administratively, countries were governed differently, hence different colonial legacies? 
 In other words, while ruled by the same colonial power, are there significant 
differences in Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire in the realm of colonial administrative policies, 
political participation, political institutions/policies and associative socio-economic 
effects that could account for non-politicization in the case of the former and ethic 
politicization in the case of the latter? If, there are indeed significant differences, have 
these key colonial institutions/policies affected how post-colonial societies were formed 
and the political and social structures the countries adopted upon independence and 
extended well into the post-independent period?  If there are no significant differences 
in colonial administration, the implication is that the answer(s) lie more closely with the 
institutions or policies employed during the post-independence era than with colonial 
legacy.  A critical question therefore becomes: to what extent do these institutions 
adopted in the post-independent era differ between the two countries?  
  To assess or appreciate fully the impact of colonial legacies on ethnic 
politicization in their former colonials, this chapter addresses whether, and to what 
extent the colonial experiences differed in Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire, particularly in 
terms of how they affected societal transformation and political and party development. 
The chapter also examines whether, and to what extent the post-independence political 
institutions differ from their colonial origins in each country.  The cases of colonial 
Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire constitute the initial sections of this chapter, while the latter 
sections focus on post-colonial Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire.   
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French Colonial Rule in West Africa: Background 
 Direct rule was the preferred model of French colonial rule. Unlike the British 
system that tended to rely on local political elites or institutions, French colonies were 
treated as extensions of the Metropole; France attempted to replace local leadership 
with practices from their own country.  While it is true that France generally adopted 
this model of colonial rule, research indicates that administratively, politically, and 
practically, Africa never functioned as a unified object in French colonialism. Indeed, 
even at the height of its African empire, France did not govern Africa under a single 
colonial apparatus. Rather, numerous forms of political control were employed across 
the continent. The policies used often depended on the goals and interest of the colonial 
rulers within the particular country.  Still, much of the discussions of the differences in 
French administrative policy implementation is made within the context of sub-Saharan 
Africa and the Maghrib.  
     Given that both Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire were governed under one administrative 
body- Afrique Occidentale Francaise /French West Africa (AOF)- which was created in 
1895- to what extent do the two cases- colonial Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire- differ in 
terms of the colonial administrative structure, organization, institutions, and policies?  
Did the French encourage different distributions of administrative policies and social 
control among the local populations of Senegal than among those in Côte d’Ivoire? Or, 
were the decisions of French officials similar with different effects on social structure 
and political rule in each of the countries? 
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Colonial Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal  
Côte d'Ivoire was made a French colony in 1893. Until 1947, efforts were made 
by the French government to attach parts of Upper Volta (present-day Burkina Faso) 
and French Sudan (present-day Mali) to Côte d'Ivoire for economic and administrative 
reasons. For the most part, Côte d’Ivoire was governed under the French policy of 
association, which stipulated the superiority of the French in the colonies. Under this 
policy, the Africans in Côte d'Ivoire were allowed to preserve their own customs only 
insofar as they were compatible with French interests. The Ivoirian African population 
was considered subjects of the French empire with no political rights, and was 
controlled by the Code de l’Indigénat or the Colonial penal code.81 Per the direct rule 
model, Governors were appointed in Paris and the Ivoirian African population had little 
room for participation in policy making or administration.  
French activities in Senegal date back to the early seventeenth century. The 
French established trading posts along the Senegal River in1638. In 1659, the trading 
posts were moved to the more secure location on the island of Saint Louis and in 1677 
the French seized) the island of Gorée from the Dutch (a pivotal point on the coast). The 
French later established a station further inland at Médine in the 1850s. Dakar was 
captured in 1857 and later replaced Saint Louis as the capital of Senegal in 1902. 
Senegal remained at the center of France’s West African empire until all the separate 
colonies won independence in 1960.82  
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Administrative structure 
 France divided its territories into administrative units or districts called Cercles. 
A Cercle (district) consisted of several cantons, each of which in turn consisted of 
several villages, and was headed by a French colonial officer (commandant du cercle).  
Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire were both structurally administered on the basis of this 
colonial administrative principle. In both countries, a commandant du cercle ruled 
through a hierarchy of local rulers or chefs de subdivision, and was subject to the 
authority of a District Commander, and the government of the colony above him. It was 
also typical French colonial policy that individuals born within these Cercles /districts 
were subjects of the French empire and were regulated by the Code de l’Indigénat or the 
Colonial penal code.83  While the French applied this colonial policy throughout the 
entire territory of Côte d’Ivoire, a slightly different approach was taken in Senegal. As 
one of the first colonies in which the French sought to establish a settler society, the 
French initiated an exceptional policy in Senegal called the Four Communes.  
According to this policy, individuals born in the regions of Dakar, Rufisque, 
Saint Louis, and Gorée, regardless of race or ethnic affiliation, had the status of French 
“citizens.” The Four Communes had a measure of self-governance shared by no other 
colony in Africa.84” As citoyens, individuals from these Communes were allowed to 
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elect a representative to the French National Assembly and enjoy the same political 
participation and voting rights as those born in the Metropole.   
Senegal elected a deputy to the French National Assembly as early as the 
revolutionary period of 1848, when France began organizing local elections. Although 
the early deputies were all White or Métis (of mixed race), indigenous black residents 
of these cities enjoyed equal rights to vote as French citizens.  If literate in French and 
familiar with French customs, individuals from the Four Communes could work in the 
administrative institutions. While this policy was strongly opposed in France as being 
too liberal, the policy became an important feature of colonial Senegal.  In1907, 
Galandou Diouf was the first black African elected as Legislator Councilor in Rufisque.  
Blaise Diagne was Senegal’s (and Africa’s) first black representative directly elected as 
to the French Assembly in Paris in 1914.  
 
Colonial Administration: the Ivoirian Experience 
The colonial conquest of Côte d’Ivoire was notably longer and more arduous 
than in Senegal. A coastal region that had long established trading relations with 
foreigners, Senegal offered less violent resistance to French settlement than Côte 
d’Ivoire, where “permanent European contact took place very late.”85  Until 1900, “the 
[indigenous] Kings retained all their prerogatives and continued in effect to rule their 
own country.”86Ivoirian resistance movements against European conquest were 
protracted because they were dispersed and often organized along ethnic lines.  In the 
face of the complexity of the ethnic map, the French adopted a policy geared towards 
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stifling any form of resistance by applying the old and well-known maxim of divide and 
rule. The ethnic policy of the colonial administration in Côte d’Ivoire consisted of 
regrouping, assigning (and confining) ethnic groups to territories with rigid borders.  
The basis of establishing these so-called ethnic maps was to better identify and, 
if necessary, implicate so-called troublesome ethnic groups; thereby diminishing the 
intensity of local resistance.  Such ethnic parceling was widespread in Côte d’Ivoire 
throughout the entire colonial period and served to accentuate cleavages and other 
minor differences between various cultural entities. “Chiefs who had fomented revolt 
were deported; natives were disarmed; others were interned; war fines were imposed on 
various tribes amounting to more than $700,000 between 1910 and 1912.”87  After 1910 
new African auxiliaries were appointed on the basis of their loyalty to France rather 
than because of any traditional qualifications. It became common practice to appoint 
members of different ethnic groups as sub-chefs to rule over the canton. 88 
 
French Economic Policy in Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal 
As France consolidated its holdings in Africa, it took steps to ensure that the 
territories were profitable and self-supporting.  The Minister of Colonies believed that if 
the colonies were properly developed, there would be less need to depend on foreign 
countries for raw materials and a new market would be created for French goods. To 
minimize the administrative costs however, the French quickly initiated a policy that 
made each colony responsible for securing the resources- money-needed for its 
administration and defense. The exploitation of natural resources was one means by 
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which the French sought to ensure profitability. In Senegal, the French embarked on a 
peanut export economy. In sharp contrast to Côte d’Ivoire, the dominance of peanut 
export industry in Senegal led to a monoculture economy. Until 1925, Côte d’Ivoire’s 
main contributions to the French economy were timber and palm oil. Cocoa (and later 
coffee) were added to the list as a result of Govern Angoulvant’s efforts. By 1930, Côte 
d’Ivoire was producing more cocoa than France could absorb.89   
Exploitation of natural resources requires massive commitments of labor. The 
French therefore imposed a system of forced labor in both Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire 
under which each male adult was required to work for ten days each year without 
compensation as part of his obligation to the state.90 While Senegal was able to meet the 
labor requirement on French peanut plantations, the population of Côte d'Ivoire was 
insufficient to meet the labor demand on the numerous plantations that sprung up over 
time. Because of this labor scarcity, the French actively recruited large numbers of 
workers from the Upper Volta (Burkina Faso) to work in Côte d’Ivoire. This source of 
labor was so important to the economic life of Côte d'Ivoire that in 1932 the AOF 
annexed a large part of Upper Volta to Côte d'Ivoire and administered it as a single 
colony.  
By the nineteenth century, forced migrant labor was the backbone of Ivoirian 
economy. Also, at the encouragement of the colonial administration, enterprising 
Africans from regions of Côte d’Ivoire (mostly northern regions bordering Burkina 
Faso and Mali) unsuitable for commercial agriculture migrated, settled and colonized 
other parts of the country.  An important consequence of this policy was that workers 
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imported to these areas often settled there afterwards, obtained land, and became 
farmers.  By the late 1940s, many of the local cities had a majority of immigrants from 
foreign countries or other regions of Côte d’Ivoire. Similarly, in some rural districts 
there are more foreigners than natives.  According to the 1955 census, foreign Africans 
made up nearly half of the total population of Abidjan. The original inhabitants, the 
Ebrié, constituted less than seven percent of the city’s total population by 1948. In the 
cercle of Bouaflé, which was originally inhabited by the Gouro, two-thirds of the 
population consisted of Baoulé and Malinké immigrants.91  
One impact of this policy is continuous tension and conflict between original 
inhabitants (autochthons) and foreigners (allogènes). According to Raulin, “…since the 
Bété knows that the population of Gagnoa is made up mostly of non-Bété foreigners, he 
fears, rightly or wrongly, the rule of the non-Bété and rebels against the Dioula.”92 
Similarly, in the Agboville region, there were documented fears that the Abbey natives 
might eventually be eliminated from their own region’s development by the foreign 
townsmen. During the 1920s and 1930s, the native Dida in Divo were contemptuous of 
the Baoulé and Dioula immigrant farmers who engaged in work reserved for women in 
their own society. Except for exacting compensation payment for the use of their lands, 
the Dida had little to do with the foreigners.  
Another serious implication of this migration policy was the significant 
economic differentiation that developed between regions; particularly between the 
North and the South. While much of Côte d’Ivoire’s economic profitability occurred 
because of migrant workers from the North, in terms of investments and infrastructure 
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development, the Southern regions of Côte d’Ivoire benefitted far more than the 
northern regions over time. Because the differences between regions also corresponded 
with the ethnic map created by the French, Côte d’Ivoire soon became a country of rich 
ethic groups and poor ethnic groups.  Also, the policy had the effect of drawing sharper 
distinctions along religious lines while Christianity was localized in the south; Islam 
was localized in the north. What is more, because of the large influx of migrant Muslim 
workers from neighboring Burkina Faso and Mali, southerners often generalized all 
northerners into foreigners, Dioulas and Marabouts- distinctions which reinforced 
tensions between natives and foreigners or geographically contiguous because of  
ethnic, geographic and economic differences.  
The French also used taxation to maximize profits while minimizing its 
administrative costs in its colonies was taxation. Taxation not only generated revenue 
but, because taxes were payable in cash only, it also induced large numbers of African 
men to take up wage employment.  In Senegal, this meant that the rural population had 
little choice but to participate in peanut production.  The French however had 
tremendous difficulty collecting these taxes in the deep hinterlands of Senegal. To 
promote efficient tax collection, the French forged a working relationship with local 
Islamic leaders called Marabouts.  
A large portion of the rural population had come under the influence of Muslim 
leaders due to the power/leadership vacuum created by the destruction of the indigenous 
political institutions by colonial conquest. Rather than eradicate or compete with these 
Islamic orders, pragmatic French leadership sought to co-opt the Sufi leaders.  
Marabouts would help to promote peanut production, publicly endorsed the payment of 
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taxes to the French Administration and actively recruited soldiers in exchange for 
peaceful existence, continued social and spiritual dominance in the countryside and 
monetary rewards.  By the 1950s the leadership of the main Sufi orders had become 
pillars of the colonial establishment and were deeply embroiled in politics. These 
brotherhoods came to dominate the rural political economy in the early 20th century and 
represent the most legitimate and popular social organizations in the country. Despite 
their role in facilitating French colonial extractions, the brotherhoods were able to 
maintain their legitimacy in the post-independence environment. This was due primarily 
to the redistributive services that the brotherhoods provided with those goods extracted 
from the colonial state. Because they are “pan-ethnic, inclusive, universalizing and 
transcendent,” 93 the Brotherhoods have served as a kind of bulwark against the 
tendency of political elites to seek the path of least resistance in political mobilization in 
playing the ethnic card. 94  
 
 
Accounting for the relative salience of ethnic cleavage in Colonial Senegal and Côte 
d’Ivoire 
 
  Clearly, from the discussion above, the administration of French policies were 
hardly uniform across former colonies. Indeed, the argument can be made that (at least 
partially) the policy of the Four Communes established the framework for social 
distinction in modern Senegal that never existed in Côte d’Ivoire.  The policy of the 
Four Communes de-legitimized ethnicity as a pre-requisite for political participation. 
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Consequently, ethnic distinctions became less of an available political mobilization tool 
for politicians to utilize in the future.  
 By placing focus less on ethnic affiliation and more on citizenship, social 
distinctions ran more along the lines of whether one was in fact a citoyen or an 
indigene, than ethnic affiliation.  In other words, because of the policy of the Four 
Communes, ethnicity was expunged from commonsensical assumptions of Senegalese 
politics in the colonial period and subsequently in the post-colonial periods. What this 
means is that the early tensions within Senegalese society were really less about ethnic 
affiliation than citizenship rights.  
 With the majority of the rural population considered indigene and lacking the 
rights to political participation in the manner allowed their sometimes distant cousins or 
immediate family members born in any of the Four Communes concerns regarding 
ethnic affiliation never really took root. Both Blaise (Senegalese named to the French 
National Assembly) and Senghor (first President of Senegal) were black Africans; the 
former a Wolof and the latter a Serer. 
Also, the policy of the Four Communes meant that Senegal has had longer 
experiences with political participation than most other African countries, including 
Côte d’Ivoire.  According to Gellar, “the communal tradition in Senegal has had 
profound influence on the creation of a strong taste for liberty among those living in the 
Four Communes and the basis for a democratic culture” (Gellar, 2005:63).  
 Co-opting rather than eliminating Muslim control over the Senegalese country- 
side also helped to further de-legitimize ethnicity in Senegalese society. First, local 
problems were more likely to be solved locally (by Marabouts), and therefore less likely 
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to escalate directly to the state/national level in the Senegalese system than the 
hierarchical systems imposed in Cote d’Ivoire would allow.   Second, the Sufi orders 
developed into pan-ethnic, inclusive and universal movements across the country, 
making ethnic affiliation a non-issue in terms of Senegalese social, economic or 
political realities. 
But, to what extent did this framework persist in a post-colonial Senegal?  And, 
to the extent that it did, what sustained it? 
 
 
 
Continuity and Change in post-colonial Senegal and Côte D’Ivoire 
 
The following section will account for the perpetuation and reinforcement of 
post-colonial structures and policies by post-colonial heirs and indicate that the manner 
in which the post-colonial heirs structure policies and institutions (particularly in terms 
of making ethnic mobilization profitable) directly affects whether or not ethnicity 
becomes politicized.  
A number of scholars suggest that there is path dependence in much of the 
politics of post-colonial societies.  According to Posner (2005), even as states became 
free of colonialism, the options or choices open to political actors were somewhat 
limited. Many of the options open to elites in postcolonial politics were carried over 
from colonialism. If my argument about the French policy of the Four Communes and 
how the inclusive nature of the religious Marabouts de-ligitmized ethnicity and 
expunged it from the Senegalese colonial realities is correct, then we should find that 
appeals to ethnicity by post-colonial political elites in Senegal are low or non-existent 
or highly ineffective.  Conversely, if my argument about the incentives that the colonial 
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administrative, ethnic and economic policies generated for investing in one’s tribal and 
religious identities during the colonial era is correct, then we should find evidence of 
strong continuation of these policies by post-colonial Ivoirian political elites. 
 
 
 
Towards an explanation for the salience (or lack thereof) of ethnic cleavage in post-
colonial Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire: a case of path-dependence? 
 
 
Senegal 
 
A direct result of the Scramble for Africa and territorial conquest was the 
breakdown of the traditional familial or tribal structures in Senegal. French conquest 
caused the breakdown of the old political and social order and created a virtual authority 
vacuum. Individuals became drawn to the Islamic Sufi orders for social, economic and 
political leadership. These Brotherhoods came to dominate rural political economy in 
the early 20th century and represent the most legitimate and popular social 
organizations in the country. Cruise O’Brien (1971, 1975) and Villalón (2006) have 
written extensively on this issue. Rather than eradicate or compete with them, pragmatic 
French leadership in the form of governor Faidherbe co-opted Sufi leaders: the 
Marabouts retained social and spiritual dominance in the countryside and helped 
promote peanut production95 in exchange for peaceful existence (Klein, 1968). 
Marabouts publicly endorsed the payment of taxes to the French administration and 
actively recruited soldiers.96  The French, in turn, rewarded important and cooperative 
Marabouts with gifts, political donations, and money. In fact, as Behrman points out, 
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“[i]t became a matter of habit for families of the great Marab[o]us to expect money 
from the government” (Behrman, 1975: 52).  
By some accounts, French colonialists were in perpetual fear of jihad-type 
resistance against them and decided that it was wiser to control and accept the 
Brotherhoods rather than to ban them. As such, in 1906, the French West African 
colonial administration set up a corps of civil servants specializing in Muslim affairs. 
The aim was to closely monitor the activities of Muslim leaders in the colonies.97A 
more plausible explanation for why the French opted against instituting bans against the 
Brotherhoods is that the Marabouts were very important to the peanut production and 
exports trade that constituted the foundation of Senegal’s colonial export economy.   
The rapid adoption of the Islamic Sufism offered by the religious orders over 
time allowed the Sufi orders a considerable amount of autonomy over a huge 
percentage of the Senegalese population.  While it is not entirely clear whether the 
percentage of the population adhering to the Sufi orders increased over time in response 
to the increased legitimacy and influence of the Marabouts or vice versa, one thing is 
certain: the ability to attract followers from all the major ethnic groups allowed Sufi 
leaders to acquire that much more social legitimacy and social command. Data from 
Senegalese national population census indicate that the number of Muslims in Senegal 
went from approximately 1,026,000 in 1907 to 2,789,320 in 1963.98  
 The 1960 and subsequent national census, indicate that progressively, more and 
more Senegalese (including those areas such as the Casamance where Christian 
Missionaries had the most impact) self-identified as Muslim. It has been more than 30 
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years since the 90 percent mark of Senegalese who identify as Muslim has been 
surpassed.99  
Local newspaper reports dating back to some of the earliest electoral campaigns 
in Senegal depict a symbiotic relationship between political elites and Sufi leaders that 
mirror those held between the colonial rulers and Marabouts.  Some of Senegal’s 
earliest prominent political elites such as Blaise Diagne, (Senegal’s first black 
representative to be named to the French parliament during the late 1920s to the early 
1930s), had the support of one of the most important religious leaders of the time.  One 
of the main reasons that Senghor, a Christian, won against Lamine Gueye, a Muslim, 
for the coveted position as President of Senegal was that unlike Gueye, Senghor had the 
support of the most important religious Marabouts of the period.100 The Lamine 
Gueye/Senghor race to the presidency by way of courtship of the chief Marabouts of the 
time has become a classic example of the influence that the Sufi orders have in the 
country. The proverbial message to other up-and-coming political elites: ignore the 
Marabouts at your electoral peril.  
Political parties have no real social base.101 Rather, the political parties, and 
indeed, the entire regime structure are, “deeply socially embedded.”102 Interviews with 
representatives of the numerous political parties in Senegal revealed that none of the 
parties consider themselves having a loyal base. Even the Trade Union based political 
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party leader 103admitted to not having worker base during my interviews. Rather, that 
party receives majority support from University and Teacher College students and with 
the support of very important religious Marabouts, some members of the Mouride 
Brotherhood members.104  Campaign appeals almost never evoke any real sense of party 
loyalty. While each party distributes political flyers pin-pointing their respective 
political platforms and agenda, upon close analysis, there are very few differences in 
terms of political perspective. Most championed a democratic cause, however, 
democracy not in the Anglo-American political model, but more akin to the European 
social democracy model.  
One implication of this lack of a social base, as Galvan similarly found during 
his field research in Senegal, is that the Senegalese political parties became embedded 
in the Sufi brotherhoods.105 With more than ninety percent of the population being 
Muslim (many of whom belong to one of the four major Brotherhoods in the country), 
the influence of religious Marabouts throughout the country is tremendous. And, since 
the religious orders tend to be all encompassing of the various ethnic groups, pan- 
ethnic, inclusive and universal and political elites are forced to appeal to the public via 
these religious orders. Accordingly, ethnic differences the importance of ethnic 
affiliation became further diminished in the political calculations of Senegalese political 
elites.  
The media coverage of the electoral campaign paints a telling picture. Political 
elites, regardless of prominence or religious affiliations, all seek electoral votes by 
courting the most important Marabouts and even paying homage to smaller more local 
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ones as well. A particularly striking and (repetitive) newspaper image over the decades 
is that of a prominent Christian candidate, adorned in Muslim garb and Islamic religious 
symbols, while visiting prominent local religious Marabouts as part of their political 
campaign.  Interestingly, when asked about the significance of this practice, few of 
these political elites admitted to it being a political strategy. More often than not, the 
response was that this was merely ceremonial, and hardly strategic. As one political 
elite declared however, “whether ceremonial or strategic or both, the only way to get the 
vote of the people is if we can convince Marabouts to instruct their followers to vote for 
us. Wearing the Muslim garb shows that we have tremendous respect for these 
Marabouts.” 106  
The tremendous influence over the decisions of large portion of the country’s 
population generated strong incentives for religious Marabouts to demand benefits from 
dependent political elites on the one hand and allegiance from disciples on the other 
hand. As well-organized institutions with an extraordinarily high degree of popular 
legitimacy based both on an ideological religious foundation and their responsiveness to 
popular concerns, the orders have been able to provide the Senegalese society with a 
degree of strength in interactions with the state which is virtually unparalleled 
elsewhere in Africa (Villalón, 2006:199).   
Given the relationship between the religious leaders and the political party 
leader, a clear incentive for the disciples is to comply with the instructions of their 
Marabouts. They recognize that besides their religious leadership, Marabouts serve as 
conduits for redistribution of governmental benefits. Marabouts also realized that if they 
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were to maintain their following and their more than favorable position as mediators 
they have to facilitate and contribute to the circulation of resources.  
Though difficult to corroborate, the media have made numerous assertions that 
political elites pay out huge sums of money and other resources in order to gain the 
support of the major Marabouts. This is an important tactic by political elites to gain 
electoral support from the disciples.  Interviews with various party representatives 
suggest that visits and gifts for Marabouts are more than ceremonial. Several interview 
respondents disclosed outright that this is a political strategy of the party leaders to 
garner the votes of the masses. Those who admit outright to this political strategy are 
quick to point out that other political parties have engaged in similar behavior. 
According to one respondent “if you want to know who is going to win an election in 
Senegal , all you have to do is figure out who is paying out the most money and other 
resources, and who is making the biggest donations to the religious leaders.” 107   
 Newspaper articles are full of accounts depicting the persistent influence of 
religious Marabouts beyond the colonial era. Much of the television news reports 
following the 2007 Presidential elections re-counted the courting relationship between 
religious Marabout and political elites.  One of the first pieces of official business that 
Abdoulaye Wade performed as President of Senegal in 2000 (after defeating a forty 
year rule by Abdou Diouf) was visiting the very powerful and influential Marabout in 
the holy city of Touba. The media coverage of this event was extensive. Pictures of 
Wade kneeling before the Marabout and kissing his ring were plastered on the front 
pages of every newspaper as well as on the evening news reports.  When tension later 
arose between President Wade and leader of the National Assembly (Mackie Sall), 
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Wade made official request from the Mouride Marabout to pray for Mackie Sall (a 
thinly veiled message or appeal to the religious leader to negatively influence public 
opinion against Mackie Sall.) Before long, natives were calling for the resignation of 
Mackie Sall. Within days of the death of the old Marabout (who favored Wade), the 
new Mouride Marabout leader, perhaps fearful of the escalation of the political tension 
between the President and Leader of the National Assembly, issued a “ndiggle” or order 
for both parties to cease and desist the fight immediately. The Marabout outlined the 
constitutional right of the leader of the National Assembly to serve his term and ordered 
no further public discussion on the topic. Within two days of this ndiggle there were no 
more newspaper or media reports concerning political tensions between the President 
and Mackie Sall.  
 Given the influence of the Marabouts during colonial rule, it is hardly surprising 
that the post-independence political elites sought to continue the cooption of Sufi 
brotherhoods. For one thing, as the post-colonial administration swapped out French 
officials for Senegalese officials in the administrative positions, the latter found it easier 
to continue in the path set by the former. Also, having acquired massive wealth, 
established redistributive networks whereby the society could access particular public 
goods and their large scale religious influence, Marabouts held the distinctive 
advantageous position of fending off potential challengers they deemed threatening  to 
their persistence. Consequently, political elites found it more than useful during the 
early party developmental stages to solicit the support of the people by vigorously 
courting heads of the Sufi Brotherhoods.   
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 As informal institutional configurations that help to transcend historic ethnic and 
religious communities, Sufi Brotherhoods provide an institutionalized and pragmatic 
basis for the idea of national citizenship and cross-cultural tolerance that block the use of 
political appeal to cultural difference as a mobilization tool.  But how did Sufi 
brotherhoods come to hold such powerful sway over the Senegalese population? 
Addressing this question requires a journey through the colonial and post-colonial past. 
 A country’s social life can offer key insights into the salience of ethnicity in a 
society. As in most countries, the Senegalese social life is distinguished between formal 
official practices and ordinary everyday informal practices.  In everyday social 
interactions, ethnic origins are of great importance. In ordinary conversations, personal 
introductions are often apostrophized by “Je suis Wolof,” “lui, il est Serer,” “c’est un 
Fulani,” “elle est Pulaar,” and “ils sont Diola.”108 Also, a large proportion of the quips 
in the conversations between Senegalese turn on the qualities and defects attributed to 
each person by reason of his/her ethnic origin.  For example, it is not uncommon to hear 
the following quip in the streets of Dakar: “Mon Cher, tu es vraiment une personne 
stupide. Ça c’est parce que tu es Diola. Vraiment!  Si, tu était Serer comme mon frère 
Senghor, tu peux jamais parler comme ça.”109  During my field research in Dakar, I 
once overheard a young man talk his way out of a certain fine from a police officer by 
bombarding him with insults. Someone later explained to me that as ethnic cousins, had 
                                                 
108
 Personal observation during field research in Senegal 2007-2008.   
109
 Field research, Dakar, Senegal 2007. It should be noted that such exchanges are generally friendly 
banter between related ethnic groups or ethnic groups that have historically established a joking 
relationship. In this case, this exchange was between the Sereer and the Diola. Joking relationships 
between these two ethnic groups are well known, studied and documented. 
96 
 
the young man not offered up the worst insults he could muster, he would surely have 
been fined (maybe twice as much) by the police officer. 110  
  At the official level however, ethnic groups are not taken into consideration for 
job placement or official appointments or promotions. Ministers, civil servants and 
clerks are appointed without regard to their ethnic origins.  An audit of elected members 
of parliament from 1960- 2007 by ethnicity depicts a diverse and eclectic group.  It is 
not by accident that Senghor was elected the first President of Senegal, despite 
belonging to one of the smallest ethnic groups in the country, a Sereer and a Christian.  
In an interview about the history of ethnic relations in Senegal, a prominent 
retired professor at the University of Cheike Anta Diop told me the story of how, as a 
young man, he left his hometown of Kaolack to attend school in St. Louis and was 
befriended and invited home for lunch by a local of the city.  His friend appropriately 
introduced him to his grandmother, who, upon enquiry, learned that the young man, 
whom her grandson had brought home from school, was from the hinterland.  The 
grandmother’s response, (which the retired professor swore never to forget) was, “ah, 
c’est une indigène.”  Of little importance to this grandmother was the fact that this 
friend that her grandson had brought home was also a Tukulor. Tellingly, the fact that 
he was not from one of the Four Communes carried more weight than the fact that they 
all belonged to the same ethnic group.   
On another occasion, I was invited to have lunch with a group of professors at 
the University of Chieke Anta Diop, and was introduced to each of the seven men (ages 
ranging from the early 30s to the late 60s) by the names, ethnic affiliation, area of 
expertise and region of origin respectively.  Interestingly, with the exception of Diola, 
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each of the country’s ethnic groups was represented at the table. Being, by this time, 
fully acclimated to the non-stop teasing rivalries about the merits of the various ethnic 
groups that are typical at such social gatherings, I fully expected the discussion to 
follow this trend.  Surprisingly, what started out as (what I thought to be) a standard, 
ethnic teasing rivalry, soon turned into a teasing rivalry of citoyen versus indigene.  It 
was clear that those who fell into the former category, regardless of ethnic affiliation, 
felt somewhat superior to those who fell into the latter category.  “We [who are from 
Dakar, Saint Louis, Rufisque, Gorèe],” one of the professors explained to me, “are more 
civilized than they are [those from the other regions of Senegal]. When they were 
manning the farms, we were helping to decide governance in France.” 111   
That this social framework continues to operate on these levels is also illustrated 
by the fact that, taxi drivers from areas outside of original Four Communes are 
generally referred to as an indigene. I once asked how one can tell the difference, since 
almost everyone spoke Wolof and/or French and the response was: “You can most 
certainly tell by the accent, which differs by region.112”   
Clearly, since the framework for social distinction created by the French policy 
of establishing the Four Communes, that diminished importance of ethnicity as a social 
identifying factor and consequently as a useful political bargaining tool, persisted from 
the colonial era to post-colonial Senegal, colonialism has indeed played a huge role in 
non-politicization in Senegal.  The early experiences of non-ethnic based political 
participation may have set the stage for future concepts of inclusion in the sense that it 
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removed ethnic affiliation from the table as a potentially profitable or attractive strategy 
for political elites. 
 
Côte d’Ivoire 
 
Unlike the case of Senegal, the French played a more active role in 
Christianizing Ivoirian locals; particularly those in the Southern regions of the country. 
Since colonial settlements rarely extended beyond the coastal areas, Christian influence 
was almost entirely limited to the south. This did little to stem the flow of Islamic 
influence throughout the rest of the country, especially in the northern parts of the 
country.  By the 1900, Côte d’Ivoire was clearly delineated into a Muslim-north/ 
Christian-south society and the government favoring the south soon became apparent. 
While traditionally several regions were economically self-sufficient, significant 
economic differentiation occurred between regions (particularly the north and the south) 
under colonial rule. The South benefitted disproportionately in terms of direct 
investments and infrastructural developments and quickly became, in general, richer 
than the North. Whereas the northern regions experienced little improvement in road 
construction or other modes of transportation and access to schools and running water, 
great improvements along these lines were made in the Southern regions. Of course, 
geographic location/characteristics factors into this equation, as the northern and more 
Sahelian regions are far less conducive to agricultural development than richly fertile 
forest regions of the South.   Nonetheless, even in terms of per capita income (1958), 
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income in the southeast for a family of eight stood at 100,000 Franc de la Communauté 
Financière d'Afrique (CFA)113  per annum and 15,000 CFA in the North.114   
There is plenty of evidence indicating the continuation of the colonial 
differential treatment between the Muslim north and the Christian south in post-colonial 
Côte d’Ivoire.  In the 1970s there were many direct demands by northerners for former 
president Houphouët-Boigny to improve public services, increase public investments 
and promote economic development in the north by ethnic groups from the region. 
Houphouët-Boigny responded to these demands by scheduling presidential tours of the 
region in 1974.  
Immediately after this tour, Houphouët-Boigny reportedly allotted large sums of 
money to address the many problem of the region. An increasing amount of public 
investment towards the promotion of economic development was received in the north 
throughout the 1970s (see Table V). For example, public investment per capita of the 
northern region increased from 18,400 CFA francs in 1974 to 29,400 CFA francs in 
1977 and greatly exceeded that received in most other regions (with the notable 
exception of the Southwest and Abidjan Region).  Resenting this re-allocation of funds 
to the north, many southerners voiced their opposition to the increased investments in 
the northern regions. Some felt that by improving the region, many migrant workers 
would no longer have the incentives to work on the palm or cocoa plantations. Others 
believed that since a large portion of the country’s income is derived from the plantation 
economy of the south, this is where the majority of the investments should be made.115 
northerners on the other hand felt that while the investments were a start in the right 
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direction, the government was not doing nearly enough for the region. After all, many 
point out, the migrants workers from the north are the backbone of the Ivoirian 
economy.  
TABLE V 
Public investment per capita by region, 1971-77 (CFAF thousands) 
Region  1971  1972  1973  1974  1975
a
 1976
a
 1977
a
 
1971-77  1973 Pop. 
North  1.3  10.8  21.3  18.4  27.0  28.8  29.4  137.0  554.6  
East  5.3  0.4  0.4  1.1  1.5  1.1  1.5  11.3  266.5  
South  6.5  7.7  6.3  8.2  12.3  13.2  13.6  67.9  1,193.6  
West  0.3  3.4  2.3  3.7  4.6  2.8  3.1  20.2  701.9  
Center 
West  0.3  0.1  0.1  0.7  2.5  3.2  0.6  7.6  712.0  
Center  10.8  11.5  9.2  11.0  13.5  10.4  4.3  70.7  1,490.4  
S.West  49.4  17.9  13.5  33.3  60.3  75.0  102.6  351.9  156.0  
Abidjan  11.7  14.5  23.0  31.1  41.4  33.0  22.4  177.0  840.0  
Non-
allocated  2.3  2.8  3.0  4.2  6.2  6.8  6.9  32.2  NA
c
 
Total  9.6  11.0  12.4  16.1  22.9  22.1  19.8  113.8  5,910.0  
Source: Den Tuinder (1978: 151)  
a. Projected  
B. in thousands. The 1973 population was used for all years. Thus, figures for the later years are biased upward in 
comparison with earlier years.  
c. Not applicable 
By the end of the 1970s, the performance funds and generous investments in the 
north desisted.  While some Ivoirians and analysts believe that Houphouët-Boigny 
changed course under the pressure of resentment from the south, many felt that 
Houphouët-Boigny was hampered by the deteriorating economic environment brought 
on by the fall in world prices for primary agricultural products.  Since sustainability of 
investment initiative in the north depended largely upon economic growth or positive 
performance, these were some of the first programs to go on the budgetary chopping-
block.  Not only did Côte d’Ivoire revert to having severe regional socio-economic 
disparities between the north and the south, the resentment of the northerners against the 
government and the south were further exacerbated. 
The French policy of channeling working migrants from the northern regions of 
the country (sahelian or desert) and neighboring countries such as Burkina Faso and 
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Mali, to the southern regions to establish plantations has been identified as the key to 
the economic success of Côte d’Ivoire for the French. By the 1950s, France was the 
direct beneficiary of the wealth generated from the export of between 1000 and 500,000 
metric tons in cocoa, coffee, timber and banana. 116To the extent that returns from these 
economic activities benefitted the country and people of Côte d’Ivoire directly, it was in 
the form of public investments and in infrastructure. One of the primary goals of the 
colonial rulers, after all, was that the colonies could sustain themselves.  Notably 
however, the majority of colonial investments in infrastructure were designed primarily 
to promote trade with the metropole. Indeed, of the millions reportedly spent in foreign 
investments between  the early 1900s and 1960, more than three quarters was spent on 
those regions of crop production in an effort to improve production levels or allow for 
better access to market (that is, increase profits). 117    
There was no official change to this colonial migration policy at independence. 
To the extent that there were any changes, it was in the direction of an extension of the 
policy, when in a bid to attract more workers; Houhouёt-Boigny boldly declared that 
“the land belongs to he who cultivates it.” Côte d’Ivoire experienced a huge influx of 
foreign workers to the south, primarily from neighboring Burkina Faso (57.5 percent), 
Mali (20.4 percent) and Guinea (3.4 percent).   The majority, however, were born in the 
country, albeit in the northern regions (they were predominantly Voltaic— mainly 
Mossi and Sénoufo and northern Mandé —mainly Malinké and Dioula ethnic 
groups).118   
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While this policy has successfully attracted numerous workers from all over the 
continent, and consequently increased productivity and economic growth, it also 
amplified the strained relationships between natives and foreigners and/or between 
geographically contiguous groups that had developed during colonial rule. There are 
many empirical accounts of the tendencies (particularly of Southerners)  to treat 
northerners not as  real Ivoirians (Ivoiriens douteu’), but more like foreigners from  
Burkina Faso, Mali or Guinea (Coulibaly 2002).  
 Zolberg (1964) offers accounts of how the southerners often generalize and 
stereotype all northerners as Dioula and /or Marabouts. Because of shared geographic, 
regional and cultural traits between some internal migrant workers and foreign migrant 
workers, being northerner or Muslim became synonymous with being a foreigner. 
Crawford Young (1982) finds that the ethnic and religious background of agricultural 
migrant workers affected their ability to work with peasant farmers. In essence, whereas 
the French could arguably have continued through to infinity with such a policy as they 
never had to fully address the question of citizenship rights; once independent however, 
the effects of this policy could provide ethnic mobilization opportunities for Ivoirian 
political elites or opposition parties.    
Stewart (2000, 2002), Mustapha (2005) and Langer (2005, 2007) indicate that 
economic inequalities can indeed affect the political salience of group identity.  Their 
research on Ghana and Nigeria detail how group inequalities (perceived or otherwise) 
can provide powerful grievances, which in turn provide the bases for ethnic 
mobilization.  Given the regional disparity described above in the case of Côte d’Ivoire, 
one can assert that the politicization of ethnicity in Côte d’Ivoire has its origins in 
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colonial rule, particularly in terms of the policies that were initiated upon and that have 
persisted after independence.   
We already noted how local towns were essentially ethnic communities under 
the French policy of organizing the colony along ethnic lines, initially to facilitate 
conquest, and later, to control migrant workers in the urban areas. This did nothing to 
help promote tolerance or inter-ethnic cohesion in the society. Rather, French colonial 
policies promoted fierce competition among the various groups for access to 
colonialists and resources such as education and public services such as running water.  
One consequence of this policy (however unintended) was the development of 
voluntary associations. These groups, by substituting an association for the traditional 
political community, pledged to bring the issues pertinent to a particular ethnic group, 
to the local colonial administrators.  Leader of these associations were to be the new 
mediators between the population and the colonial rulers. If, these leaders had the “ear 
of the colonialist” this could mean access to basic services and/or resources.   
The problem however, is that some ethnic groups had more access to the 
colonial administrators and, therefore, some voluntary associations (given the ethnic 
base) were better able to lobby for resources/services than others. This is true of the 
Baoulè ethnic group as they were granted better access to educational opportunities than 
other ethnic groups such as the Krou, the Bètè or Malinkè. Indeed, the first President of 
Côte d’Ivoire, Houphouët-Boigny, was a beneficiary of this policy. Like other members 
of the Baoulè ethnic group, Houphouët-Boigny received a university degree. Houphouët 
-Boigny received the highest medical degree a non-French person was allowed under 
colonialism-Indigenous Medicine.  
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The rise of Voluntary Associations in Côte d’Ivoire 
There are many examples from contemporary Côte d’Ivoire that illustrate how 
voluntary associations continued to play a crucial role in the post-independent era. 
Zolberg (1964) details the role of ethnic voluntary groups in the development of 
Ivoirian political parties and offers an interesting account of how these associations 
helped Houphouët-Boigny become the first president of Côte d’Ivoire. According to 
Zolberg (1964), the PDCI secured the support of different ethnic communities by 
providing public offices and redistributing state resources to ethnic elites, who were 
brought into the PDCI via the voluntary associations. Consequently, the associations 
became the building blocks of early electoral coalitions. Ethnic groups were largely 
dependent on the effectiveness of these voluntary associations to “bring home the 
goods.”119   
Ultimately, the voluntary associations in Côte d’Ivoire helped to perpetuate 
internal divisions along ethnic lines. They also helped to create a political ethnic 
identity consciousness that may not have otherwise developed within the context of the 
pre-colonial traditional social unit. This was particularly true for those societies in 
which there was little organization above the village level. In such cases, smaller ethnic 
groups and associations found it more effective120 to form larger associations in which 
coalesced. For example, representatives of the eight groups that make up the Baoulé 
ethnic group would often coalesce into one large association, the first of which was 
called the Union Fraternelle des Originaires de Côte d’Ivoire (UFOCI). 121 The leaders 
of the Agni and other Akan groups of the Southeast founded the Association pour la 
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Défense des Intérêts des Autochtones de la Côte d’Ivoire (ADIACI)  in 1934. And, in 
1944 the Westerners in Abidjan founded the Union des Originaires des Six Cercles de 
l’Ouest (UOSCO), which included the Krou ethnic groups.  The Odienné ethnic group 
formed the Odienné Idéal and later incorporated other Malinké Muslims from areas 
such as Séguéla. Notably, these ethnic groups were generally closely related.122 Indeed, 
it was rare for unrelated ethnic groups to be found in the same voluntary associations.  
Even foreign Africans had their own associations. These included the Union Fraternelle 
des Senegalais and the Union Voltaique (Zolberg, 1964).  For these societies, therefore, 
the voluntary associations provided ethnic groups not only the communication links 
between the towns and the hinterland. They were also the chief mechanisms by which 
smaller ethnic groups could gain access to public goods and political representation.  
 As previously noted, the French policy of the Four Communes was never 
extended to Côte d’Ivoire.  Rather, the French administrative policy in Côte d’Ivoire 
was to establish ethnic communities whereby entire neighborhoods, towns, cities, and 
even regions were divided along ethnic lines. In theory, African subjects in Côte 
d’Ivoire could become citizens through a procedure analogous to individual 
naturalization. However, unlike Senegal, the necessary educational facilities for 
acquiring the proper qualifications for this form of legal assimilation were extremely 
limited in Côte d’Ivoire.123  Indeed, former president Houphouë-Boigny was among the 
many Ivoirians who had to travel to Senegal to fulfill their educational pursuits.  In 
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1921 for example, only 308 (of a total population of six million) of African Ivoirians 
were French citizens.124 Many among these African citizens were Senegalese. Because 
of the lack of educational facilities in Côte d’Ivoire and subsequently the lack of 
knowledge and skills among the Ivoirian population, Senegalese administrators were 
brought in by the French to fill administrative positions during the late-colonial era.   
 The impact was that neither citizens nor subjects of Côte d’Ivoire had much 
opportunity to participate in government.   Government remained in the hands of the 
French officials. Even after independence, a large majority of the administrative 
positions continued to be held by French citizens and other foreign nationals such as the 
Senegalese.125 Houphouët-Boigny also maintained the ethnically organized 
communities as established by the French.  This in turn perpetuated the relevance and 
importance of voluntary associations in Ivoirian post-independence politics.  With 
entire neighborhoods, towns, cities, and regions divided along ethnic lines and the 
question for Houphouët-Boigny was how to structure and coordinate the Ivoirian 
political and party system that would incorporate all of the major ethnic groups. Rather 
than restructuring or reorganizing the population126, Houphouët-Boigny incorporated 
the voluntary associations in the political and party system. Indeed, as in the late-
colonial era in which leaders of the voluntary associations from all of the major ethnic 
groups were incorporated into the party structure of the PDCI, in the post-independence 
era, Houphouoët-Boigny incorporated them not only into the PDCI but also the 
government.  In this way, voluntary associations became institutionalized and regarded 
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as effective redistributive mechanisms that both the state and ethnic groups could 
utilize.127   The benefits derived from membership and promise of political support 
among major ethnic groups created the incentives for sustaining and maintaining 
voluntary associations.  Their persistence in turn helped to reinforce and therefore 
accentuate, rather than attenuate, the importance of ethnic identity in Ivoirian politics.  
   
 
Conclusion 
 The chapter shows that despite having the same colonizers, the colonial 
administrative, political and economic policies in Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire varied 
significantly. These differences affected the formation of colonial and post-colonial 
societies as well as helped to determine the types of social institutions that emerged in 
each country both before and after independence. As the following chapters indicate, 
the nature and role that these institutions played in the respective countries were 
consequential for the attenuation and/or accentuation of ethnic identity. 
 Whereas the French conquest and colonial policies significantly altered the 
nature and strength of leadership and relations between the state and society in both 
countries, in the case of Senegal the colonial experience provided much of the space 
and opportunity for the rise of the Sufi Orders while the colonial experience in Côte 
d’Ivoire resulted in the rise of voluntary associations. Both the Sufi Orders and 
voluntary associations became the primary redistributive intermediaries between the 
society and the state within the respective countries.  Compared to voluntary 
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associations, which tended to emphasize the ethnic distinctions among Ivoirians 
however, Sufi Orders were largely pan-ethnic and inclusive.    The reliance on Sufi 
Orders and voluntary associations as redistributive intermediaries in post-independent 
Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire gave these informal institutions the bases for establishing the 
rules regarding the salience and/or use(s) of ethnicity as a mobilizational tool.   In the 
case of Senegal, the pan-ethnic and inclusive nature and redistributive role of the Sufi 
Orders helped to attenuate the political salience of ethnic identity in the Senegalese 
society. In Côte d’Ivoire, the redistributive role of the voluntary associations 
accentuated the salience of ethnic identity as both membership and access to resources 
were based on ethnic affiliation. 
 Once the institutions of the Sufi Orders and voluntary associations took on the 
role of intermediaries between the state and society, providing redistributive goods, it 
became exceedingly difficult to change (in great measure) the general rules regarding 
the salience of ethnicity to the access of public goods, political representation, over 
time.  In fact, the chapter shows that even after independence, the Sufi Orders and 
voluntary associations persisted, as did their redistributive role and the influence of their 
rules regarding ethnic balancing and/or ethnic transcendence, long after colonialism had 
ended.   
 The implication here is that if these institutions continued to establish the 
political rules of the game in terms of the salience of ethnicity and the use of ethnic 
identity as a mobilizational tool (potential or otherwise) , the chances  of ethnic 
politicization remained low/constant.  Conversely, if there are shifts to these 
institutional rules, the changes of the use of ethnic identity as a mobilizational tool may 
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rise dramatically.  Both hypotheses are explored in the subsequent chapters. The 
following chapter, for instance, details the extent to which the informal institutions of 
the Sufi Order and the voluntary associations have influenced the political rules of the 
game (particularly as they relate to the use or non-use of ethnic identity) in Senegal and 
Côte d’Ivoire since their rise during the colonial era.  The chapter finds that much of the 
difference in the relative salience of ethnic identity between the two countries may be 
explained by the nature and the redistributive roles of Sufi Order and voluntary 
associations.   The chapter also shows that while ethnicity has largely been more salient 
in Côte d’Ivoire than  in Senegal, informal institutional rules such as relatively balanced 
ethnic representation and the  agrarian policy of “land belongs to whomever cultivates 
it” kept ethnicity from being politicized in Côte d’Ivoire between 1960 and 1993. The 
question addressed in Chapter Six, therefore, is: what changed in Ivoirian politics that 
brought about ethnic conflict and strife that dominated the 1990s and much of the new 
millennium? Taking on a dominant argument in the study of comparative politics, the 
chapter suggests that the answer lies less with formal institutional change  and more so 
concerns changes to the informal institutional rules such as relatively balanced ethnic 
representation and the agrarian policy of “the land belongs to whomever cultivate it.”  
Chapters seven and eight provide empirical support reinforcing this argument.   
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
 
 
 Religion, Politics and Institutions: Towards an Explanation of Ethnic 
Politicization in West Africa 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 In this chapter, I explore the role of religion in the politicization or non-
politicization of ethnicity.  One the one hand, scholars such as Makhtar Diouf (1986) 
attribute the non-politicization of social cleavages in Senegal directly to religion. On the 
other hand, religion has also been identified as a major cause of ethnic politicization in 
Côte d’Ivoire. Given that both countries have a large Muslim population and a relatively 
small Christian population; can religion be a central factor in the contrasting outcomes 
of these two countries?  
Some writers point to the relatively larger Christian population in Côte d’Ivoire 
as a possible explanation for the differences in outcomes between the two countries.128 
This argument stems largely from assertions that Islam and Christianity have opposite 
effects on ethnic politicization, particularly within the context of African societies.  
Works on Christian missionary activities and Islamic influences imply that Islam has 
more of an integrating effect on African societies than Christianity. Christianity tends to 
accentuate ethnic identities/difference while Islam attenuates ethnic 
identities/differences.   
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  Côte d’Ivoire is 30 percent Christian; Senegal is 5 percent Christian.  
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  Ali Mazrui (1983) and Makhtar Diouf (1994),  129credit Islam with playing an 
integrating role in African societies.   Makhtar Diouf, for example, asserts that by 
attenuating local divisions and creating a more over-arching, less divisive identity, 
Islam has “de-ethnicized” the Senegalese society (1994:92).  According to Diouf, not 
only has Islam created solidarity among Muslims regardless of their ethnic background, 
it teaches tolerance and respect for other religious groups.   In their studies of ethnic 
politicization in Africa, Lemarchand (1964) and Vail (1982)130 find that African 
countries with a large Christian population are more likely than Islamic African 
countries to experience ethnic politicization and ethnic conflict because that Christianity 
has reinforced and accentuated ethnic identities and tribalism throughout African 
societies. According to these authors, whereas Islam is aimed at unifying cultures, 
Christian missionaries are instrumental in creating cultural identities through their 
specification of, and dependence on, traditional culture and local languages for their 
evangelizing. Such parochial identities are then reinforced and perpetuated through 
mission education (1989: 12).  
 While my own research on religious tolerance seems to fit well within this 
framework, closer  analysis of the role of Islam, more specifically the Sufi 
Brotherhoods in Senegal, suggest that it is not Islam or Christianity per se, that prevent 
or cause the politicization of social cleavages.  Indeed, if Islam and Christianity were to 
be understood in this fundamentally primordial way, how would we explain the bloody 
wars between Muslim sects or Christian denominations? The Protestant/Catholic 
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 Makhtar Diouf is a prominent Senegalese Scholar and author of “Les Ethnies et La Nation (1994). 
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 Vail argues that missionaries were instrumental in creating cultural identities through their 
specification of “custom” and “tradition” and by writing “tribal” histories (1989). Such parochial 
identities were then reinforced and perpetuated through mission education (1989:12). 
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conflict of Northern Ireland is very well known, studied and documented. Also, as late 
as 1989, Muslims along the Senegalese-Mauritania border clashed in violent conflict 
over fishing rights.  
 What is more, if Islam were to be used as a primordial identity for the majority 
of the people of Senegal, and hence the basis of good relations among the various ethnic 
groups, it should follow that cleavages will develop between those who share this 
identity and those who do not. Yet, what is observed empirically is that the five percent 
Christian population are over-represented at the national level, the state level, as well as 
in modern sectors of the economy. Senghor, the first President of Senegal, was 
Christian.  
The central argument of the chapter is that while religion is indeed important, as 
it helps to shape behavior and influences the capacity for collective action, it does not 
determine political actions.   Islam was able to mitigate ethnic politicization in Senegal, 
not because of the religious doctrine or theological foundations, but because of the 
extent to which the religious structures encouraged the facilitation of a social 
institutions (formal or informal), that: (a) attenuate ethnic differences; and (b) serve as 
an effective counterweight to the state, in terms of goods provisions.  As such, like 
Villalón (2006), I underscore the need to examine the issue, not so much as a bipolar 
relationship, but more so, within the context of more nuanced understanding of state- 
society relations.  Joel Migdal (1988) provides a useful model of this relationship by 
characterizing society as a mix of social organizations. He characterizes African 
societies as strong in relation to the state but diffuse in that social control is spread 
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through various fairly autonomous social organizations, among which both religious 
and ethnic affiliations should be considered.131  
By tracing the history of the interaction between the post-colonial regime in the 
Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire and local social institutions/ associations, the chapter shows 
that social structures born out of Islamic religious tradition proved to be effective at 
mitigating ethnic politicization not simply because they were able to serve as conduits 
for the redistribution of governmental benefits. These Brotherhoods were successful at 
mitigating ethnic politicization because they were able to do so in a manner that was 
non-discriminatory, inclusive and pan-ethnic.  As informal institutional configurations 
that help to transcend historic ethnic and religious communities, Sufi Brotherhoods 
provide an institutionalized and pragmatic basis for the idea of national citizenship and 
cross-cultural tolerance that blocks the use of political appeals to cultural difference as a 
mobilization tool. 
  Conversely, in Côte d’Ivoire, social institutions that sought (with varying 
degrees of success) to mediate the processes of state-society relations operated largely 
on the basis of ethnic and ethno-regional differences.   The success of these social 
organizations at redressing the mismatch that has usually characterized African state-
society struggles depended upon a precarious ethnic/ethno-regional balance. Once the 
perception of particular ethnic groups gaining better access relative to others became 
more pervasive, individuals became susceptible to ethnic appeals, providing favorable 
conditions for political elites to politicize ethnicity. 
The chapter also depicts how the Ivoirian social institutions/associations became 
incorporated into, and existed under, the umbrella of the Parti Democratique de la Côte 
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d’Ivoire (PDCI) as individual elements of an ethnic whole.  This created incentives for 
continued investments in ethic/ethno-religious/ ethno-regional identities. It also created 
a favorable condition for political elites to make ethnic/ethno-religious/ethno-regional 
appeals at the advent of an authority vacuum and/or political fallout.132  Conversely, in 
Senegal, the political parties have been largely dependent on the Religious 
Brotherhoods for electoral votes. The patronage ties of the respective Brotherhoods 
formed the social base of the political parties thereby creating a transcendent social 
capital that has acted as a kind of bulwark against the tendency of political elites to seek 
the path of least resistance in political mobilization in playing the ethnic card.133   
 
 
 
Religious Tolerance and Coexistence: A Survey of Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire 
  
 That there is a high degree of religious tolerance throughout Senegal is easily 
observed empirically.  The Constitution of Senegal specifically defines the country as a 
secular state and provides for freedom of religion.  According to the International 
Religious Reports, the government of Senegal generally respects religious freedoms in 
words as well as deeds.134   A survey of International Religion Reports from 2001 to 
2008 indicates very little change in the status of respect for religious freedoms by the 
government over time.  There have been no reports of societal abuses or discrimination 
based on religious affiliation, belief, or practice. The government observes Tabaski, 
Tamkharit, the birth of the Prophet Muhammad, Korite, Easter Monday, Ascension, 
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over future governance and policies issues. 
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 See International Religion Reports.   
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Pentecost, Feast of the Assumption, All Saints’ Day, and Christmas as national 
holidays. 135 In Senegal, even the most devout Muslims have no qualms about sending 
their children to Catholic institutions. In fact, the majority of students attending 
Christian schools in Dakar are Muslims.136   
 Both the Sufi Orders in Senegal and Catholics in Senegal strongly embrace 
values and principles of religious freedom.   These attitudes have led to a high degree of 
religious tolerance throughout the country. Differences in dogma, practices and religion 
are met with high levels of tolerance and emphasis on unity, respect and deference, 
rather than condemnation and/or discrimination by the Sufi Orders.   Behrman (1970), 
details for instance, how the doctrines of the respective Religious Orders emerged from, 
and have followed, a traditional Sufi path of tolerance whereby all religions and 
believers merit being treated with respect so long as they do not attack Islam.137  It is 
not uncommon for Sufi Orders to attend each other’s religious activities and 
celebrations. In fact, the belief that all marabouts are good, regardless of affiliation, is 
widespread throughout Senegal.  
 Despite formal disagreement among the religious Brotherhoods over such issues 
as the official day on which to begin observance of Ramadan for example, there are no 
disparaging or disapproving statements issued by the Marabouts. Indeed, the general 
attitude among the public is that such differences are not at all significant as all spiritual 
roads, regardless of the path taken, lead to the same end.138 Each Marabout issues its 
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Ndiggle139 concerning the observance of Ramadan, which is then passed on to the 
respective followers during worship and via the media. In their coverage, the media has 
generally remained neutral. Indeed, newspaper op-ed pieces and radio or television 
commentaries rarely cast any particular Brotherhood as being right or wrong on these 
issues.   
  It is also not uncommon for Sufi and Catholic leaders to attend each other’s 
events and celebrations.   Christians are generally invited to the homes of Muslims in 
observance and celebration of Tabaski140 and Christians often do the same for Muslims 
at Christmas.141  The Pope received warm welcome during his visit to Senegal in 1992, 
not just from the Christian population but also from many of the Sufi leaders and their 
congregants, The cordial relationship between the Brotherhoods and the Christian 
minority is also evident in the practice of having representatives of the Catholic Church 
share the same place of honor on the dais in official state ceremonies as representatives 
of the Sufi Brotherhoods. While in general, name choice analysis is not a scientific 
measure of social tolerance, the relatively high number of non-Serer and non-Diola 
Senegalese142  with Muslim firsts name and Christian middle names is significant here. 
An examination of school attendance in Dakar indicates that the majority of students 
attending Christian schools are Muslims.143 Consequently, as prominent lawyer 
explained:  
I can no more dislike Christianity than I could Islam. I am a practicing 
Muslim who is baptized in the Catholic Church. As a child, I studied 
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 Direct orders issued by Marabouts to fellow congregants. 
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 Fest of the Sacrifice of the lamb as represented in the Old Testament of the Bible.  
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 Ethnic groups with larger percentage of Christians than Muslims.  
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 See the International  Religious Report , 2008.  
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both the Koran and the Bible.  I went by my Muslim name on the 
playground and my Christian name in the classroom. 144 
 
 While some among the Senegalese intellectuals have expressed the view that it 
is impossible to gain electoral success unless one is a Muslim and Wolof in 
contemporary Senegal145, this was not born out in my own research. When asked which 
they thought was more important, to support politicians that shared their own religious 
affiliations or to support the politician with the best abilities, even if he/she was from a 
different group, 90 percent said they thought it was better to support the politician with 
the best abilities.146In response to the question about whether Senegalese tend to support 
Muslims, one respondent offered the following explanation: 
The reason that some political candidate of minority ethnic groups are not 
chosen during elections is not because they are not Muslims or Wolof, but 
because of their inability to speak the lingua franca well, which tends to lead to 
problems of communication with the majority of the population…If [one] 
cannot communicate with those who lack education in the official language 
[French], one’s abilities to win over the voters become dramatically reduced. 
Also, voters could be troubled by the fact that they elected a candidate with 
whom they would not be able to communicate.147 
 
Almost all respondents point to the fact the country’s first President, Léopold 
Senghor, was Christian as adequate disproof of the above assertion.  That the first duly 
elected president was a Christian is significant. Among other things, it strongly suggests 
that Marabouts had little problem accepting political leadership by the religious 
minority.  As one respondent points out; having Catholic wives who were active in 
public affairs did not hamper support of by Sufi Orders for the presidential bids of 
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Adbou Diouf and Abdoulayde Wade.  In fact, President Wade’s decision to appoint a 
second Catholic to his Cabinet in June 2007 after complaints about the lack of Christian 
appointments was met with approval by the Sufi Orders.  In general, expanding the 
cabinet to 38 members is viewed as a relatively small compromise for continued 
tolerance and adequate representation of all Senegalese.148   
 When asked whether they thought that non-Muslim politicians had difficulty 
gaining country-wide electoral support because of their religion, only 10 percent 
agreed.149   The non-Muslim political party leaders themselves fully disagreed.  A 
prominent Senegalese Christian politician in Dakar pointed out that he is loved and 
respected by people all over the country, Christians and non-Christians alike. He stated:   
In fact, I receive more electoral support from Muslims than among the Christian 
population…people like me or dislike me, not because of my religion, but because of 
my political views and ideas. We are a very tolerant and respectful people.150 
 
  A Catholic Diola party leader from the southern Casamance region similarly 
stated that while he in fact enjoys overwhelming support among the Christians in 
Casamance, this had less to do with his religion and more so, the legacy of his work in 
the region as Mayor. According to this party leader: 
In the [2007] election, we carried areas in the country that were predominantly 
Muslim while we lost in regions with larger Christian communities. This tells 
you that it is not about religion… [T]he people don’t care if you are a Christian 
or a Musliman, they care that you are a good person and that you intend to work 
hard to help their community and the country.151 
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In sharp contrast to Senegal, a high degree of religious intolerance is evident 
throughout Côte d’Ivoire. As in Senegal, there is no official state religion in Côte 
d’Ivoire.  In fact, the Ivoirian Constitution, much like Senegal’s, declares freedom of 
religion and religious practices for everyone. In practice however, Islam has largely 
been depicted as a religion of foreigners, non-citizens or circumstantial Ivoirians. 
Conversely,   Christianity (for the historical and ethnic and ethno-regional reasons 
explored in the previous chapter), has been palpably favored by the Ivoirian 
government. Despite the Ivoirian government’s claims to provide religious freedoms, 
there have been serious infringements. The Ivoirian Muslim community has complained 
of being repressed and discriminated against for many years.   Muslims in general 
largely believe that their religion has made them targets of discrimination by the 
government with regard to both employment and access to governmental resources. 152  
Many believe that it is not by coincidence that all of the heads of state and many senior 
government officials since independence have been Christians.153  
 While like Senegal, a majority of Ivoirians (80 percent)154 thought that it is 
better to support the politician with the best abilities, a majority of Muslim respondents 
felt that this rule has not been not strictly adhered to in Ivoirian society. Muslims in 
general feel discriminated against. Many call for more Muslims in high government 
positions “and not just token positions to placate us Muslims, but individuals who can 
effectively represent our interests.”155  The Christian respondents argue that it makes 
perfect sense that Christians have a stronger showing at the highest levels of 
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government and in the private sector, as more often than not, Christians out- perform 
Muslims academically and are more competitive in the job market. Christian schools 
are better educational institutions that Quranic institutions. 156  
Whereas the Senegalese government recognizes both Christian and Muslim 
holidays, up to 1993, most official holidays in Côte d’Ivoire have been Christian. The 
main Muslim holidays were public only for Muslims: the Civil Service and public 
schools remained open on those days.157 Also, while Quranic schools are required (since 
1965) to teach French, Arabic is not taught in public schools. In fact, when the 
curriculum for public education was discussed in the 1960s, Houphouët-Boigny refused 
to include Arabic in the list of foreign languages offered at the primary and secondary 
school levels.158 When the proposition was repeated by Conseil National Islamique in 
the mid-1990s, it provoked a general outcry on grounds that the Muslim federation was 
trying to Islamize Côte d’Ivoire.159 Simone Gbagbo, wife to current President Gbagbo, 
has been heavily criticized by Muslims for her blatant anti-Muslim statements and 
rhetoric.160     
 One of the most frequently cited examples of religious bias on the part of the 
Ivoirian government is the construction of a US $300 million basilica in Yamoussoukro 
by Houphouët-Boigny.161 While the government helped in the building of several 
mosques throughout the decades, the completion of such Christian monuments as the 
Marian sanctuary, the Saint Paul Cathedral (both in Abidjan) and the Yamoussoukro 
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basilica highlight a serious disproportion in financial investments between the country’s 
main religions.162 Muslim leaders also point to the creation of two new bishoprics in the 
almost entirely Islamized towns of Bondoukou and Odienné, respectively in 1988 and 
1995, as a sure sign of an attempt by the Ivoirian government to promote Christianity 
from above. These activities prompted influential Islamist reformist El Hadj`Aboubacar 
Fofana to ask in 1990: “Is the State still secular or it is choosing a religion?”163     
 The Ivoirian government has a long history of monitoring Muslim religious 
groups for what it deems “subversive or dangerous” political activity.164  There are 
numerous reports of raids by the Government of areas owned by Muslims. In 1999 
gendarmerie searched the mosques and the homes of Muslim Imams and in 2000 
Muslim leaders and their followers were reportedly killed by the authorities during 
demonstrations.165 Muslim Human Rights watchdogs have issued statements that the 
government of President Gbagbo has been targeting Muslims harshly since taking over 
the reign of the country in 2002. According to the Human Rights group, Muslims in the 
Côte d’Ivoire have been subjected to arrests, killings, and the destruction of their 
mosques by death squads. These squads are set up by the president to intimidate the 
Muslims, particularly those living in the capital city of Abidjan.166  
 The bias has negatively affected the relationships between Muslims and 
Christians. 167 Anti-Muslim statements, characterizations and quips are not uncommon 
in the streets of Abidjan and in the media.  A survey of the local newspapers dating 
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back to the 1970s suggests that coverage of Muslims is three times more likely to be 
negative coverage of Christians. 168 Similarly, a survey of editorial cartoons indicates 
that depictions of Muslims tend to reflect negative stereotypes more often than do 
depictions of Christians. 169  
  The introduction of Ivoirité by Bédié in 1994 has further compounded the 
Muslims/Christian tensions.  The policy has had the profound effect of interjecting 
religion into the national political contest.  Akindès (2003) noted for instance, that the 
identity discourse propelled by Ivoirité has “sown the seeds of mutual paranoia” in Côte 
d’Ivoire since 1994.  Communities began to view each other on the basis of identities 
fixed to a dichotomy where all northerners and Muslims were the out-group.  Ivoirité 
also promulgated a new electoral code that essentially created two types of citizen: pure 
Ivoirians and circumstantial Ivoirians. 
 While it cannot be stated with 100 percent certainty that the introduction of 
Ivoirité resulted in the creation of the Rassemblement des Républicains (RDR) in 1994, 
and certainly the founders of the political party themselves were not from the northern 
regions of the country, nor were they Muslims, there is something telling in the fact that 
northerners and/or Muslims comprise the support base for the party. However, it was 
undoubtedly Bédié’s declaration that the RDR was nothing but a northern regionalist 
party with a sinister Muslim agenda, his dismissal of Ouattara loyalists in the civil 
service, the party and the government media, including Ali Coulibaly (head of Ivoirian 
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TV1), Koné Moussa (editor of Ivoir Soir) and Yacouba Kébé, the managing director of 
Fraternité Matin that drove thousands of Ivoirians to support the RDR (Crook, 
1997:13). 
    The disqualification of Ouattara from running for President in 1995 on the basis 
of allegation that both of his parents were not Ivoirians also led to wide scale shift in the 
support of northerners and Muslims from the PDCI to the RDR.  Many believed that 
Ouattara was being disenfranchised because he was a northerner and Muslim.170   It is 
not surprising, therefore, that northerners and Muslims ultimately formed the base of the 
RDR. Thus, although Crook (1997) rightly points out that RDR founder Djény Kobina 
was from the south-east near the border with Ghana and self-identified was a Nzimba, 
and three of the other eight founding deputies were from the southern and central towns 
of San Pedro, Sassandra and Bouake´ (Crook, 1997), loyalty to Ouattara on the ground 
has been mostly among northern Muslims.171 Ouattara further galvanized the 
northern/Muslim votes by declaring at a political rally in France, that his presidency 
was being denied simply because he was from the North and because he was a 
Muslim.172 The fact that a number of Muslims northerners lost their jobs under 
President Bédié’s leadership fueled the fire even further, by seemingly reaffirming a 
north-south, Muslim-Christian divide.  
 RDR party officials deny allegations that Ouattara has made appeals on the basis 
of religious affiliations. In fact, the Secretary General points out that the members of the 
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RDR are diverse, ethnically and religiously.173 The manifesto and party documents 
support the Secretary General’s claims. There are no explicit references to ethnic, 
religious or even regional concerns. The official party documents focus on economic 
issues, in particular, rationalism similar to the type of policies Houphouёt-Boigny had 
implemented.  As Chandra (1994) points out, however, it is often the case that ethnic 
appeals are not overt or explicit. Party manifestos can refrain from making explicit 
appeals to ethnicity, yet the party officials themselves do not.  Ouattara’s statements in 
France accusing Bédié of undermining his chances at the presidency simply because he 
is from the North and Muslim, is a case in point.174 It is the belief among top Ivoirian 
officials that this was Ouattara’s official war cry for his fellow northerners and Muslims 
to mobilize behind his cause- a bid on the presidency.175     
 That ethnicity and religion are closely related- if one is a Baoulé or a Bété, 
he/she almost certainly a Christian, and if one is a Senufo he/she is almost certainly a 
Muslim- further complicated the problem.  What may seem purely religious on the 
surface may indeed be undergirded by ethnicity.  As many Muslims as non-Muslims 
(particularly the Christian Bété) were upset about the lack of representation at the top 
level government appointments and outraged at the dominance of the Baoulé.176  
Indeed, the 1980s was characterized by political upheavals with opposition parties and 
leaders calling for an end to “Baoulé nepotism,” especially in recruitment to public jobs. 
Le Front Populaire Ivoirien (FPI), and its leader Laurent Gbabo, were the main 
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oppositions to Houphouёt-Boigny’s leadership to the PDCI and Houphouët-Boigny 
during this time period.   
 The FPI fiercely opposed and coined the phrase, the Baoulization de la Côte 
d’Ivoire.177  The FPI’s main message in 1990 was to stress that the PDCI was a partial 
regime which had systematically favored the interests of particular Ivoirian ethnic 
groups-Baoulé.   This tactic gained support among the Akyé and “lower-ranking” Akan 
ethnic groups as well- especially after Houphouët-Boigny named Bédié as his 
successor. Indeed, a prominent Ivoirian writer noted that rightly or wrongly, after 33 
years of power by a Baoulé president and the passage of this leadership role to Bédié, 
someone of the same, ethnic affiliation, the majority of the Ivoirian ethnic groups 
forged opposition to the Baoulé ethnic group.178  
 The general impression of Houphouët-Boigny naming a fellow Baoulé as his 
successor is that he was seeking to promote the dominance of the Baoulé people.179  A 
number of newspaper articles stated as much. According to the author, with the many 
instances of mismanagement of the country’s finances at the hands of Bédié, a point 
well known and acknowledged by Houphouët-Boigny himself, the only reason that 
Houphouët-Boigny chose Bédié was because he is a fellow Baoulé.  By Houphouët-
Boigny’s owns words, Bédié was not honest, and lacked honor.180  The backlash against 
Bédié increased after he published a book in 1995 promoting the idea that the rulers de 
la Côte d’Ivoire should come from among the “superior” Akan ethnic group.181    
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 The RDR also vehemently accused the PDCI of being nothing more than a cover 
for unfair domination by the President’s ethnic group the Baoulé. RDR party leader 
denied Gbagbo’s accusations however, that the ethnic groups from the North were 
favored by the PDCI.  Ouattara and the RDR decried Bédié’s purge of the party’s 
supporters from high-level positions182 within the government as systematic 
discrimination against the ethnic groups of the North.   The RDR therefore accused the 
FPI of trying to promote the interests of the Bété by evoking fear of foreigners, a 
concept which, for the Bété, meant all non-Bété ethnic groups who moved to the West 
to establish, or work on, plantations.  The PDCI‘s response was to characterize both the 
FPI and RDR as ethno-regional parties—“the party of the Bété” and the “party of 
northerners and Muslim,” respectively and cast itself as the only true “National Party” 
de la Côte d’ Ivoire.  
 Decades of uncontrolled migration into the center and south-west areas of the 
country had the effect of fostering grievances among the Bété, Baoulé and those ethnic 
groups from the North.   The migration of the people from the Baoulé region, the north 
and the Sahelian states, (mainly Burkina Faso) to the regions long settled by the Bété 
and the Krou ethnic groups,  created bitter conflict between the indigenous population  
and “foreigners” over land and employment. According to Raulin (1957), “…since the 
Bété knows that the population of Gagnoa is made up mostly of non- Bété foreigners, 
he fears, rightly or wrongly, the rule of non-Bété and he rebels against the Dioula” and 
the Baoulé.183   The colonial policies, perpetuated by Houphouёt-Boigny, were 
perceived as benefiting the large cocoa plantation owners and foreigners over the 
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indigenes, and therefore helped to define the boundaries of the Bété identity in terms of 
opposition to the PDCI. Similarly, the treatment of northern Ivoirians as foreigners or 
“circumstantial Ivoirians” by Southern ethnic groups helped to define the boundaries of 
the Northern/Muslim/Dioula identity in terms of opposition to the PDCI and the FPI.  
The end result in both instances was the creation of “centers for mobilized ethno-
regional hostility” (Crook, 1997: 222). 
 
 
Towards an explanation of ethnic and religious tolerance in West Africa: role of Sufi 
Brotherhoods and Voluntary Associations in Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire.  
  
 The following section explains how the Sufi-Brotherhoods and voluntary 
associations affected the set of options open to political elites in post-colonial Senegal 
and Côte d’Ivoire. In the case of Senegal, the pan-ethnic nature of Sufi Brotherhoods 
and their efforts at the re-distribution of government resources along non-ethnic lines 
de-legitimized ethnic differences and expunged ethnic/cultural difference from the post-
colonial politics and political discourse. Consequently, appeals to ethnic differences 
became a highly unlikely political mobilization tool for Senegalese political elites.  
Conversely, in Côte d’Ivoire, ethnic affiliation was a prerequisite for access to state 
resources. This accentuated ethnic differences and ultimately legitimized ethnicity as a 
pre-requisite for political participation, thereby making ethnic distinctions a useful 
mobilization tool.  
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The rise of Maraboutic Authority in Senegal 
As discussed in the previous chapter, one of the most striking developments that 
took place after the French conquest of Senegal was the remarkably rapid spread of 
Islam and the rise of new Muslim religious leaders who became the predominant 
indigenous authorities throughout the country.  Although Islam existed prior to the 
arrival of the French (owing to the Islamization of the region in general), it was not until 
the nineteenth century that the Brotherhoods became extremely important. The 
Scramble for Africa and territorial conquest demolished the traditional indigenous social 
structures and political institutions and caused a breakdown of the old political and 
social order, which then created a virtual authority vacuum. The Islamic Sufi orders 
filled this authority gap.  According to Galvan (2002): “by the mid-1880s, Muslim 
spiritual authority was well on its way to replacing the temporal authority of traditional 
African rulers and elites whose power had been smashed during the course of the 
French conquest.”184 
The rapid adoption of the Islamic Sufi Orders over time enhanced the appeal of 
the Marabouts, allowing them considerable autonomy over a huge percentage of the 
Senegalese population. Data from the national population census indicate that the 
number of Muslims in Senegal went from approximately 8.4 percent of the total 
population in 1907 to 82 percent of the total population in 1963.185  Since the French 
successfully defeated local opposition to colonial rule however, why didn’t the colonial 
administration promote Christianity as a counterforce to Islamic influence and seek to 
eradicate the Sufi Orders?  
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By some accounts, French colonialists were in perpetual fear of jihad type 
resistance by the Muslim leaders186 and decided against trying to eradicate or compete 
with them. Rather, French leadership in the form of governor Faidherbe assumed a 
more pragmatic approach that involved co-opting and controlling the Sufi-leaders: 
Marabouts could retain social and spiritual dominance in the countryside, so long as 
they would help in the promotion of peanut production, endorse the payment of taxes to 
the French administrator and actively recruite soldiers. Cooperative Marabouts would, 
in turn, be rewarded with monetary gifts, political donations and access to land.187 
According to Behrman by the 1950s” [i]t became a matter of habit for families of the 
great Marab[o]us to expect money from the government.” Since much of this 
production was to take place in the rural regions of the country, which comprised more 
than 97 percent and 85 percent of the total population between 1885 and 1945 
respectively, the French found it in their best interest to co-opt the leading Marabouts. 
Gellar states: 
To the extent that he Marabouts preached submission and obedience to the 
French authority while exhorting their followers to pay their taxes on time, settle 
new lands, and grow peanuts as a cash crop, the French were willing to grant the 
leaders of Senegal’s major Muslim brotherhoods a good deal of autonomy and 
freedom of movement.  188 
 
Disciples recognized that besides their religious leadership, Marabouts served as 
conduits for redistribution of state benefits. The arrangement with the Colonial 
authorities allowed Marabouts to accumulate wealth. Because of their involvement as 
peanut producers and the contributions of their followers, the leading Marabouts were 
able to accumulate much wealth which enabled them to support large entourages and to 
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fulfill many of the redistributive functions previously performed by traditional rulers 
(Gellar, 1995:46).  Entire communities, townships and many individuals rely directly 
upon Marabouts for their daily existence. Marabouts help to construct houses, 
community health care centers, roads and running water among other resources.  
The ability of the Marabouts to provide economic security and protection 
provided a clear incentive for disciples to comply with the instructions of their 
Marabouts and helped significantly to reinforce the Marabouts’ authority over their 
followers. Many in Senegal attribute their success in life as professors, journalists, 
businessmen, to the assistance provided to them by Marabouts. Even the taxi and car 
rapide189 drivers owe their livelihood to the Marabouts.  When asked what specific 
attributes are considered in electoral choices, one student stated: “I vote the way my 
Khalif tells me to vote… my allegiance is to my Marabout...It is because of him that I 
am attending university and will have a good life once I am done.”190 Although among 
the minority to directly admit the level of Maraboutic influence in their political 
decision making, this respondent highlights a reality in Senegal to which many will not 
publically admit. Another stated: 
If you need assistance to go to the doctor in Senegal, you do not go to see your 
local government representative; you go to your Marabout. If you want to move 
from the country to Dakar, you go through your local Marabout to make the 
connections for housing and work, not the Mayor. Marabouts take care of us, not 
government…[i]t does not matter where you are from or what ethnic group you 
belong to, if you need help…you go to your Marabout. 191 
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Indeed, Maraboutic influence also rose to high levels in Senegal because of the 
“pan-ethnic, inclusive, universalistic, and transcendent”192 nature of the Brotherhoods.   
Despite the fact that there are various Brotherhoods, with different practices and dogma, 
there has been no real ethnic divide among the Brotherhoods. Rather, each of the Orders 
has proven to be “ethnically transcendent.”193   Some scholars suggest that Sufi leaders 
were able to shore up their membership because they were universalistic. The ability to 
attract followers from all of the major ethnic groups allowed the Sufi leaders more 
social command and legitimacy.  The reverse may however be the case: as the 
percentage of the population adhering to the Sufi Orders increased, the more inclusive, 
universalistic and pan-ethnic they became; ergo, the more influence the Marabouts 
gained with the indigenous population.   Whatever the direction of the causal arrow, it 
became clear by the 1950s that the leaders of the main Sufi orders had become pillars of 
the colonial establishment and were deeply embroiled in post-independence politics.   
As the influence of the Brotherhoods grew stronger and influence over the 
decisions expanded to more than 90 percent of the country’s population, the Sufi orders 
came to enjoy a particularly favorable socio-political position.  Marabouts had clear 
incentives to demand benefits from the colonial administrator and later the state, on the 
one hand, and the clout to claim the allegiance of the disciples on the other hand.  
Without direct access to the local population, political parties, and indeed, the entire 
post-colonial regime structure are deeply socially embedded.   
It was evident during the 2007 presidential elections for example, that while 
somewhat elitist, Senegalese political parties have no “real” social base of which to 
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speak.  Campaign appeals almost never evoked any real sense of party loyalty.  Rather, 
as the Secretary General of the Parti de l’Independence et de Travaillé explained, like 
every other party in Senegal… [they] get votes by going through the Marabouts.”194  
This may help to explain why, as depicted in almost all newspaper coverage of 
Senegalese elections since independence, electoral candidates, (Christian and non-
Christian alike), make a point of meeting with the most powerful Marabouts in the 
country as noted earlier.  
 
Voluntary Associations in Côte d’Ivoire 
We already noted how local towns in Côte d’Ivoire were essentially ethnic 
communities under the French policy of organizing the colony along ethnic lines, 
initially to facilitate conquest, and later, to control migrant workers in the urban areas.  
This did nothing to help promote tolerance or inter-ethnic cohesion in the country. If 
anything, it promoted fierce competition among the various groups for access to the 
colonial administration (and later the state) and resources such as health services, 
educational facilities/institutions and, public services such as running water. One 
consequence of this policy was the development of ethnically based voluntary 
associations.  
While many of these associations claimed to seek the protection of the interests 
of Ivoirian in general, they almost always represented the interest of one or a few 
closely related ethnic groups.  Their objective was to promote the progress of their 
particular territory. As such, these associations pledged to bring the issues pertinent to a 
particular ethnic group to the local colonial administration. The Association de Defense 
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des Intérêts des Autochtones (ADIACI) is perhaps one of the most active associations 
that emerged to represent the interest of the Agni ethnic group  during the 1920s and 
1930s (Chauveau and Dozon, 1987: 259).   The Mutualité Bété was also established in 
Abidjan by migrants from the centre-west during the 1920s and 1930s. The objective of 
the Mutualité Bété was to promote development in their home region.  According to 
Cohen (1974): 
These groups brought together the most influential people born in the region in 
order to combine their collective resources and access to public authorities to 
improve the locality.”   Having the ear of the state administrators often meant 
better access to basic services or resources for them.195   
 
  In their competition for scarce resources ethnically based associations posed a 
significant problem. They accentuated ethnic, ethno-regional and ethno-religious 
differences, which created conditions favorable for political elites to politicize ethnicity.  
Stated differently, rather than encouraging Ivoirian national unity, these associations 
provided an institutionalized basis for the idea of citizenship to be centered on ethnic, 
ethno-regional, ethno-religious differences. They did little to discourage or block the 
use of political appeals to cultural differences as potentially profitable or an attractive 
mobilization strategy choice for political elites. Instead, the issue of ethnicity became 
directly tied to a struggle for power and economic goods, within and outside the state, 
which created incentives for ethnic factions within the post-colonial regime to use them 
as political capital in their competition for power and access to limited economic 
resources.  
 Unlike the Sufi Brotherhoods, the Ivoirian voluntary associations became 
incorporated into the emerging political party structure prior to independence.   
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Knowing that the Baoulé could not stand alone in the leadership of the country, 
Houphouët-Boigny used his mastery of ethnic calculus to create “a dream of territorial 
unity” (Zolberg, 1964, p.74). Incorporation of the association into the PDCI meant 
broad support from the major ethnic groups in the country. According to Zolberg, the 
most important factor to the political success of Houphouёt-Boigny and the Parti 
Democratique de la Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI) was his “ability to take advantage of personal 
position, political opportunities, and widespread grievances, to create a sort of 
federation of ethnic groups” (Zolberg, 1964:74). One of the founders of the Treichville 
branch of the PDCI offered this explanation of the process:  
During the elections of [1945 and 1946] we had found that the voluntary 
associations that existed in the city functioned efficiently for electoral purpose 
as well.  In preparation for the battle we would be waging, we thought that it 
was necessary to create highly solitary units, equivalent to the communist cells 
in France. Ethnic organization was the most natural and the most practical for 
this purpose. Regardless of where they lived and worked in the city, people of 
the same tribe came together for social purpose. So, we transformed the ethnic 
associations into party subcommittees. Where they did not exit, we helped the 
tribes to organize original ones. Only in this way could we communicate with 
the members, collect dues, and pass down party directives in the various local 
languages 196 
 
 It was through this personalized strategy of ethnic co-optation that Houphouët-
Boigny won the political support of the North. On his visit to Korhogo in 1965 
Houphouët-Boigny announced that his government would aggressively push to promote 
the economic development of the poorer northern regions.197 More important, he stated 
that regions which established their own home-town associations would fare better, 
given the fact that his leitmotif was aide-ton l’état t’aidera (Fraternité Matin, 1970:4). 
With the trip to Korhogo the President inaugurated an annual event: he would elect a 
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major town in a particular region of the country to celebrate Independence Day. These 
visits created an incentive for urban elites to create home-town associations to compete 
for the visit and the public resources which usually followed once a town had been 
selected (Keller, 1983: 260).  
 Incorporation into the PDCI meant that associations could not establish clearly 
defined and functionally specific bodies in the Côte d'Ivoire. This did not mean however 
that access to state resources on the basis of ethnic or cultural differences ceased. 
Indeed, with more direct access to these governmental benefits, these associations 
proliferated over time; albeit more in the form of a network of auxiliary associations.  
According to Zolberg, many bureaucrats and party officials viewed the formation of 
local and regional associations as a means of building up a clientele base for themselves 
(Zolberg, 1964.). The motivation was to link their rise in the post-colonial state 
apparatus with their own ethnic group, as a means of protection.  The refusal and 
subsequent “cut-off” of the Agni ethnic group from governmental resources because of 
refusal to be incorporated into the PDCI party structure, was particularly instructive to 
many.   
According to Bates, the perception by modern political elites was “that they 
must organize collective support to advance their position in the competition for the 
benefits of modernity” (1983: 159).The nomination by the President of an individual to 
a leadership in the government or within a parastatal was not seen solely in individual 
terms. The general perception is that such accolades are rewards to the individual and 
by extension his ethnic group. What this means is that an individual’s success in Côte 
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d’Ivoire is seen as the success of an entire ethnic group. One’s failure is interpreted in a 
similar manner.  
While Houphouët-Boigny was masterful at striking the right ethnic balance the 
balance was fragile and there was a perpetual threat that a potential political fall-out or 
death could result in politicians appealing to ethnic or cultural differences. Since the 
general perception among the Ivoirian elite was that the most effective way to obtain 
resources from the state and secure their own political positions was by organizing 
home-town associations, which by their very nature were ethnic, ethno-regional and 
ethno-religious, there was very little below the surface national unity.  
Since Zolberg’s (1964) ground-breaking study on single-party dominance in 
Africa, a number of scholars have examined the relationship between leadership within 
voluntary associations and dominant political parties in West Africa. One prominent 
finding in the case of Côte d’Ivoire is that  Houphouët-Boigny would often appoint 
individuals that came to the his attention because of their leadership role within an 
ethnic and/or a socio-professional association. In fact, one of the main ways of making 
it into the national elite was to gain control of an association and declare its support for 
the President and the PDCI.198 An analysis of the careers of several members of the 
political bureau of the party as well as of top state officials reveals just such a pattern. 
Each one of them had been either director or assistant director of an associational group. 
Some notable examples are Mme Jeanne Gervais, Philippe Yace and Mathieu Ekra. 
Ekra, in particular, played a central role in the association for the development of his 
native village of Bonoua. 199 
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Philippe Yace served as the secretary-general of the PDCI from 1965 to 1980. 
He had been the director of the Syndicat National des Ecoles en Côte d'Ivoire (SNECI) 
from 1949 to 1954 and later led the Union de la Jeunesse de la Côte d'Ivoire (UJCI). 
Mathieu Ekra, who has been Minister in practically every government since 
independence, was the founder of the Syndicats des Cheminots Africaines (SCA) in 
1944.200 His union supported Houphouët-Boigny and the PDCI early on. Mme Gervais 
had played an important role in the historic march by Ivoirian women on the prison of 
Grand Bassam to force the colonial government to release PDCI supporters. She later 
became the director of the Association des Femmes Ivoiriennes (AFI), a member of the 
party’s political bureau as well as Minister of Women’s Affairs. 201Alphonse M. Djedje 
helped create the Mouvements des Elèves et Etudiants de Côte d'Ivoire (MEECI), with 
the support of the party, while he was a student at the University of Abidjan. Later he 
became the first secretary-general of the Syndicat des Médecins, Pharmaciens et 
Vétérinaires, as well as a member of the political bureau. 
 The persistence of voluntary associations after independence may be attributed 
to two distinct factors: first, the increased level of competition for limited economic 
resources and, second, the utilization of ethnic associations by elites to consolidate their 
own economic and political position in the post-colonial state. Bates (1983) goes so far 
as to argue that “... ethnic groups represent, in essence, coalitions which have been 
formed as part of rational efforts to secure benefits created by the forces of 
modernization-benefits which are desired but scarce” (1983: 152).  Many bureaucrats 
and party officials viewed the formation of local and regional associations as a means of 
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building up for themselves a clientele base. Their motivation was to link their rise in the 
post-colonial state apparatus with their own ethnic group.   
 
 
Conclusion 
When analyzed in terms of religious tolerance, my research at first glance shows 
that religion is in fact a key explanatory factor in the politicization and non-
politicization of ethnicity in sub-Saharan Africa. The comparative analysis indicates 
that Senegal, a country with a higher ratio of Muslims to Christians than Côte d’Ivoire, 
has a higher degree of religious tolerance than Côte d’Ivoire. Closer examination and 
analysis of the role of Islam in Senegal reveals, however, that the key to understanding 
non-politicization in Senegal not religion per se, but rather the Sufi Brotherhoods.  
Islam was able to mitigate ethnic politicization in Senegal, not because of the religious 
doctrine or theological foundations, but because of the extent to which the religious 
structures encouraged the facilitation of social institutions such as the institutions of 
social integration that: (a) attenuate ethnic differences; and (b) serve as an effective 
counterweight to the state, in terms of goods provisions. As informal institutional 
configurations that help to transcend historic ethnic and religious communities, Sufi 
Brotherhoods provide an institutionalized and pragmatic basis for the idea of national 
citizenship and cross-cultural tolerance that block the use of political appeal to cultural 
differences as a mobilization tool.   
Conversely, examination of voluntary associations in Côte d’Ivoire indicates 
that while, like Sufi Brotherhoods in Senegal, these informal institutions provided 
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governmental resources, and they did so primarily on the basis of ethnic and ethno-
regional differences. What this shows is that unlike Senegal, the informal institutional 
configurations of voluntary associations did nothing to help transcend historic ethnic 
and religious communities. If anything, they made the use of political appeals a 
potentially profitable or attractive strategy choice for political elites. By making ethnic 
identity a prerequisite for access to state resources, the redistributive system of 
voluntary associations became a mechanism of electoral mobilization. This in turn 
created accentuated ethnic identity politically and created incentives for political elites 
to use ethnic identity a potential primary mobilizational tool.  Furthermore, with 
ethnicity and religion so closely related in Côte d’Ivoire, the incentive structure would 
allow an Ivoirian political elite seeking to part ways with an extant party to emphasize 
particular ethnic grievances as a means of attracting political support.   
The real source of ethnic politicization in Côte d’Ivoire then is not Christianity 
per se, but rather a pervasive political system based on ethnic preferences and 
institutions that accentuate these cultural differences.  
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Part III 
 
 
  
Introduction to Part III 
 
Accounting for Ethnic Politicization in Sub-Saharan Africa: a case of Informal 
Institutional Changes? 
 
 
 As established in the previous chapters, a key explanation for why the axes of 
political competition in post-independence Senegal have not been based on ethnic 
affiliation  concerns the informal social  institutions established by the  Sufi-Orders in 
the late colonial and post-colonial periods. And, in contrast, the system of local resource 
distribution in Côte d’Ivoire is characterized by a recursive relationship between ethnic 
identity, resource distribution and politics. Over time, each system of local resource 
distribution became the chief mechanism for electoral mobilization.  In fact, as the case 
explorations above show, while Ivoirian political elites gain access to state resources via 
political support from particular ethnic groups, which in turn are rewarded with 
distributed material resources, political elites in Senegal are dependent on ethnically 
transcendent religious Sufi Orders for political support.  
 These observations contribute to the study of ethnic politics by articulating and 
providing theoretical support for a set of clear, generalizable propositions about the 
specific conditions under which political elites are likely to make political appeals on 
the basis of ethnic identity.  Thus, while scholars such as Bates (1983), Posner (2005) 
and others have highlighted the impact of resource based distribution system on ethnic 
politics in various countries, different countries are covered in this project.   What is 
more, while the nature of these distributive systems goes a long way towards explaining 
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how ethnic identity became salient in Ivoirian society, there remains the question of 
why ethnicity never became politicized between 1960 and 1993? Why, despite a 
political system in which ethnic preferences and institutions that accentuated cultural 
differences were pervasive,  did Côte d’Ivoire remain politically stable and without 
ethnic strife, at least until 1993?    
 Based on the more recent works on ethnic politics and democratization,202 one 
of my initial inclinations was to point to the obvious shift in electoral systems, 
particularly the transition from single party to multiparty rule, to explain ethnic 
politicization in Côte d’Ivoire.  However, several objections come to mind. First, the 
Ivoirian democratic transition from single to multiparty rule did not begin in 1993, but 
rather, early 1990.203 If the transition to multiparty rule were to adequately explain the 
ethnic politicization, why was ethnicity not politicized prior to 1993?  
 Second, and even more important, Senegal, the Cameroon and Tanzania, have 
all made the transition from single to multiparty electoral rule  without the  axes of 
political competition becoming ethnicized.  Third, not only has Senegal had a history of 
single party rule, like Côte d’Ivoire, it  adopted the French presidential system,  
instituted the first past the post electoral system, and experienced a similarly strong 
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presidential leadership in Senghor, much like Houphouёt-Boigny.  If neither differences 
in regime type nor changes to the electoral party systems (formal institutional rules) 
adequately account for the differences in ethnic politicization in Senegal and Côte 
d’Ivoire, what factors or mechanisms (particularly those that go beyond shifting formal 
institutions) affect ethnic cleavages politically? 
 The discussions in the previous chapters provide an essential clue—informal 
institutional rules governing resource distribution, political representation and land 
tenure and citizenship rights.   I posit that where the actual rules followed are not those 
that have been formally structured but rather those established by informal institutions, 
formal institutional changes may occur without necessarily affecting the political 
salience of ethnic identity. In such cases, there are no real changes to the incentive 
structure or altered expectations and therefore, the likelihood that ethnic identity will 
become the axes of political competition remains low.   
 The case explorations above suggest that we can identify the persistence of 
specific informal institutional configurations in Senegal that block the political appeal 
to ethnic identity as a mobilizational tool despite formal institutional changes.  It is also 
true for Côte d’Ivoire under Houphouët-Boigny’s leadership in the 1990s. These 
institutions are conspicuously lacking in post-1993 Côte d’ Ivoire. Other, more divisive 
informal mechanisms have taken their place.  
 The implication of my argument is that so long as these informal institutional 
configurations persist, despite  formal institutional changes, so too will the 
incentives/disincentives for political elites to view ethnic appeals as profitable or 
unprofitable strategy. Thus, in the case of Côte d’Ivoire where ethnicity has been 
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continuously salient, if informal institutional configurations of the redistribution system 
remain intact after multiparty rule has been introduced, ethnicity should remain latent.   
Conversely, changes to these informal institutions may result in a change in the salience 
of ethnic identity from dormant to actualized; the sudden collapse or failure to deliver 
material goods may mean that the needs of a group are no longer being met 
satisfactorily. Consequently, ethnic groups may become more likely to respond to 
ethnic appeals and political elites more likely to view ethnicity as a mobilizational tool.   
Such mobilization may in turn encourage counter-mobilization and ethnic outbidding.   
Changes that disrupt and challenge the established rules of the game may: (a) cause 
changes in the balance of power among various ethnic groups, give rise to fear and 
confusion as well as amplify grievances, (all of which drive mobilization), to the extent 
that it becomes actualized as these issues dominate political debate and become the axes 
of political competition; (b) provide the political opportunity for political elites to 
galvanize support along ethnic lines  or make it difficult for political elites/parties to 
attract cross-ethnic electoral support. 
 To develop my account however, I first have to establish that while the 
institutional arrangements governing power-sharing, representation and access to goods 
endured during the late-colonial and post-independence periods as well as the early 
transition periods, they were significantly altered in Côte d’Ivoire during, or after, 1993. 
To do so, I conduct a comparative analysis of the role of redistributive networks during 
Houphouёt-Boigny’s tenure with that of Bédié and other successors. More specifically, 
I examine whether, and to what extent, the informal redistributive institutional rules in 
Côte d’Ivoire changed after 1993. I also assess how, if at all, these changes affected 
144 
 
mobilization from above (elite level) and below at the ground level. Evidence of 
significantly altered institutional arrangements could help to explain how and under 
what conditions political elites are likely to make ethnic appeals to garner electoral 
support. 
 Focus on the informal nature of these redistributive networks is particularly 
important here. First, it raises some essential questions regarding our understanding of 
the effects of institutional changes on political outcomes. While much of the 
comparative politics literature focuses on the effects of formal institutions such as shifts 
in the electoral systems, constitutional design and other formal institutional 
arrangements, political stability, ethnic conflict or civil war, this chapter reveals that the 
key to understanding and explaining such political outcomes, may in fact lie with the 
informal rules that operate beneath the surface. If the changes in informal institutions 
have led to a shift in the salience of ethnic identity, then this suggests the possibility of a 
general proposition about the conditions under which ethnicity becomes politicized. 
This is so especially if, despite changes in the formal institution, there are no shifts in 
the salience of ethnic identity and no changes in the informal institutions.   
 Second, focus on how informal institutions shape politics presents a much 
different picture of political change and outcome in sub-Saharan Africa. Scholars such 
as Young (2002), Gellar (2002) and Touranga (2001), point to the extent to which 
uncodified rules shape the behavior and expectations of people throughout sub-Saharan 
Africa.  As in most African countries, the actual rules that political elites and the public 
adhere to in Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire are not necessarily formally established. Rather, 
as documented in previous chapters, institutional rules, such as balanced ethnic 
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representation and the concept of the land belongs to whoever cultivates it, are generally 
informally established. Neither the redistributive networks established by the Sufi 
Orders in Senegal, nor the resource reciprocity system of the voluntary associations in 
Côte d’Ivoire, have formally established rules concerning ethnic representation. In both 
cases, the rules regarding pan-ethnic and balanced ethnic access to government and 
government resources are uncodified. Yet, as established in the previous chapters, these 
are the actual rules that have shaped the behavior and expectations of the people in 
Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire since the late-colonial, and throughout the post-independence 
periods.   
 The section develops as follows: Chapter Six shows that while political support 
has largely been based on ethnic identity in Côte d’Ivoire, ethnic affiliation became the 
axes of political competition not because of democratization or the introduction of 
multiparty rule, but rather, because of changes to long established and institutionalized 
rules governing political representation, power-sharing and resource distribution.  These 
changes significantly altered widespread expectations of relatively balanced ethnic 
representation and access to distributive resources at the elite and ground levels.   
 I argue that although ethnic politicization and ethnic conflict in Côte d’Ivoire 
coincide with, and seem to be directly related to shifts in the electoral system, from 
single party to multiparty rule, the relationship is spurious. While the shift to increased 
political competition  may have prompted Bédié to choose a particular strategy to off-
set the competition, Houphouet-Boigny’s choices suggest that it was not the transition 
per se that brought about ethnic politicization. Rather, it was changes to the long 
established informal rules governing Ivoirian politics instituted by Bédié that shifted the 
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salience of ethnic identity from latent to dominating the political discourse.  The chapter 
shows how, by affecting property rights, citizenship rights and political rights, the 
seemingly minor changes to access to and distribution of state resources brought the 
issue of ethnic identity to the forefront of Ivoirian national politics and made it the axes 
of political competition since 1993. The changes altered incentives for political elites to 
agitate the latent potential of ethnic identity.   
 Chapter Seven depicts how changes in the informal rules of balanced ethnic 
representation and those governing land tenure and citizenship rights aroused fear and 
confusion among the Ivoirian population and helped to create a political condition in 
which local grievances became amplified at the national level.  This in turn provided the 
political opportunity for political elites to galvanize support along ethnic lines, even 
where there were few direct appeals to ethnic identity.  
 Chapter Eight then presents a series of analyses that test the implications of my 
argument. The chapter considers the cases of other sub-Saharan African territories with 
varying experiences of politicized ethnicity. These include Casamance and Cameroon.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
 
Rules that Matter: Informal Institutions and Ethnic Politicization in Senegal and 
Côte d’Ivoire 
 
 
Introduction 
 
  A dominant assertion in the comparative politics literature is that 
democratization, particularly the transition from single-party to multiparty rule, 
exacerbates ethnic differences, unleashes ethnic tensions and gives rise to ethnic-based 
rebellion, and ethnic conflict (Touranga,2001; Herbst 2002; Posner 2005).  Scholars 
argue that in the cases of Congo-Brazzaville and Burundi, the move to multi-party 
politics dramatically exacerbated latent ethnic tensions and the democratization 
collapsed amidst murderous ethnic conflict.204  Lamarchand (2001) for instance 
attributes ethnic politics and genocide in Rwanda to the democratization efforts in 
Rwanda and neighboring countries.  
 The general assumption here is that these political outcomes result from change 
in formal institutional rules.   An important implication of this assumption is that ethnic 
politicization results from, and therefore, may be explained by change in formal 
institutional rules, particularly shifts in the electoral system (single to multiparty rule).  
For, as Posner (2005) and others argue, change in the formal institutional rules tend to 
lead to shifts in the salience of ethnic cleavages. 
 This is not what this study finds. In the case of Senegal, formal institutional 
changes of exactly the kind that Posner and others have pointed to, have not led to any 
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noticeable changes in the salience of ethnic identity in Senegalese politics. I also find 
what appears to be a strong association between increased salience of ethnic identity in 
Ivoirian politics and shifts from single to multiparty rule is spurious.  Senegal, 
Cameroon, and Côte d’Ivoire under Houphouёt-Boigny’s leadership provide empirical 
examples that changes to formal institutional rules do not necessarily result in ethnic 
politicization, ethnic conflict, civil wars or genocide.  As in the case of Senegal, 
Tanzania and the Cameroon have not experienced ethnic conflict or politicization 
despite transitioning to multiparty rule.  
 If, in fact, formal institutional changes hold strong explanatory power for ethnic 
politicization and conflict across sub-Saharan Africa, how then do we explain the many 
instances of the lack of ethnic politicization in countries that have undergone these 
changes?  If, as the recent literature on democratization in Africa suggests, the 
introduction of multiparty electoral politics invite or foster ethnic politicization, how 
might we explain the cases of Senegal, Cameroon and Tanzania?205 What is more, how 
do we explain the lack of politicization in Côte d’Ivoire in the period immediately 
following the shift to multiparty rule in 1990?  Beyond shifting party systems, what 
factors or mechanisms affect ethnic cleavages politically? 
 While embracing the argument that institutions matter, the chapter demonstrates 
that what drives ethnic politicization has less to do with changes to the electoral 
systems, and more with changes to deeply embedded, informal institutional rules, 
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 . In general, these countries have taken to multi-partyism without much fanfare. Senegal transitioned 
from single to multiparty rule in 1981. Although the first multiparty elections were not held until 1995, 
democratic transition started in Tanzania in 1992 (ending 34 years of one-party rule).  By the end of 
1992, more than 20 political parties were registered.  Transition in Cameroon began in 1990. For a 
discussion on political transition in Cameroon see Mbaku & Takougang 2004.  
   
149 
 
governing access to and distribution of government resources.
 Institutions of social integration such as the Sufi Orders in Senegal and 
voluntary associations in Côte d’Ivoire, however informal, have established the rules of 
the game by which society operates and consequently, the relative salience of ethnic 
identity in national politics.  These are the rules that give “cues to individuals on how to 
act to maintain or advance their status” (Migdal 1988:29). They drive political behavior, 
shape expectations and determine the overall incentive for the use of ethnic appeals. 
 The timing and character of ethnic politicization in Côte d’Ivoire came largely in 
response to changes to the underlying principles of ethnic inclusion and balance 
representation established by the voluntary associations  over the course of the late -
colonial and much of the post-independence period.  The rough ethnic balance,  
representation of, and access to state resources by all the major ethnic groups that were 
attained and encouraged in Côte d’Ivoire between 1960 and 1993, and that helped to 
promote political incorporation, power sharing and a relatively balanced access to 
resources among the various ethnic groups,  were significantly weakened during 
Bédié’s tenure.  These changes stoked fears of ethnic discrimination and differential 
treatment, 206 amplified grievances and resentments among the electorate and political 
elites, all of which in turn escalated ethnic issues in the national political debate.  More 
importantly, they significantly altered incentives for ethnicity to be employed as a 
mobilizational tool.  
 The chapter shows that one of the central reasons that Bédié instituted these 
changes concerns the issue of legitimacy.  Unlike Houphouët-Boigny and his 
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Senegalese counterpart, Abdou Diouf, Bédié faced serious challenges to his political 
legitimacy on the basis of his overall competence and ability to govern effectively.  I 
argue that it is this challenge to his political legitimacy in the wake of the death of 
Houphouët-Boigny that led to the introduction of Ivoirité into Ivoirian politics and 
which subsequently weakened and destroyed extant rules governing representation, 
access to public goods and citizenship. It is the changes to these informal rules — not 
the shift from single to multiparty rule — that altered incentives for ethnicity to be 
employed as a mobilizational tool and therefore explain why ethnicity became 
politicized in post-1993 Côte d’Ivoire.  
 
 
 
Democratic transitions and ethnic politicization: a comparative analysis of Senegal and 
Côte d’Ivoire. 
  
 There is a theoretical reason to presume that differences in outcome in Senegal 
and Côte d’Ivoire are due to institutional changes, particularly change in electoral 
system types from single party to multiparty systems. While there are in fact debates 
about the mechanisms, there is a general consensus that institutional change is key to 
explaining ethnic conflict.  The argument is that since incentives are generally created 
by political institutions, a change in the institutional rules may significantly alter actors’ 
incentives as expected outcomes themselves change. Change in expected outcomes 
generated by the shift in institutional rules may directly affect costs and benefits 
analysis, which may in turn affect the strategies political elites will employ.   
 In his epic work, Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa, Posner (2005) traces 
and attributes the variation in the salience of particular ethnic identities in Zambia to 
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changes in institutional rules. Posner found that, in Zambia, shifts in the electoral 
system, particularly from single-party to multi-party rule, coincided with shifts in the 
salience of a particular ethnic cleavage. According to Posner, since political institutions 
provide common knowledge  about  the incentives faced by everyone in society, they 
have the power not just to “ shape how individuals identify themselves but also to 
coordinate these identity choices so as to affect which ethnic cleavage becomes 
politically salient in society more generally.” 207 Taken to its logical end point, Posner’s 
assertion is that, as the rules governing political competition change, so too will the 
boundaries of the political arena and with it, the incentives for using ethnic identity as a 
primary mobilizational tool. To the extent that the boundaries of the political arena are 
defined by institutional rules, those rules and the changes thereof will be central to any 
explanations of ethnic conflict and/or cooperation.  
 Indeed, one of the most dominant accounts of ethnic conflicts within the 
comparative politics literature is the assertion that democratization, particularly the 
transition from single-party to multi-party rule,  exacerbates ethnic divisions, unleashes 
ethnic tensions and triggers violent ethnic conflict (Ottaway, 1999; Posner, 2005; 
Hyden, 2005;) . Ottaway,  for example , asserts that ethnicity is “more central than ever 
to the political process of many African countries, as political openings and multi-party 
elections have led to the formation of innumerable overtly and covertly ethnic parties” 
(1999:300).  Along the same lines, Donald Rothchild (1999:321) asserts that the lack of 
institutionalized rules that often accompany transition may create a political 
environment that fosters pursuit of ethnic self-interests over community-wide interests. 
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The state with its scare resources may in turn be unable to respond to legitimate public 
demands and conflict may result. 
 For some scholars, the key to explaining the ethnic conflicts is the winner-take-
all rules of the political institutions adopted. According to this perspective, countries 
that adopt winner-take-all rules, particularly presidential systems, are more likely to 
experience ethnic conflict as   incumbents and opposition become so polarized along 
ethnic lines that there is little possibility for peace or cooperation.  Instead, transitions 
unfold along a path of escalating confrontations that generally result in outright conflict 
or war.208  
 According to Bratton and Van de Walle (1994), one of the first casualties of 
democratic transition tends to be the sustainability of extant integrative formulas that 
cemented national unity and ensured political stability (Bratton & Van de Walle, 
1994:483).  Democratice transistions harden ethnic suspicions, deepens mutual ethnic 
antagonisms and, as a result of the simple majoritarian and especially, the winner-takes-
all and first-past-the-post electoral systems, reduces electoral politics to a zero-sum 
game. This has ruled out power-sharing options for many ethnic groups assured of 
electoral victory, on the basis of their numerical superiority over other ethnic groups. 
Rather, the adoption of winner-takes-all by many African countries has “tended to turn 
competitive electoral politics into a virtual warfare in which the objective is to 
annihilate one’s political enemies” (Jinadu, 2007:21). According to Duchacek: 
The problem for most ethnic minorities is that they are permanent minorities 
and the ruling groups a permanent majority. In interethnic relations therefore, 
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The convenient democratic game of numbers does not work since the 
unalterable power symmetry between permanent majority and permanent 
minorities impedes the formation of a consensual community”209  
 
 Indeed, a large portion of the democratization literature concerns mitigating 
ethnic conflict via institutional solutions to exiting electoral systems.  Lijphart (1968, 
1991, 1996) proposes adopting  more consociational forms of electoral systems, 
whereby governments focus on power-sharing arrangements210  based on accomodation 
and bargaining among political elites of various ethnic,  religious or sociocultural 
groups. These include grand coaltions in parliament, proprtional rules for the allocation 
of ministries at all levels of government, group autonomy and minority veto.  
Concerned that consociationalism would reinforce rather than minimize the salience of 
ethnic or religious cleavages,  Horowitz (1986, 1991, 1993) has advocated the use of the 
alternative vote by which voters rank-order their preferences  for candidates. If no 
candidate receives a majority of first preference votes, the candidate with the fewest 
first preferences is eliminated and for those ballots where this candidate was first 
choice, votes are reallocated to the next candidate on the voter’s list. This process is 
continued until a candidate receives a majority of first-place preference.  According to 
Horowitz, this approach is the best electoral rule to bridge or transcend ethnic 
differences and foster voting patterns that will cross ethnic lines and parties with multi-
ethnic base.   
 One of the better known cases of instituting and reinforcing power-sharing 
arrangements on the basis of ethnicity is Nigeria. While the federal nature of the 
Nigerian political system dates back to the period of British colonial administrative 
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 These consist of “practices and institutions that result in broad-based governing coalitions generally 
inclusive of all major ethnic groups in society” (Sisk1996:vii).  
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rule,211 the system was recently re-engineering to reflect true federalism. Under this 
arrangement, ethnic groups are given home-rule in their heartlands, under a polycentric 
sustem of government,which shares sovereignty between two levels of government, the 
central/national/federal government, and the unit-state governments, through specified 
legislative lists (namely, a federal exclusive list, a joint federal/state concurrent list, 
with the residual left to the states), which enable each level of government to directly 
impact the citizens. The federal character clause of Section 14(3) of the 1979 Nigerian 
Constitution dealing with the executive and legislative functions of the unit/state 
government, stipulates that: 
The composition of the government of the federation or any of its agencies and 
the conduct of its affairs shall be carried out in such a manner as to reflect the 
federal character of Nigeria and the need to promote national unity, and to 
command national loyalty, thereby ensuring that there shall be no predominance 
of persons from a few states or a few ethnic or other section groups in that 
government or any of its agencies.212  
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 Nigeria was gradually divided into two administrative units, the northern and Southern Protectorates, 
between 1900 and 1914, by the British colonial administration. 
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 The proportionality quota principle, inherent in the federal character clauses, was extended to 
appointments and promotions in the public services, to the appointments of chairperson and membership 
of boards of directors of parastatals, to promotions in the armed forces, to the allocation of public revenue 
and distribution of public projects, to the composition of a number of federal executive bodies and to 
admission to federal secondary schools and federal unversities under Section 157(5), Section 197(2) and 
Section 197. Section 153 of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution established the Federal Character  
Commission, as a federal executive body, empowered in Section 8(1) of the Third Schedule of the 
constitution to oversee and monitor the implementation of the federal clauses, as follows: 
(a)Work out an equitable formula subject to the approval of the National Assembly for the 
distribution of all cadres of posts in the public service of the Federation and of the States, the 
armed forces of the government-owned companies and parastatals of the States; 
(b) Promote, monitor and enforce compliance with the principle of  proportional sharing of all 
bureaucratic, economic, media and political posts at all levels of government; 
(c) Take such legal measures, including prosecution of the head or staff of any Ministry or 
government body or agency which fails to comply with any federal character principle or 
formula prescribed by the Commission;  
(d) and, as provided for in Section 8(3) of the Schedule: the Commission shall ensure that every 
public company or corporation  reflects the federal character in the appointment of its directors, 
and  senior management staff. 
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 For some scholars the central problem with democratic transitions concerns the 
increased electoral competition that accompanies multi-party electoral politics. 
According to this perspective, the increased competition significantly alters expected 
outcomes, political calculations and ultimately, the incentives and political 
opportunities for elites to draw on otherwise latent ethnic divisions to mobilize political 
support (Silber & Little 1997; Herbst 2002; Lamarchand 2001; Posner 2005: Touranga 
2005).  For scholars such as Silber & Little (1997), this is exactly what happened in 
Yugoslavia in the earl y 1990s.   Increased competition among new political elites 
exacerbated ethnic tensions and triggered one of the worst cases of ethnic conflicts in 
recent history.  
 According to these scholars, while the creation of cultural ethno-religious 
divisions may be traced back to the early periods of Soviet control, pre-transitional 
elites lacked the incentive and capacity to politicize; democratic transition altered the 
incentive structure, and hence the scope for political elites, particularly the new political 
elites suddenly forced to compete in the popular elections, to use ethnic identity as a 
primary mobilizational tool. 213 
 Similar approaches have been used to account for a number of cases of ethnic 
conflict in Africa. Lamarchand (2001), for instance, asserts that the ethnic conflict and 
genocide in Rwanda are due to democratization efforts; particularly the transition to 
multiparty rule.  He wrote:  
Democratization in Burundi brought the first ethnic majority (Hutu) regime to 
power in   1992, only to be followed by a brutal coup led by the minority ethnic 
elite (Tutsi), which intensified ethnic paranoia in neighboring Rwanda. Fear and 
vilification of the Tutsis, set against the pressure of democratization in Rwanda 
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helped to incubate the genocide schemes that would be unleashed in the spring 
of 1994.214  
 
Ake (2001) argues that the increased competition accompanying democratic transitions 
in Africa has pushed the premium on political power higher and higher and with it the 
intensity for political elites to capture political power for themselves and/or their ethnic 
groups.  As political elites grow more fearful of what seem to be the grave 
consequences of losing to their rivals in the competition for control of state power, they 
resort to playing the “ethnic card” (Ake, 2001: 5).  
Given that one of the most notable features of democratic transition in Côte 
d’Ivoire has been the return to competitive elections; it is plausible that this factor could 
account for why the otherwise latent ethnic identity became actualized. Several issues 
make the case a difficult one to claim, however. First, multi-party elections were held in 
Côte d’Ivoire in 1993 without ethnic identity dominating national politics. Also,  if true,  
how do we account for cases such as Senegal that stand  as clear examples of a 
functioning multiparty regime that made the transition  without ethnicity becoming the 
axis of political competition? Are these other cases mere anomalies, or is there more to 
the problem than generally assumed? What might we learn from Senegal’s and Côte 
d’Ivoire’s experience with the re-introduction of multi-party rule?  
The case explorations below strongly suggest that while the demise of Côte 
d’Ivoire as a stable regime in the 1990s coincided with its efforts to democratize, what 
appears to be a direct relationship between democratization and ethnic politicization and 
ethnic conflict is spurious.   In the case of Senegal, informal institutional rules such as 
ethnic transcendence that have served as a constraint on  the use of ethnic identity as a 
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possible mobilizational tool over time have remained relatively intact despite formal 
institutional changes.  In other words, although there are many cases of ethnic conflict 
whose origins can be traced to formal institutional change, not all countries that have 
transitioned from single to multiparty rule have experienced ethnic conflict. 215    
The empirical results of this chapter suggest that informal institutions are 
important in explaining cross-country differences in ethnic politicization in Africa; in 
some specifications, more than formal institutions. It is relatively well established in the 
political science literature that as in Latin America, informal institutional rules are as 
important as (if not more than) formal institutions in shaping expectations and political 
behavior in African societies. In many instances, informal rules subvert and even 
supersede formal institutions; the actual rules followed are largely unwritten and are to 
be found codified nowhere in an official legislative or regulatory document.  
In Côte d’Ivoire, notwithstanding constitutional stipulations explicitly 
denouncing ethnic consideration for economic and political appointments, Ivoirian 
governments since the late-colonial period, have instituted informal power-sharing 
arrangements centered on ethnic balancing and coalitions (Zolberg 1975; Crook 1997).    
In Senegal political parties have no “real” social base to speak of and political elites are 
largely dependent on religious Sufi Orders for electoral support.  In Malawi, Botswana, 
Mozambique, Uganda, Tanzania and parts of South Africa, despite the official state 
Land Rights Act, land tenure and property rights issues are often regulated by 
indigenous or customary rules.216  Also, it is more common than not for local 
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 For a detailed discussion see Sally Falk Moore (2000). Moore’s  study of the Chagga, a people who 
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communities in Africa to solve conflicts through indigenous law and other informal 
justice systems instead of via state judicial institutions (Claassens and Cousins 2008).  
 
 
Informal Institutions 
By definition, informal institutions are “socially shared rules and procedures that 
are created, communicated, and enforced outside the officially sanctioned channels.”217 
Whereas formal institutions are generally publicly debated and formally recorded, 
informal institutions are rarely written and actors who create and enforce them may 
deny doing so. Though often murky and disputed as Helmke and Levitsky (2006) point 
out, scholars such as Guillermo O’Donnell (1996)and Douglas North (1990) argue that 
informal institutions are often as important as formal institutions in establishing and 
structuring the rules of the game.  
  Scholars such as Bratton and Van de Walle (1997), Young (2002) and Gellar 
(2002), among others have found that  in Africa, notwithstanding  formal institutional 
rules as laid out in constitutions, electoral laws or legislative statutes , the actual rules218 
adhered to many cases are informal. Examples include widespread power-sharing 
arrangements such as ethnic balancing, ethnic coalitions and indigenous conflict 
resolution practices and customary laws across Africa.   
                                                                                                                                               
crop and   a steady decrease in the amount of land available for agriculture, rights of access to land had to 
be reformulated. This was achieved under the banner of traditional customary law.   
217This definition borrows from Helmke and Levitsky (2006) and is consistent with North (1990), 
O’Donnell (1996b) and Carey (2000).  
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  In her epic work Muslim Brotherhood and Politics in Senegal, Lucy Behrman 
(1970) highlighted the intricate and complex relationships between the Muslim Sufi 
Orders and political parties and leaders in the late -colonial and post-independence 
Senegal. Berhman (1970) found that while franchise was extended to all, the Sufi 
Orders, and in particular Marabouts, shaped voting behavior. Marabouts often 
instructed their disciples of which party or candidate to support.   In Cameroon, 
members of the legislative branch are generally handpicked by the sitting president, 
despite electoral laws stipulating that members of the legislative branch should be 
elected via an election process open to the public (Mabaku and Takougang, 2004). Also, 
as mentioned above, while the constitutions of most African countries denounce ethnic 
quota systems, informal power-sharing arrangements such as ethnic balancing and 
ethnic coalitions are widely practiced. Such arrangements serve as an important lever of 
ethno-political accommodation that helps to mute ethnic conflict.  While this was never 
officially acknowledged, ethnic balancing and coalitions have been an integral part of 
late-colonial and post-independence Ivoirian politics.  
A number of studies have found that notwithstanding formal institutional 
changes such as transition from single to multi-party rule, many of the informal 
institutional arrangements identified above persist, and continue to drive African 
politics.  Indeed, one of the reasons that Bratton and Van de Walle (1997) and others 
have concluded that democratization in Africa has mainly served to “erect a façade of 
institutional respectability”219 is because of the role of informal institutions.220 The 
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scholarship on Senegal often point to the clientilism and deep rooted traditional norms 
to explain the quasi-democratic nature of the Senegalese regime.  
 In his analysis of the democracy in Senegal, Gellar (2005) argues that one of the 
chief impediments to democratic consolidation is the dominance that clientilism 
continues to have on Senegalese Politics. The title of Linda Beck’s (1997) article:  
“Senegal’s Patrimonial Democrats: Incremental Reform and the Obstacles to the 
Consolidation of Democracy,” speaks for itself.  Similarly, Leonardo Villalón (2006) 
has found that the informal redistributive institutions of the Sufi Orders remain as 
pertinent and strong in the post-independence multiparty era as they were in the single 
party era. Institutional rules established by the Sufi Orders during the late-colonial  
period that  govern political representation, access to public goods, citizenship and 
property rights  are as much in effect today as they were more than thirty years ago 
when Behrman (1970) first conducted research on the subject.   The implication here is 
that because there are no significant changes in these informal institutions in spite of 
shifts in formal institutional rules, expectations and political behavior are unlikely to 
change. Consequently, in cases such as Senegal where the informal institutional rules of 
the Sufi Orders have served as a bulwark against the use of ethnic identity as a possible 
mobilizational tool, political elites will continue to have little opportunity or incentives 
to use the ethnic card.  
 Clearly, informal institutions may continue to shape expectations and behavior 
and consequently, incentives for ethnic mobilization. One would expect to find that 
where such institutions undergo change, the incentive structure may also become 
altered- to the extent that ethnic identity becomes an attractive mobilization for political 
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elites. Notwithstanding this possibility, much of the discussions on the effects of 
institutional change on ethnic conflict and ethnic politicization focuses (almost 
exclusively), on formal institutional change.  
 Gretchen Helmke and Stephen Levitsky (2003, 2006) have made recent calls for 
more research focusing on informal institutions in order to uncover the “real incentives 
and constraints that underlie political behavior.” 221 Still, while the literature on 
clientilism and neo-patrimonial institutions has expanded somewhat, there have been 
few attempts to examine the impact of changes in informal institutional rules on ethnic 
politicization and ethnic conflict.  Even studies that have highlighted the role of 
informal institutions tend to frame the issue in terms of the relative strength of the state 
vis-à-vis civil society.   In fact, besides formal institutional change, a dominant theme in 
the existing scholarship is that the African state is weak. Herbst (2001), for instance, 
posits that one of the reasons for the various degrees of ethnic conflict and political 
stability throughout Africa is that democratization is introduced without the requisite 
strong institutionalized political parties and civil society organizations.  
 Much of the existing literature on Africa attributes such political outcomes as 
regime break down, ethnic conflict and other political outcomes to weak, ineffective, or 
insufficient formal institutions.  Some scholars assert that vibrant informal networks 
grow and expand as a result of a weakened or weakening state.222 Theorizing the causal 
story in reverse, others assert that the existence of strong informal networks may 
weaken the state from below, particularly in redistributive role. 223 However, as Helmke 
and Levitsky (2006) aptly point out, formal institutional weakness does not necessarily 
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 See Helmke and Levitskey (2003:1).  
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 See Herbts 2000; Chabal and Daloz 1999;Bayart et al.(1999) 
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 See Chazan 1983; Dei 1992; Cheru 1997; Karen Hansen (2004). 
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imply the presence of informal institutions. Citing O’Donnell (1994), the scholars point 
out that in much of Latin America, the formal rules of representative democracy are 
weakly institutionalized.  The absence of institutionalized checks on executive power 
allowed for the considerable widening of the scope of permissible presidential behavior 
and the substantial abuse of executive authority. 224   
 Focus on informal institutional changes (or the lack thereof) may help explain 
cross-country differences in ethnic politicization in Africa. The persistence of informal 
power-sharing arrangements such as ethnic balancing despite democratic transitions and 
the changes in electoral rules- single to multi-party competition- may help explain why, 
contrary to the predictions of the democratization literature; political elites in countries 
such as the Cameroon have not turned to cultural differences as a mobilization tool.  
Informal institutional change may help explain why countries such as Côte d’Ivoire 
have recently experienced ethnic politicization.    
  
 
 Single Party, Multiparty Politics and ethnic politicization in Senegal &Côte d’Ivoire 
  
 During the 1990s many countries in sub-Saharan Africa experienced significant 
political liberalization. While the real reason for change is still a matter of dispute, 
given the  large number of countries that introduced (reintroduced) multi-party 
government, Huntington’s (1991) reference of the third wave of democratization seems 
apt. Between 1989 and 1991, over 21 countries instituted constitutional changes and 
electoral laws to allow for greater political participation. During the 1990s, 42 of 50 
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countries held elections.225.By the end of 1998, thirty nine percent of forty eight sub-
Saharan African countries enjoyed political stability, twenty three percent faced 
political crisis, while thirty eight percent were engaged in ethnic conflicts.226  
Unlike Côte d’Ivoire, conflict among the five major ethnic communities in 
Senegal is virtually unknown. With the notable exception of the Casamance region, 
there have been no significant changes in the number of ethnic/ethno-religious 
grievances (measured in terms of reported/officially documented instances of crimes 
believed to be ethnically related) since1981.  Of the few dozen reported cases in 2007, 
almost all can be explained by factors unrelated to ethnic affiliation or religious 
beliefs.227    
 
 
 Democratic transition: the cases of Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire 
   
 Both Senghor and Houphouët-Boigny established virtual single-party states 
upon their countries’ independence from France in 1960. While Senghor permitted 
limited opposition party participation in national Presidential elections during the early 
post-independence period, it was not until 1981 that Senegal officially made the 
transition from a de facto single-party regime to a real multiparty system.   
 Senegal became a one-party participatory democracy in 1966 after the 
Senegalese Progressive Union (UPS),228 headed by President Leopold Senghor, became 
                                                 
225
 Notably, not all of these elections were deemed free and fair.  For example, only 10 of these elections 
resulted in a change of government. These include Zambia, Togo and Senegal. Others, such as Kenya, 
Gabon and Côte d’Ivoire, held elections in which the incumbents have won and retained control of the 
presidency. 
226
 Including countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Sierra Leone, Rwanda, 
Burundi, Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire.     
 
228
 The party was later changed to Parti Socialist (PS) in 1976.  
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the country’s only political party.  This came after at least three years229 of highly 
competitive electoral politics. For example, in 1960 Cheikh Anta Diop created a 
political party called the Bloc de Mass Senegalaise (BMS). The African Party for 
Independence of Mamadou Diop was created in 1957. These, and other political 
parties230 created by Chiekh Anta Diop were declared illegal and banned. Although the 
increasing concentration of power into the hands of the president became a concern for 
some, the introduction of one-party rule did not increase the salience of ethnic 
identities, exacerbate ethnic tensions, or result in ethnic politicization.  The introduction 
of one-party rule did not alter the institutional rules stipulating ethnic transcendence.   
 Rather, the period between 1966 and 1976 was characterized by relatively low 
levels of ethnic or religious conflicts, cross-ethnic support for the governing party and a 
large capacity to integrate otherwise potentially fragmentary ethnic communities. In 
fact, responses to the dissolution of existing parties and the lockdown of Senghor’s most 
fervent competitors, bought out no claims whatsoever of ethnic discrimination. Senghor 
was accused of being anti-federalist, neo-colonialist, and often was often described as a 
lackey for French foreign forces. 231   However, no accusations were made against his 
actions on the basis of ethnicity.  
 In the new one-party institutional setting, Sufi Orders and their institutional rules 
stipulating ethnic transcendence created during the late-colonial periods continued to 
shape voting behavior.  In fact, the institutional configurations of the Sufi Orders 
continued to play a crucial role in blocking ethnic politicization.  Although the one-
                                                 
229
 Much longer if we were to consider pre-independence electoral politics. Even during the colonial 
period, there were several parties that in general, were affiliated with those based in France and that later 
Senegalese.   
230
 In 1963 Chiekh Anta Diop created another party called the Senegalese National Front (FNS).  
231
 See Le Vine (2004).  
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party system increased the intra-party competition, political elites, having never 
established any “real” social base, continued to be dependent on the Islamic 
Brotherhoods for electoral support.  With the rules on ethnic transcendence firmly in 
effect, political elites had few incentives to use appeals to ethnic identities as a 
mobilizational tool.  Indeed, where the Islamic Brotherhoods were well established 
(which, for the most part is Senegal North of the Gambia), institutional rules inhibited 
the politicization of ethnic identities. And, Where they were not well established (e.g. 
Senegal, south of the Gambia), ethnicity was more likely to become politicized.  
 Also, the Sufi Orders did not lose their capacity to perform their redistributive 
roles during the period of one-party rule. Rather, as Galvan (2001) points out, the 
institutional redistributive networks were encouraged by the government.  Senghor 
needed the continued support of the religious Orders in order to remain in power. In 
exchange for such support, Sufi leaders receive payouts, which were then re-distributed 
to their followers. This created incentives for religious followers to vote per their 
Maraboutic instructions.  
 
   
Transition from single to multiparty rule and ethnicity in Senegal 
 In 1974 Senegal instituted limited party competition. While this has meant that 
Senegal has had minority party representation in its national assembly from since 1974, 
democratic transition-from single-party rule to multiparty rule- did not officially begin 
until 1981 when Abdou Diouf declared the Senegalese society open to multiparty 
elections. Since then, more than 113 political parties have been created and no party has 
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since been banned from competing in elections. More importantly, there have been few 
reports of political parties and/or political elites mobilizing on the basis of ethnic 
differences. This is also true of locally established parties in minority regions such as 
Senegal south of the Gambia. In fact, as mentioned above, one of the striking 
observations of the electoral campaigns in Senegal is the lack of political appeals to 
ethnic identity or religion.   
 For the most part, campaigns have focused on the issue of the economy, 
especially falling standards of living brought on by loss of revenue from decline in the 
world market prices of primary goods in the 1970s. In fact, while Abdou Diouf was 
regularly elected by wide margins232 in 1983, 1988 and 1993, questions of the state of 
the economy dominated the campaigns and were posed most sharply by the 
opposition.233  Campaigns also focused on the broad issue of continuity and change; the 
PS campaigned on a variety of slogans portraying Abdou Diouf as an effective 
administrator while the opposition campaigning was dominated by the cry for sopi (or 
change).234   
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 In 1983 Diouf won 83.5 percent of the votes with voter turnout out at 57percent. Diouf’s closest 
opposition candidate won just under 15 percent of the total votes. In 1988 Diouf won just over 73percent 
(voter turnout almost 59 percent).  Wade place second with an improved 25.8 percent. In 1993, the 
margins narrowed even more, as Diouf secured just over 58 percent of the vote, to Wade’s 32 percent 
(voter turnout 51 percent). In 2000 Wade finally came out ahead with a little over 58 percent of the votes 
to Diouf’s 41.5 percent.  (Notably, this was in the second round as Diouf won the first round, by 41 
percent to 31 percent. However, failure to secure a clear majority, Wade won in the end .Turn-out was 60 
percent and 62 percent respectively).  
233
 Especially after 1983 demands for increased stipends and educational scholarships for college and 
university students were prominent issues during these elections. Many believe that Abdoulaye Wade 
won the 2000 presidential elections because of the support of young students demanding better 
educational support.   
234
 For example, in the 1993 electoral campaign t Abdoulaye Wade and the PDS issued posters and 
graffiti depicting the slogan sopi or “sopi jot na”  (the time for change) has arrived, throughout the 
country. Diouf and the PS’ most prevalent campaign poster showed the president juxtaposed against a 
millet field under the slogan “Suuf, sunuk om-kom” (the land is our economy).  Other campaign issues 
included t he distribution of voting cards and the voter identification question, and the issue of the secret 
ballot.  See Jeune Afrique : Elections 88: Les Principales revendications de l'opposition”, (“the main 
demands of the opposition”). No. 1419, March 16, 1988: 68. 
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TABLE VI 
 Presidential elections of 1983, 1988, 1993 and 2000 compared: Vote distribution percentage 
 
   1983     1988   1993   2000 
Abdou Diouf  83.5      73.2   58.4     41.5235 
Abdoulaye Wade 14.7      25.8   32.0                58.5 
Others     1.8        1.1     9.6  
 
 
Table VII 
:  Presidential elections of 1983, 1988, 1993 and 2000 compared: participation percentage 
   Registered voters   percent voting 
1983   1,888,444     58.2 
1988   1,932,265    58.7  
1993   2,549,699    51.5 
2000   1,667,775                                     60.8 
Source: Institute of National Statistics- Senegal.  
 And, while many Senegalese political elites faced imprisonment during the 
single-party era (1960-1981), arrests have been much less frequent during the 
multiparty period.  None of the Senegalese political elites or journalists interviewed for 
this project that claimed to have been, at one point, a political prisoner in their own 
country, cited ethnic or religious affiliations as a substantive factor in the 
imprisonment.236  The opposite is true of Côte d’Ivoire. While fewer political elites 
faced imprisonment during the single-party era than after the transition, particularly 
after 1993, most attribute their detention to ethnicity. 237    
 In terms of representation in the legislature, the President’s cabinet or other 
major governmental appointments, the data indicates that, in Senegal, representation has 
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 These are figures from the second round votes, hence no votes for “others.”  
236
 Field research interview, Dakar, Senegal July- Dec. 2007.  
237
 Field research, interview, Abidjan, Jan-June 2008. 
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remained as ethnically diverse during multiparty rule as it was under single party 
regime. The number of women representatives have been noticeably higher during the 
multi-party years, however, Christians are slightly overrepresented (relative to their 
overall percentage of the population) in the legislature as well as the President’s cabinet 
under both systems.   
 In Côte d’Ivoire, the Baoulé were generally slightly over-represented among the 
political elites and in these political institutions. All of the other ethnic groups were also 
fairly well represented. In fact, it was not until after 1993 that any one ethnic group 
dominated the legislature and other important political institutions in Côte d’Ivoire.  
  
 
Transition from single-party to multi-party rule and ethnicity in Cote d’Ivoire 
  
 Like Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire adopted single party system rule immediately after 
independence in 1960.  Also like President Senghor in Senegal, Houphouët-Boigny 
declared the PDCI a de facto single party. Houphouët-Boigny banned all opposition 
parties and those who remained operational (mainly the FPI) were forced into 
clandestine operations. It was not until 1990 that Côte d’Ivoire adopted a “real” 
multiparty system.   
 In sharp contrast to Senegal, ethnicity has been politically salient in Côte 
d’Ivoire since the late-colonial period. This is reflected by the many interview 
respondents who indicated that given the choice they would identify with their ethnic 
group before and above their nationality.  When asked which they would put first when 
it comes to politics, nationality or a member of their ethnic group, more than seventy 
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percent of those interviewed placed their ethnic identity before their nationality.238  This 
is in stark contrast to Senegal, where more than 87 percent239 of the respondents stated 
that being Senegalese took priority to being a Serer, a Puel, or Wolof. Futhermore, 
statements such as: “I am Bété [Baoulé, Tagounda, Krou] before I am Ivoirian,” and 
other statements to that effect by political leaders, are generally rare in African 
countries; even for those countries where ethnicity clearly undergirds the social, 
political and economic life.240   
 Chapters four and five document how early dependence on ethnic alliances and 
ethnically based voluntary associations, particularly their incorporation into the political 
party structure, reinforced the importance of ethnicity in Ivoirian society in the late-
colonial and post-independence periods. A major part of the political campaign 
process241 was that political candidates (deputies) returned to their ethnic hometowns to 
galvanize support.242  This included those who have no specific ties to the rural regions 
of the country, having migrated to more urban regions decades earlier. Of the ten 
administrative sub-sections or districts of Abidjan, all of the mayors, with relatively few 
exceptions, reflect the dominant ethnic group among the population.243   
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 Of the 45 individuals interviewed 31 placed ethnicity before nationality. Admittedly since the field 
research was conducted after the civil war, this could be a factor in the heightened importance of one’s 
ethnicity. Still, the responses provide an insight into the importance of ethnicity in Ivoirian society. Field 
research, Abidjan, Jan-June 2008.  
239
 Of the 47 individuals interviewed during the field research about 42 said that they would put their 
nationality above their individual ethnic group. Those who responded in the opposite were generally from 
the Casamance regions and expressed sentiments of not be treated as “Senegalese” as many of the other 
ethnic groups from the regions North of the Gambia. Several respondents were irritated by this question 
and some went as far as to state: “I am Senegalese, that’s all! Ethnic identity is of no importance… chez-
nous, we are all Senegalese.” 
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 More specifically legislative elections since a real multiparty Presidential election did not occur until 
1990.  
242
 Field Research interview, Abidjan, 2008. 
243
 Field Research, interview, Fraternité Matin. 
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Access to state resources, employment, official appointments, promotions, and 
education have all been influenced by ethnicity in Côte d’Ivoire. Yet, with all the 
pertinence of ethnic identity in Ivoirian society, ethnic politicization did not occur until 
after 1990.   Crook (1989) notes for instance that: “Although the Akan are dominant in 
the sense that they form around forty two percent of the population (1978) and are 
slightly over-represented in the political elite, ethnic identity has never been highly 
mobilized.” 244 This begs the obvious question: Why did the return to multiparty 
elections in Côte d’Ivoire not yield ethnic conflict or ethnic politicization as evident by 
the successfully non-violent and largely non-ethnic political campaign and election in 
1990?  
 
 
Non-Politicization in Côte d’Ivoire 1960-1993: Towards an explanation 
 Some scholars point to the strong leadership of President Houphouët-Boigny to 
explain why Côte d’Ivoire was not tribalized. 245 The case explorations above suggest 
however, that we can indentify informal institutional rules in Côte d’Ivoire that , while 
encouraging the salience of ethnicity, also prevented ethnic identity from being highly 
mobilized. These rules have been entrenched in Ivoirian politics since the late-colonial 
period, persisted throughout the post-independence period, and endured even after 
regime transition in 1990.  I posit that while democratization brought about a shift from 
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 Crook (1989:15). 
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 Azam (2001:431), for instance, calls Côte d’Ivoire’s former President Houphouët-Boigny a “maestro 
in the art of buying the loyalty of the most active representatives of the different ethnic groups”, and the 
policy of visible public investment in the various regions “provided the cement of the emerging Ivoirian 
nation.”  
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single to multiparty rule, between 1990 and 1993, the actual rules governing access to, 
and distribution of goods, experienced no significant change(s). The implication here is 
that ethnic politicization resulted from changes in the informal institutional rules along 
with the introduction of Ivoirité after 1993. These institutions, however informal, 
generally ensured relative access to, and distribution of, government and governmental 
resources, land and citizenship rights.   
To assess this claim I examined the proportional representation of the various 
ethnic groups in government appointments from 1959- 1989, 1990-1993- and 1993- 
2007. Scholars have identified key markers or indicators to determine disparities among 
various ethnic/ethno-regional, or class cleavages in a society. Bakary (1984) and Langer 
(2004), suggest focusing on the social composition of the cabinet -measured in terms of 
the distribution of cabinet posts along ethnic and ethno-regional lines.  A second, more 
refined indicator in this respect can be social composition of the inner circle of political 
power (Langer 2004: 23), measured by the ethnic and ethno-regional distribution of key 
political positions.246  
A third indicator is the social composition of parliament, measured in terms of 
the ethnic and/or regional distribution of parliamentary seats. Since those ethnic groups 
that have access to the legislature would be expected to be influential it makes sense to 
count the number of ethnic groups represented in the legislature after 1993 and compare 
this figure to the pre-1993 years. However it is important that any measure used must 
weigh the relative importance of each ethnic group within the country.  
 A final indicator is the ethnic composition of the party elites, measured by the 
ethnic and ethno-regional distribution of top posts within parties. A comparative 
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analysis of Houphouët-Boigny and Bédié’s leadership using these key indicators 
highlights changes in ethnic balancing and new ethnic distinctions regarding 
membership in the political community that occurred after 1993. The analysis offers 
some insight into how and why ethnicity became politicized in Côte d’Ivoire when it 
did.  
The immediate question is why this change came about. The case explorations 
below reveal that one of the key differences in the factors that Houphouët-Boigny and 
Bédié faced, which significantly affected their political choices and the consequent 
political outcomes concerns political legitimacy.   Like Senghor, Houphouët-Boigny 
enjoyed enormous political support and confidence in his leadership. Unlike his 
predecessor and Senegalese counterpart, Abdou Diouf, however Bédié faced significant 
questions and challenges about his ability to govern effectively and hence, his 
legitimacy as President of Côte d’Ivoire, from political elites and voters alike. This 
significantly shaped the strategies that Bédié employed. Focus on fomenting political 
support and legitimizing his claim to the Presidency resulted in changes to long 
standing institutions governing access to state resources and political representation and 
citizenship issues. These changes in turn altered the salience of ethnic identity and 
consequently the incentives for political actors to use ethnic identity as a mobilizing 
vehicle.   
 
 
 
Single Party Politics, Multiparty Politics and ethnic politicization in Côte d'Ivoire 
 
We established in the previous chapters that Houphouët-Boigny was able to 
garner the support of all of the major ethnic groups in Côte d’Ivoire by incorporating 
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ethnically based redistributive networks under the umbrella of the PDCI.   One of 
Houhouët-Boigny’s main opponents in the early post-colonial period, a noted politician 
from northern Upper Volta region, Coulibaly, withdrew from the electoral competition 
and pledged his247 support for Houphouët-Boigny and the PDCI on the promise that the 
northerners would have relatively good political representation and access to state 
goods and resources.248  A retired political elite explained the importance of what he 
called the “genius of Houphouët-Boigny getting all of the major ethnic groups living 
together peacefully over such a long period of time.” According to this interview 
respondent, rather than exploit the ethnic divisions within the society, Houphouët-
Boigny found an almost organic way of taking the distinctiveness of each part of the 
society and making them part of a larger societal framework…“kind of like a quilt; each 
piece is different and unique, yet fit perfectly together to make a perfect piece of 
fabric.”249   In an interview with Ivoirian scholar Aristide Zolberg, one of the founders 
of the Triechville branch of the PDCI explained the logic of the incorporation of the 
informal ethnic associations/networks under the umbrella of the PDCI this way: 
During the elections [of 1945and 1946] we had found that the ethnic 
associations that existed in the city functioned efficiently for electoral purposes 
as well. In preparation for the battle we would be waging, we thought that it was 
necessary to create highly solidarity units, equivalent to the communist cells in 
France. Ethnic organizations were the most natural and the most practical for 
this purpose. Regardless of where they lived and worked in the city, people of 
the same tribe came together for social purposes. So we transformed the ethnic 
associations into party-subcommitttes. Where they did not exist, we help the 
tribes to organize original ones. Only in this way could we communicate with 
the members, collect dues, and pass down party directives in the various local 
languages.250 
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 And by extension that of the people of the North, 
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 See Zolberg, 1964, Bakary 1984, Crook, 1989, Langer 2004.  
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 Field Research interview Abidjan March 2008 
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  Interview with M.Mathieu Ekra, (1959), cited in Zolberg (1975:116).  
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What was achieved was the development of a multi-ethnic party coalition (PDCI), with 
different ethnic, ethno-regional groups making up an ethnic whole— “an amalgam of 
heterogeneous components… constructing an indirect party in which individuals were 
not members of the party but of social groups that belonged to the party” (Zolberg, 
1964: 76).   
Since membership to the party meant access to state resources, these 
redistributive networks and the PDCI became mechanisms for political elites to 
represent and negotiate on behalf of their ethnic groups.  With this framework in place, 
a sort of federation of ethnic groups through something akin to, though not quite, an 
ethnic calculus was established in Côte d’Ivoire. While no ethnic calculus was ever 
formally institutionalized251  and in fact, Côte d’Ivoire has never had a formally 
institutionalized ethnic quota system for government appointees or elected 
representatives, there has always been252  a relatively rough representative balance 
between ethnic groups in Ivoirian politics or political institutions.  As Le Vine (2004) 
notes, under Houphouët-Boigny, the country “had an almost institutionalized system of 
ethnic candidature to the National Assembly.”253 This was largely because access to 
state resources rested on the informal ethnic associations or redistributive networks that 
form the base of the PDCI.  
To ensure relative equality among the various groups, Houphouët-Boigny relied 
heavily upon the informal rule of ethnic balancing to regulate the level of ethnic 
representation. The broader, and more equitable the access to, and by, ethnic groups, the 
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less likely it would be that ethnic identity would become viewed as a politically 
advantageous mobilizational tool.  The construction of a wide elite consensus around 
these informal networks meant that political elites had little incentive to politicize ethnic 
identity, even though it was a potentially potent mobilization tool. A federation of 
ethnic groups also made dissent from ethnic groups relatively rare, and where dissent 
appeared, it was easy to marginalize and/or suppress.254 
Some of Houphouët-Boingy’s chief political advisers during his lengthy tenure 
as the President de la Côte d’Ivoire were from Koroghgo in the North, Jacqueville in the 
South- West and Bounouko in the East. Although he was known for switching around 
his cabinet members quite a bit,255 there was always a measure of balanced 
representation of the various ethnic groups. In terms of party composition, all of the 
major ethnic groups were represented in the PDCI. Indeed, a significant characteristic of 
the PDCI was the geographic basis of representation.  
Much like Kenya, electoral districts in Côte d’Ivoire tended to be identified as 
the home of particular ethnic groups- “ethnic homelands.”256 The practice of political 
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 For example, when the King of the Agni ethnic group of Sanwi claimed that their kingdom had 
become part of Côte d'Ivoire without their consent and called for the kingdom to secede in 1969, they 
were quickly marginalized and cut off from access to state resources until the “revolt” had subsided. 
Also, when a Bété leader, Gnagbé Niabé (also known as Gnabé Opadjelé) proclaimed himself grand 
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supporters and marched on Gagnoa, government troops were unleashed to capture the “rebel leader” and 
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 In 1977 and throughout the 1980s Houphouët-Boigny constantly reshuffled his cabinet members.  
Fraternité Matin. 
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 As in Kenya, communities in Côte d’Ivoire are organized basically along ethnic lines. The cities are 
broken down into sub-sects as well. In Senegal on the other hand, large cities (Dakar) or rural areas, 
Kaolack, tend to be very diverse. Almost all ethnic groups have representation in these cities and there is 
very little division by street or sub-sect on the basis of ethnic affiliation. It is not uncommon for top-
ranking political elites to be a member of the minority in their area or town of origin. For instance, 
Mackie Sall, a Serer, is from Puel majority region (56 percent). Despite his ethnicity, Sall has been 
nominated and won the political support of the people of his region.  Houphouët-Boigny had a slightly 
different system whereby representatives from the various regions/ethnic communities were elected by 
individuals from their ethnic group, to serve in the government. This allowed for a system of equal 
176 
 
candidates returning to the “ethnic homeland” to rally political support, while never 
formally institutionalized, was nonetheless widespread (Zolberg, 1964; Bakary, 1984; 
Crook, 1997). It was, for all intents and purposes, an integral part of the informal rule 
regulating ethnic representation and access to the government and its resources.  One 
interview respondent stated that while as a junior candidate, he served as counselor for 
regions where the ethnic majority did not reflect his own ethnic affiliation, as he moved 
up, and took on more serious political roles, and eventually became a political candidate 
for the Assemblée Nationale, he was required to, and found it essential to, work more 
closely with those areas of large Bété concentrations.257 This respondent further stated: 
“ici, chez-nous, c’est comment on a gagné les élections législatives, jusque 1993 et 
certainement, âpres.  Si on fait pas ça, on n’a rein accompli” (here in Côte d’Ivoire, this 
is how we won the legislative elections up to 1993 and after. If we did not do this, we 
accomplish nothing.) 258  
   Tables VIII and IX depict the level of representation of the various ethnic 
groups that characterized Côte d’Ivoire from 1959-1993. Table VIII covers the years 
1959-1980, while Table IX covers those years from 1980-1993.  The tables indicate a 
slight over-representation of the Akans among the political elites. They also show 
however, that the other ethnic groups were relatively well represented in the national 
politics. One might even point out that the Kru were relatively over-represented in 
several instances. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
representation, however, the vote at the base remained largely ethnic and precarious-subject to shifts in 
balance brought about by electoral changes or political disputes.   
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 Field Research interview, Abidjan, March 2008. 
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 Field Research interview, Abidjan, March 2008. 
177 
 
TABLE VIII 
Elite Representation in Political Institution from 1959-1980 
Ethnic 
Group 
 
Total 
Political Elite 
Minister Deputy Economic 
and Social 
Councillors 
PDIC 
Politiburo 
Total 
Population  
in 1975 
 No. percent No. percent No. percent No. percent No. percent percent 
Akan 163 50.9 39 53.4 100 50.0 50 56.1 43 55.1 41.4 
Kru 33 19.6 15 20.5 41 20.5 13 14.6 10 12.8 16.7 
N.Mandé 33 10.3 7 9.5 19 9.0 10 11.2 8 10.25 14.8 
S.Mandé 17 9.06 2 2.7 13 6.5 4 4.4 4 5.1 10.2 
Voltaic 29 9.06 6 8.2 9 4.5 4 4.4 7 8.9 15.7 
Others 13 4.06 4 5.4 6 3.0 7 7.8 5 6.4 1.2 
Unknown 1 0.3 -  
 
1 0.5 - -  - - 
Source:  Bakary, T. (1984: 36) 
What is interesting, as depicted in Table IX, is that ethnic representation under 
Houphouët-Boigny did not vary much from the early periods of single-party rule, to the 
outset and immediately following the transition from single party- multiparty rule. From 
the table it is clear that throughout the post-colonial period, there was a system, 
however loose and informal, of ethnic quotas for representation in the political 
institutions from 1959- 1980.  As previously noted, there has definitely been a higher 
level of representation of the Akans. Akans in fact, made up a bit more than 50 percent 
of the country’s political leaders. This is significant as Akans constitute roughly 2/5th of 
the total population (1977).  Kru and Malinké representations were just about equal 
relative to their population percentage. The representation of the Voltaic on the other 
hand, was about half of their relative population size. 
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TABLE IX 
Ethnic Representation in Political Institutions under Houphouët-Boigny, 1980-1992 
Ethnic 
Groups 
 Government ª  
  
National Assembly Economic and Social 
Council 
 Nov.80 Jun.86 Oct.89 Nov.91 Nov.80 Nov.85 Nov.90 Feb.86 Feb92  
 % RRb % RR % RR % RR % RR % RR % RR % RR percent RR 
Akan 0.49 1.16 0.41 0.99 0.47 1.12 0.61 1.46 0.46 1.09 0.45 1.07 0.47 1.12 0.55 1.32 0.58 1.38 
Baoulé 0.22 1.29 0.24 1.46 0.20 1.20 0.17 1.04 0.19 1.14 0.21 1.23 0.21 1.27 0.28 1.70 0.33 1.95 
Kru 0.19 1.30 0.20 1.34 0.20 1.37 0.17 1.19 0.20 1.40 0.19 1.33 0.17 1.17 0.19 1.31 0.23 1.54 
S.Mandé 0.05 0.51 0.10 0.91 0.13 1.25 0.04 0.41 0.11 1.02 0.10 0.91 0.10 0.91 0.03 0.31 0.03 0.31 
N.Mandé 0.08 0.51 0.17 1.07 0.13 0.84 0.09 0.55 0.10 0.60 0.14 0.90 0.16 1.01 0.14 0.89 0.12 0.73 
Voltaic 0.14 0.83 0.10 0.60 0.03 0.20 0.09 0.53 0.14 0.63 0.12 0.74 0.10 0.63 0.04 0.26 0.02 0.10 
No. N=37 N=41 N=30 N=23 N= 147 N=.175 N=175 N=120  N=120 
PIMc 0.36 0.27 0.46 0.47 0.30 0.22 0.21 0.52 0.63 
Source; Armin Langer (2005:.23)259  
The depiction in the table fits very well with the statements made by interview 
respondents about the “ethnic division of labor” that existed in Côte d’Ivoire for much 
of the late-colonial through to the early transition years. According to these accounts, 
one of the ways to ensure that all of the ethnic groups and the citizens in the country 
were made to feel that they had a stake in the welfare of the country was to have them 
control of economic and government sector such as transportation, the security forces 
and the civil service.   Consequently, “Dioulas260” were made to be in charge of all 
things transportation. Much of Côte d’Ivoire’s transportation system is owned and 
operated by individuals of northern descent.261  In terms of the military, the northerners 
                                                 
259
 a) Government positions taken into account included: President, Ministers of State and Regular 
Ministers. Deputies were not included in the calculations; b) Relative Representation (RR) is calculated 
by dividing an ethnic group’s relative proportion in government by its relative size in the entire 
population; c) Political inequality Measure (PIM) equals the standard deviation of the relative 
representation of the different ethnic groups.  
260
 Again not a real ethnic affiliation, but more so a crude reference used to categorize those ethnic groups 
from the northern regions of the country and other parts of Africa, north of Côte d’Ivoire.  
261
 Field Research, Abidjan, Jan.-June, 2008.  This became quickly apparent to me as I used the local 
transportation in and around Abidjan. Initially I resided in Marcory, about 40 minutes via taxi from the 
University of Abidjan which was in the Cartier of Abidjan called Cocody.  I was also able to observe this 
on my travels outside of Abidjan to regions such as Aboisso and Bouaké as I generally travelled on large 
buses or via mini-vans. A night out on the town in Yopougon is perhaps the best place to observe this 
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controlled higher positions in the army262; the Baoulé dominated the National Security 
Police (Sûreté Nationale),263, while the Bété and Krus were a plurality in the National 
Gendarmerie264 and the police.265  
When asked to account for the low levels of inter-ethnic and inter-religious 
conflict in Côte d’Ivoire prior to 1993, most respondents interviewed for this study, 
regardless of ethnic or religious background, socio-economic, occupational background 
pointed out that prior to Bédié’s presidency, there were no real distinctions between  
true Ivoirians and quasi- Ivoirians. They point out that for as long as they can 
remember, most ethnic groups have always had some say in the government … “a seat 
of the table, if you will.” 266  According to one interview respondent:  
“Of course there is nothing in writing about this…c’est la loi invisible. There is 
no magic number that we go by officially to appoint representative. It is just been 
understood that this is how things are done, ici chez-nous; c’est la vérité.” 267  
 
Another respondent stated that:  
 
“Before [1993], we had nothing to fear , together, we were all Ivoirian, 
regardless of ethnic affiliation, we all felt a part of our country, we all benefitted from 
the economic resources and we all had some in government that could bring our 
concern to the President. We are all proud to be who we are as far as our ethnic 
                                                                                                                                               
practice. The air is filled with the distinct sounds of the Dioula language as taxi drivers try to attract 
clients.  
262
  For example, from the mid-1970s the Sénoufo in the north were overrepresented in the army. 
263
 Houphouët-Boigny invariably appointed as his minister of defense a member of the Baoulé. 
264A branch of the armed forces responsible for general law enforcement, maintenance of public order, 
and internal security, including the suppression of violent crimes. Houphouët-Boigny invariably 
appointed a Bété chief of staff of the army.  
265
 This was a common response among interview respondents. The issue of ethnic preference is 
frequently discussed openly and joked about in daily conversation, particularly where different ethnic 
groups are represented. The joking generally sound like the following conversations that I witnessed: 
You, my friend, go fetch us a taxi, those who drive and own the taxi are all of your people, you should do 
well to get us a decent price. Or, if we get pulled over by the police, you be sure to do all of the talking. 
As soon as they recognize that they are dealing with a fellow Bété we will not have to pay and won’t have 
to sit all night haggling with them over nothing. On one of these occasions we were pulled over by the 
police on the way back from a concert at the Palais de la Culture in Treichville, Abidjan, and, as one 
would have it, the person who was Bété spoke to the police and we were soon on our way. 
266
 Field Research , Abidjan Feb.2008. 
267
 Field Research interview, May 2008. 
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identities, moi-même, je suis Mossi268  but I never felt like an outsider in the country of 
my birth, until after Houphouët-Boigny died. When Bédié took power everything 
changed; on est devenu les Ivoiriennes faux.”269 
  
 I found extremely high levels of support for Houphouët-Boingy as a venerated 
moral authority and trusted political leader, regardless of religion or ethnicity.  This 
holds true even for those of Bété descent, who otherwise carry a long held grudge after 
the 1969 massacre brought on by calls for secession. There were numerous written 
“hommage au père de la nation Ivoirienne” and “ode à Houphouët-Boigny,” in the 
country’s newspapers.  Although Houphouët-Boigny died on December 7, 1993, there 
are still numerous editorials, poems and commentary about his achievements in Côte 
d’Ivoire in the national newspapers. His funeral ceremony on February 8, 1994 was 
estimated to have been attended by over 100,000 people.270  
 Among the most common reasons cited by respondents for Houphouët-Boigny’s 
popularity, was his ability to make each ethnic group feel important and very much a 
part of the Ivoirian experience. One respondent stated for instance that what kept the 
country peaceful all those years was that Houphouët-Boigny was good at merging 
together all of the different elements of the Ivoirian experience into a single cohesive 
unit and he did so while making no one feel excluded or inferior. “Houphouët-Boigny 
would have been a masterful chess player!” 271 
 There is little evidence that Houphouët-Boigny’s popularity waned at the 
introduction of multiparty rule. In fact, Houphouët-Boigny received close to 82 percent 
                                                 
268
 An ethnic group originally from Burkina Faso among some of the earlier migrants South to Côte 
d’Ivoire to work on plantations in exchange for land and a livelihood. 
269
 Field research interview, April 2008.  
270
 Fraternité Matin Feb.8, 1994. Also see article in New York Times Feb.8,1994. 
271
 Field research interview, Jan-Jun.2008. 
181 
 
of the popular vote in the first ever multiparty elections in 1990 with an almost 70 
percent voter turnout.272 One of the reasons, which Chapter Seven clearly illustrates, is 
that while the formal institutional rules regarding electoral competition were altered, 
there were no fundamental changes made to the “rules that really mattered.” While, as 
the previous table indicated, the Baoulé had a slight over-representation among the 
political elites and the important political institutions, there was a relative balance in the 
multiparty years that characterized Côte d’Ivoire throughout much of single party era.   
 Multiparty rule meant the inclusion of other political parties into the political 
sphere. However, Houphouët-Boigny still maintained control of the vast majority of the 
state resources and could dispense of them as he wished. Based on Table VIII, he chose 
to continue the trend of allowing relatively balanced ethnic representation and access to 
state resources and services.  The regime structure may have been changed on the 
surface, but beneath the surface the rules regulating the redistribution and access to state 
resources operated on a business as usual basis. 
  The republic of Cameroon is a good case in point that formal institutional 
change does not necessarily alter the actual rules273 of the game result.   Despite the 
potential for ethnic and ethno-regional conflict, the transition from single to multiparty 
rule in 1992 did not result in ethnic politicization in the Cameroon. One of the reasons 
is that like President Ahmadou Ahidjo, his successor Paul Biya has adhered to the 
commonly established (though never formalized) rule regulating access to, and 
distribution of, government resources (Rothchild, 1997:14).274 While, as in Côte 
                                                 
272
 Electoral Results for Côte d’Ivoire. Ivoirian Statistical Institute. See also Fraternité Matin.  
273
 By which I mean that rules that are institutionalized or societally embedded even though they are not 
codified. 
274
 See Rothchild, (1997:14) 
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d’Ivoire, inequity has persisted in the Cameroon, unlike the post-1993 Côte d’Ivoire, all 
of the major ethnic groups have had a seat at the table and relatively reasonable access 
to state resources; thereby providing little incentive for political elites to mobilize along 
ethnic lines. Even after transitions to multi-party rule in 1992, the salience of ethnic 
identity has remained relatively low in the Cameroon.  
 In terms of party composition, again, even after 1990, at least until the death of 
Houphpouët-Boigny in 1993, the PDCI enjoyed large multi-ethnic support and included 
representatives from all of the major ethnic groups in the country. The PDCI won 163 
of the 175 seats in les élections législatives.275  Given this kind of national support in 
the face of political competition,276 there was little incentive for Houphouët- Boigny to 
change the rules of the game and subsequently, little reason for ethnic identity to be 
used as a mobilizational tool.   The question then becomes: what changed? The answer 
lies in the fact that unlike Houphouët-Boigny, Bédié faced serious questions and 
challenges regarding the legitimacy of his claim to the Presidency from political elites 
and voters. This significantly influenced the political strategies that Bédié employed to 
legitimize his accession to the Presidency, which in turn gravely affected extant 
informal rules regulating political representation, access to public goods, citizenship and 
land tenure.  These changes in turn led to a shift in the political salience of ethnic 
identity and ergo, the incentives for political elites to mobilize using ethnic identity as a 
primary mobilizational tool.  
 
 
                                                 
275
 Election Results of the Nov. 1990 elections. 
276
 The main opposition to compete in the presidential election was Gbagbo and the FPI. In the legislative 
elections the competition was generally the FPI and the PIT. 
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Towards explaining ethnic politicization in Côte d’Ivoire: a case of changing 
institutional rules? 
 
It is often noted that when access to resources and power is not monopolized by 
one dominant group but shared out equitably between competing ethnic groups, as in 
Kenya under Jomo Kenyatta (1963-78), a country tends to remain politically stable and 
more socially cohesive.    The previous sections outline the political stability and ethnic 
cohesion that Houphouët-Boigny was able to achieve from 1960-1993 via a form of 
state-facilitated co-ordination of a number of quasi-autonomous ethnic and or 
ethnoregional interests.  
  
The Transition Effect: change in the informal institutional rules 1993-2000 
 
As mentioned above, one of the central changes to affect Côte d’Ivoire in 1993 was the 
death of Houphouët-Boigny.  In his study of the levels of socio-economic disparities 
among ethnic groups and between regions in Côte d’Ivoire, Langer (2005) identified 
essential distinctions between the ethnic composition of the cabinet under Houphouët-
.Boigny and Bédié. My own survey of cabinet appointments between 1960 and 2008 
yielded similar results. Table X summarizes the details of this finding. In short, 
Houphouët-Boigny’s cabinets, while undoubtedly favoring Akans, were more inclusive 
and diverse than Bédié’s. Among the most significant changes that Houphouët -
Boigny’s death brought to Côte d’Ivoire was a leadership crisis.  
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TABLE X 
Ethnic representation under Bédié 1991-1999 
Ethnic 
Groups 
 Governmentª   
  
Inner Circle of political Power National 
Assembly 
Econ.&Social 
Council 
 Nov.91a  Dec.93 Jan.96 Aug.98 Nov.91 Dec.93 Jan.96 Aug.98 Nov. 95 Mar-98  
 % RR % RR % RR % RR % RR % RR % RR % RR % RR % RR 
Akan 0.61   1.46 0.52 0.24 0.52 1.23 0.59 1.41 0.73 1.74 0.67 1.58 0.67 1.58 0.75 1.78 0.46 1.10 0.58 1.39 
Baoule 0.17   1.04 0.24 1.43 0.28 1.64 0.31 1.86 0.36 2.18 0.42 2.48 0.42 2.48 0.42 2.48 0.22 1.29 0.33 1.98 
Kru 0.17   1.19 0.24 1.89 0.21 1.63 0.16 1.23 0.09 0.62 0.17 1.31 0.17 1.31 0.08 0.66 0.19 1.52 0.23 1.84 
S.Mandé 0.04 0.41 0.04 0.40 0.10 1.03 0.06 0.63 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.94 0.03 0.25 
N.Mandé 0.09 0.55 0.08 0.48 0.07 0.42 0.03 0.19 0.09 0.57 0.08 0.51 0.08 0.51 0.08 0.51 0.12 0.74 0.13 0.76 
Voltaic 0.09 0.53 0.12 0.68 0.10 0.59 0.13 0.71 0.09 0.56 0.08 0.47 0.08 0.47 0.08 0.47 0.12 0.70 0.02 0.09 
No. N=23 N=25 N=29 N=32 N= 11 N=12 N=12 N=12 N=171  N=120 
PIM 0.47 0.62 0.49 0.49 0.64 0.65 0.65 0.66 0.33 0.74 
Source: Armin Langer (2005)277 
 
 
Bédié and the crisis of legitimacy  
 Prior to his death, Houphouët-Boigny enacted a constitutional amendment in 
1990 stipulating that, in the event of his death, would assume his office until the next 
scheduled presidential elections. As the president of the National Assembly, Henri 
Konan Bédié was constitutionally slated to be the next president of Côte d’Ivoire 
following Houphouët-Boignys’ death. Thus, like Abdou Diouf in Senegal, Bédié came 
to the presidency via constitutional maneuvering of his predecessor Houphouët-Boigny. 
While like Senghor, Houphouët-Boigny sought to settle any potential legitimacy claims 
by naming a successor via constitutional revision,278  Bédié’s choice proved more 
                                                 
277
  The November 1991 government was formed under Boigny; (b) Relative representation (RR) is 
calculated by dividing an ethnic group’s relative proportion in government by its relative size in the entire 
population; (c) Political Inequality Measure (PIM) equals the standard deviation of the relative 
representation of the different ethnic groups. 
278
 This was stipulated in Article 11 of the Ivoirian Constitution as amended in 1990. According to this 
amendment, as the leader of the National Assembly, Henri Konan Bédié was declared the automatic 
successor in the event of Houphouët-Boigny’s death in office. 
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problematic for the Ivoirians than the choice of Adou Diouf was for the people of 
Senegal. 
  In particular, Bédié faced questions about his legitimacy as Côte d’Ivoire’s 
next President in a way that Abdou Diouf did not. Diouf had the support of a large 
majority the people of Senegal,279 the political elites and the Sufi religious leaders.  This 
may have been largely because he was Senghor’s choice. More importantly, however, 
Diouf’s own professional successes seem to have bought him favor with all sections of 
the Senegalese society. Throughout his career in the civil service, from regional 
governor (1961-62) to secretary general to the government (1964-65) to minister of 
planning and industry (1968-70) to prime minister (1970-1981), Abdou Diouf had built 
a stalwart reputation as a competent leader and deemed by many Senegalese to be an 
excellent candidate to assume the presidency. Abdou Diouf is known as one of 
Senegal’s chief technocrats; someone who values competence and reliability above all 
else, particularly ethnic affiliation.280 Throughout his tenure, Diouf enjoyed high 
favorability ratings. Many Senegalese had a high level of confidence in Diouf’s overall 
qualification and competence to govern. Notwithstanding his electoral defeat in 2000, 
many Senegalese believe that Diouf was an excellent president. 281  
 In contrast, the issue of Bédié’s competence to effectively govern the Côte 
d’Ivoire at the death of Houphouët-Boigny became increasingly salient during the early 
1990s as the gravity of Houphouët-Boigny’s illness became glaringly apparent.  The 
                                                 
279
 As indicated by his overall percentage in the 1981 elections. 
280
 Promotions and appointments under Abdou Diouf were largely based on educational qualifications, 
competence, skills and abilities and strong work ethic. Based on conversations during field research, these 
are some of the defining characteristics many Senegalese attribute to Adbou Diouf.  
281
 Field Research, Dakar, Senegal: interviews and newspaper coverage.  
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newly appointed Prime Minister—Allasane Ouattara— 282was proving to be highly 
competent at running the country- a task he took on more and more during the 1990s as 
Houphouët-Boigny sought treatment for his illness overseas.  The more competence 
Ouattara displayed  in his role as prime minister and the day-to-day governance of the 
country in Houphouët-Boigny’s absence, the more questions arose about Bédié ‘s 
competence and suitability, and eligilibility to become the future President de la Côte 
d’Ivoire.   
 Impressed with Ouattrara’s qualifications, accomplishments283 and plans for the 
country, the question for many Ivoirian (particularly some of the most prominent 
member of the PDCI), became: Who is the better candidate? Is Bédié the better 
candidate for this position in his party?284  The discussion played out publicly as 
newspaper publications ran daily and weekly surveys posing these very questions.  
Many Ivoirians believed that Côte d’Ivoire would fare better with Ouattara as the leader 
than with Bédié “installé a la tete de la Côte d’Ivoire.”285   
 While Bédié had a relatively successful run as President of the National 
Assembly, the focus of many newspaper reports tended to be Bédié’s dismissal as the 
Minister of Economy and Finance on charges of corruption and mismanagement of the 
public coffers in 1977 and other allegations of professional shortfalls and/or failures.  
Juxtaposed with Ouattara’s apparent successes, the message seemed clear: Ivoirians 
                                                 
282
 In 1990 Houphouët-Boigny decreed the establishment of the post of Prime Minister, and appointed 
Alassane Dramane Ouattara (ADO), an American trained economist and then serving governor of the 
West African Central Bank, and the first Prime Minister of Côte d’Ivoire.  
283
 Under Ouattara’s leadership, particularly his austere economic measures, Côte d’Ivoire experienced 
significant improvement economically.  
284
 Qui est le meilleur candidat? Etait-il [Bédié] le meilleur candidat de son parti à ce poste ? Y était-il 
pour ses qualités intrinsèques ou pour ses origines ethniques ? These questions were posed in newspapers 
as survey questions. See Le Voie, Sept. 1993- March 1994. See article by Raphael Lakepé : ”Pourquoi je 
ne crois pas en Bédié.” 
285
 See “Campagnes pour Légitimer Bédié’ by Freedom Nenda, Jan. 7, 1994.  
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held serious reservations about Bédié becoming the next President of Côte d’Ivoire.   In 
fact, despite some initial opposition to the austerity of the structural measures he 
instituted, overtime Ouattara had won the respect and allegiance of some of the key 
legislators and top ranking officials within the PDCI—so much so that he was 
encouraged by these officials to challenge the constitutional amendment that would 
allow Bédié to automatically assume the office of the presidency upon Houphouët-
Boigny’s death.   
 Aware of the growing popularity of Ouattara among members of the PDCI and 
among the general population, as well as his increasing unpopularity as more 
information seeped out about his past mismanagement as former minister of economics 
and finance,286  Bédié faced an important political dilemma: how to foment political 
support and legitimize his presidency. The situation reached critical mass when, 
emboldened by the support of members of the legislature and sensing the political 
weakness of Bédié as head of the PDCI, Ouattara officially challenged Bédié’s political 
legitimacy by bring a motion against the amendment to the Supreme Court. Ouattara 
lost this battle as the Supreme Court upheld the constitutional right for Bédié to assume 
the presidency in 1994. However, the challenge for Bédié was clear: foment political 
support and legitimize his authority or lose the presidency in upcoming elections. This 
was particularly significant as the constitutional amendment that made him Houhouët-
Boigny’s successor also stipulated that Bédié was entitled to hold the office only until 
the expiration of Houphouёt-Boigny’s mandate in 1995.  In effect, Bédié had less than 
two years to devise, plan and orchestrate a successful political campaign; one that 
would ensure his and PDCI’s electoral success.  
                                                 
286
  See reports in Fraternité Matin, Le Voie and other Ivoirian newspapers (1995-2000).  
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Bédié and the run-up to the 1995 presidential election  
 As the section above suggests, Bédié faced a significant political dilemma that 
was increasingly undermining his chances of electoral success in the 1995 presidential 
elections in the lead-up to the 1994 presidential elections.  With only two years to the 
next scheduled election, the political stakes were high.  Bédié’s strategic choices and 
apparent rejection of Houphouët-Boigny’s legacy should be viewed within this context. 
Bédié made the particular changes he did in an attempt to maintain control of the 
political process and establish his own political authority and legitimacy.  
  Perhaps the most telling indication of the seriousness of the dilemma is Bédié’s 
first act as President de la Côte d’Ivoire.   During the official and televised 
announcement of the death of Houphouët-Boigny by Ouattara,287 Bédié appeared at the 
national television station (RTI), under full gendarmerie escort. Reaffirming the death 
of the “father of the Nation,” Bédié declared himself President de la Côte d’Ivoire. 288 
Citing the constitutional amendment of 1990 enacted by Houphouët-Boigny, Bédié 
outlined that as leader of the National Assembly; he was entitled to and would 
immediately assume the office of the Presidency.289  Bédié then drove the 1.5 miles 
from RTI to the official presidential mansion, again with full military escort.  That 
Bédié felt it necessary to order military escort is particularly significant. It underscores 
the extent of the challenges and opposition Bédié felt towards his ascendance to the 
presidency, especially from Ouattara.  
                                                 
287
 In his speech Ouattara stated that: “Côte d’Ivoire is an orphan…[t]he man who has shaped [its] people 
for half a century, the father of the nation…has died.” 
 
289
 As far as his eligibility and competence to be an effective leader and president; at least compared to 
Ouattara, who, had so far displayed, in the eyes of many Ivoirians, an excellent ability to govern and 
successfully manage the country.  
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Bédié’s Strategic Choices 
 Given the increasing support among the elites for Ouattara, one of Bédié’s 
primary concerns was how to offset the political challenge posed by Allasane 
Quattara.290  As Bédié’s chief political rival, undermining Ouattara’s legitimacy to the 
presidency meant almost sure dominance at the polls for Bédié and the PDCI.  
Undermining and/or de-legitimizing Ouattara as a potential/actual presidential candidate 
became paramount.   
   The strategy of choice for Bédié was the introduction of Ivoirité (meaning the 
purported characteristics of an indigenous Ivoirian). The introduction of Ivoirité would 
not only serve as an ideological argument against Ouattara’s candidacy, but also 
legitimize Bédié’s ascendance to power.  Ivoirité required both parents of presidential 
candidates (le pèrè et la mere) to be native Ivoirians.291It also stipulated that candidates 
must reside in country within five years of bidding for the presidency. Also, candidates 
who have held a diplomatic passport from another country would be ineligible to run for 
president. The inability to satisfy these requirements rendered Ouattara unqualified to 
run as a presidential candidate in Côte d’Ivoire.  With only one parent a native292 of the 
country and having traveled and taken appointments representing Burkina Faso, and 
living outside of the country for much of his life, the stipulations dislodged Ouattara’s 
candidacy and delegitimized his bid for the presidency.  Ouattara’s candidacy was 
barred on the grounds that he held Burkinabé nationality and was not a native Ivoirian.  
                                                 
290
 This is often referred to as the ADO effect.   
291
 Prior to the change, only one needed to be native born Ivoirian.  
292
 Ouattara’s mother was from a village called Kong, which is located in the northern regions of the 
country bordering Burkina Faso. His father however is from Burkina Faso.   
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With the ADO effect sidelined, Bédié made a number of follow-up strategic 
moves. These included isolating those members of the PDCI (known and suspected) 
who favored and supported Ouattara.   Bédié not only dismissed them from their 
positions; he also quickly moved his loyalists (most of whom shared his ethnic lineage), 
into all key positions in government.293  In fact, once in power, Bédié significantly 
increased the appointments of fellow Baoulé politicians to his cabinet. Table X shows 
for instance that under Bédié, relative representation of Baoulé increased from 1.04 
under Houphouët-Boigny, to 1.86 by 1998.  The big losers in Bédié’s government, 
relative to Houphouët-Boigny’s, appeared to be Kru and northern Mandé. In the case of 
the latter group, their relative representation under Houphouët-Boigny stood at 0.91 in 
November 1991 compared to 0.19 under Bédié in the August 1998 government.294   
In a commentary piece in the Nouvel Horizon, Jacques Préjean lamented that the 
number of Baoulé being named to the government outweighed the other ethnic groups 
by a ratio of 6-1. 295 A look at the actual numbers indicates that this may have been an 
exaggeration of the facts. However, it highlights the unease/fear that many Ivoirians had 
started to feel about the changes that Bédié would bring to the country. Based on the 
many editorials, and commentaries in the various Ivoirian newspapers accusing Bédié 
                                                 
293
 The strategy is not uncommon. To the contrary it is quite commonly used by authoritarian or 
dictatorial leaders. Indeed, some of the most well known political leaders to employ such a strategy 
include Idi Amin Dada of Uganda, Mobutu Sese Seko of the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(formerly Zaire), and Francisco Macias Nguema in Equatorial Guinea. The idea is to surround oneself 
with trusted members of one’s own ethnic group, whose allegiance is paid for with direct access to jobs 
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of being tribalist or of tribalising politics,296 there was a general perception among a 
large portion of the Ivoirian population that Bédié was advancing an ethnic agenda to 
promote Baoulé dominance and privileges, at the expense of the other ethnic groups.  
In terms of the inner circle of political power, Bédié also increased the relative 
over-representation of the Baoulé from 2.18 in November 1991 to 2.48 in December 
1993. While this increase seems relatively small, when viewed within the context that 
the increase was done largely at the expense of northern and southern Mandé, that the 
over-representation was maintained throughout his presidency, along with the dismissal 
of other ethnic groups from the civil service and their replacement by party loyalists and 
fellow Baoulé representative (something he also did with members the party and the 
government media)297, a pattern of ethnic preference emerges. Furthermore, by 1998, 
the Baoulé controlled more than forty percent of the key political positions in Côte 
d’Ivoire.298  
  While in any other context changes to the composition of the cabinet might not 
have proved as significant, these seemingly minor changes have held important 
implications for Ivoirian politics. Given that ethnic identity has always been a potential 
source of political conflict in Côte d’Ivoire, one of the most important effects has been 
on ethnic politicization.  Indeed, in general, although these strategies may have helped 
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secure Bédié’s success in the 1994 presidential elections. Ethnic tensions rose sharply 
during Bédié’s presidency. The introduction of Ivoirité significantly affected the 
composition of the PDCI.  Appointing a larger number of Akans and Baoulés to the 
cabinet (especially at the expense of other ethnic groups), and barring Ouattara’s 
candidacy on the basis that he was not a “true Ivoirian,” brought an end to the fragile 
ethnic balance that had been had successfully maintained since the late-colonial period 
under Houphouët-Boigny. By stipulating that being Ivoirian meant being born to 
parents who were/are themselves natives de la Côte d’Ivoire, Bédié not only prevented 
the RDR and Ouattara from running for president in the 1995 and 2000 elections, it also 
brought significant loss of northern support to the PDCI. 
 Trying to define who was Ivoirian was and who was not, exacerbated ethnic and 
ethno-regional divisions, the manifestation of which included the growing attacks on 
foreign migrant workers from neighboring Muslim countries. Given the historical 
tendencies to treat migrants from the northern regions of the country as foreigners, 
many Ivoirians became targets of these local attacks.   After decades of being made to 
feel like an important element of the fabric of Ivoirian society, Muslims began to feel 
unfairly treated and unwelcomed in their own country.  Many northerners felt targeted 
and disenfranchised in a country to whose economic development they had significantly 
contributed.  
  This did three things. First, the traditionally safe support of the northern ethnic 
groups fell apart as a large majority of the Muslim and northern supporters transferred 
their support from the PDCI to Ouattara and the RDR. Without the support of the 
northerners, the PDCI was no longer representative of all Ivoirians.  Rather, the party 
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became increasingly stigmatized, and susceptible to charges of being an ethnic party- 
“the party of the Baoulé.”   As one interview respondent stated:  
“If the party [PDCI] was not going to represent us, and put Baoulé interests 
before everyone else, even more than before, then it made sense for us to go support a 
party that would be about us… That is why I support the RDR… I loved Houphouët-
Boigny, but after he died, I did not care for his replacement or the kind of party that the 
PDC I had become.” 
 
 Second, as more and more Notherners and Muslims transferred their support to 
Ouattara and the RDR in support of a fellow northerner, Ivoirian politics became 
embroiled into a debate about ethnic identity.  Bédié met accusations that he and the 
PDCI had become an ethnic party with counter accusations.  Pointing to the heavy Bété 
and Muslim/northerner presence among the supporters of the RDR and the FPI 
respectively, Bédié accused these parties and their leaders of engaging in ethnic politics. 
Also, as Ivoirians became more open and vocal about the “increasing inequalities,” the 
noise levels on the national stage increased, altering the salience of, and incentives to 
use, ethnic identity as a mobilizational tool. 
 Third, ruining the long standing ethnic coalition involving the northerners299   
had more far-reaching political consequences that went beyond shifting allegiance from 
one party to another.  While never formally written and codified, ethnic balancing and 
coalition were underlying and societally embedded rules that governed political 
representation and access to governmental goods from the late-colonial period.  Barring 
a political candidate on the basis of ethnic identity, appointing loyalists into all key 
positions in government while sidelining supporters of the opposition, effectively 
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undermined and significantly altered these rules.  This in effect, altered incentives for 
elites and the general population to engage in ethnic politics: elites became more likely 
to use ethnic appeals to mobilize political support, and the public was likely to respond 
to such appeals to ensure electoral success and/or defeat.300 Without the broad coalition, 
disincentives to use ethnic identity as a mobilizational tool no longer existed, which in 
effect, made the use of ethnic identity as a mobilizational tool politically appealing and 
advantageous to political elites.   
Bédié’s attempt to foment political support by tapping into deep seated 
resentment of immigrants and ruling that indigenous Ivoirians should reclaim the land 
from the immigrant population, had a profound effect on other long standing, if 
informal, societally embedded rules- those governing land tenure and property rights. 
The rule governing land tenure since the late-colonial period stipulated that “the land 
belongs to he who cultivates it.”  Historically, the main benefactors of the informal rule 
that “the land belongs to he who cultivates it” were immigrants and Ivoirians from the 
north, center and west of the country.  Change from “the land belongs to he who 
cultivates it” to needing proof not only of one’s natural birth, but also, proof that both 
parents are/were also native born citizens, led to significant increases in  political 
inequality, ethnic and ethno-regional disparities  and ethnic based grievances. 
With the introduction of Ivoirité came new legislation concerning property 
rights. The implementation of new legislation presumed identification and registration 
of customary rights. These new legislations favored the autochthons (indigenous 
groups). Indigenous groups could lay claim to land along on the basis of ancestral lines 
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at the expense of those who had inhabited and worked the land for generations (some 
prior to independence),. This further increased ethno-regional disparities and 
exacerbated ethnic tensions, leading to shifts in the political salience of ethnic identity- 
from dormant and contained, to dominating the national discourse- and the incentives 
for political elites to use ethnic identity as a primary mobilizational tool.  
 In her study of land related conflicts in Africa, Catherine Boone (2003) found 
that the number of land-related conflicts in the Western regions of Côte d’Ivoire spiked 
dramatically in the mid-to late 1990s and after.301 While Boone asserts that change in 
the political economy was the key factor at play here, my research findings suggest that 
these conflicts were due to exacerbated ethnic tensions between autochthons and 
immigrants, resulting from the introduction of Ivoirité.  The autochthon/immigrant 
struggles have their roots in the colonialism; however, prior to 1993 there was little 
incentive to benefit, economically or politically, from instigating or politicizing such 
conflicts.  The incentives generated by the introduction of Ivoirité were different.  With 
the termination of the informal rule of “the land belongs to he who cultivates it” 
autochthons sought to reclaim their ancestral lands. These actions provided further 
incentives for political elites to make ethnic/ethno-regional grievances part of their 
political campaign. In November 1994 for instance, more than 10,000 immigrants from 
Burkina Faso were forced out of their homes in the southwestern town of Tabou after 
members of the local Kru ethnic group complained that foreigners had taken over their 
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land.302 The RDR had few problems mobilizing immigrants, descendants of immigrants, 
Muslims, northern Ivoirians303or any one sympathetic to the plight of these people.  
 Ivoirité also made the criteria for being an Ivoirian stricter. The process required 
documentation of the origin of one’s parents. By 1994 this was the requirement of the 
national identification program and the issuance of new identity cards. In fact, such 
documentation was required to simply establish residential status. As more than 30 
percent of the Ivoirian population are foreign born and even a larger percentage born to 
immigrant parents and grandparents, this was particularly troublesome for many 
Ivoirians. Those most profoundly affected were northern Ivoirians.  
 As established in the previous chapters, one of the effects of the colonial 
migration policy and Houphouët-Boigny’s open land policy was that Ivoirians who had 
migrated to the South were often considered foreigners. This was increasingly the case 
after 1993.  Akindès notes for instance that an outcome of “the process of identifying 
the ‘true Ivoirians’ was that Muslims were amalgamated with foreigners… and people 
from the north of the Ivory Coast [because they are generally Muslims]were 
amalgamated with foreigners” (Akindès, 2003:14). 
  Many Ivoirians were made to feel unwelcome in their own country. According 
to Akindès (2003), in the collective imagination, there developed “a doubt as to the 
underlying reality of their belonging to the Ivoirian nation” (Akindès, 2003:13). Among 
the many thousands of people who left Côte d’Ivoire for fear of their lives and/or 
livelihood, about 10 percent are northern Ivoirians.304 Ouattara 305felt that questions 
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about his true nationality arose only because, like the population from the northern 
regions of the country, he was Muslim.  
 Again, these measures drove northerners away from the PDCI and toward the 
RDR 306 particularly since, like them, the leader Ouattara, was told that under the new 
rules of Ivoirité, he was not Ivoirian enough to run for the presidency. According to the 
Secretary General of the RDR:  
 
We certainly are not an ethnic party and we did not set out to become one. We 
attracted so many northerners because a man without a voice is like a foreigner 
in his own country and many felt that we speak on their behalf.307   
 
 With a majority northern Muslim political voter base, the RDR and its leader 
(himself a northerner and a Muslim) became increasingly susceptible to the charge that 
the party was an “ethnic party.” The RDR became a political target of the PDCI on this 
basis.  Bédié often made reference to the RDR as “a northern regionalist party.”  Indeed 
Bédié described the RDR as “a northern regionalist party with a sinister Muslim 
agenda.” (Collett, 2006: 623). While this may have been an attempt to delegitimize the 
party, it provides a unique glimpse into the political rhetoric at the time and a way to 
gauge how much ethnic identity had come to dominate the national political discourse. 
It also turned into a self- fulfilling prophecy where the perception was generated that 
Bédié was an “anti-Muslim going to punish individual ethnic, religious, and regional 
groups for their divergent political views” (Crook, 1997: 226).  
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Conclusion 
 The case explorations above strongly suggest that the  changes in the informal 
institutional rules regulating resource reciprocity systems in Côte d’Ivoire led to 
increased salience of ethnic identity  and made what was  conventionally latent,  a 
highly significant mobilizational tool.  
 The discussion highlights that analyses of formal rules alone are insufficient to 
explain political outcomes.  The findings suggests that  since the actual rules that people 
adhere to are generally not formally established, changes to informal institutional rules 
may have a more significant impact on ethnic politicization and ethnic conflict, than 
changes to the formal rules. This is true especially if, as in Senegal and Cameroon, 
change in the formal institutional rules does not translate to change in deeply embedded 
informal institutional rules.  Indeed, while one could make the case that changes to the 
informal institutions in Côte d’Ivoire resulted from the change in the formal institutional 
rules—single-party to multiparty system—the chapter indicates that the former does not 
necessarily follow from the latter. Again, Senegal and Tanzania and Cameroon provide 
empirical support. It is evident in the case of Côte d’Ivoire as well. The politicization of 
ethnicity did not immediately accompany the transition to multiparty rule in Côte 
d’Ivoire. It was not until after the death of Houphouët-Boigny, and in particular change 
in the informal institutional rules regarding political representation and access to state 
resources, that ethnic identity became a mobilizational tool.  It was not until Bédié 
changed the rules of the political game that ethnicity began to dominate Ivoirian 
political discourse and stormed the national public sphere.  
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 My research shows that while the informal institutional rules generated 
incentives for individuals to invest in, and consolidate their ethnic identities, they also 
acted as constraints against mobilizing ethnic identities as they promoted and ensured 
relatively balanced access to government and governmental resources among the major 
ethnic groups. Where these rules are altered or significantly weakened, as in post-1993 
Côte d’Ivoire, the subsequent shift in the incentive structure may be such that political 
elites find it advantageous to politicize ethnic differences.  In other words, the changes 
to the informal institutional rules altered incentives for ethnicity to be employed as a 
mobilizational tool. 
 The next chapter explores how these changes gave rise to fear and confusion 
among the Ivoirian population, which helps to explain how political elites were able to 
galvanize support along ethnic lines, even in the absence of explicit appeals to ethnicity 
by political elites and party leaders.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
Exploring the effects of informal institutional rule changes on ethnic politicization: 
Insights from the cases of Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 Scholars have long espoused that one of the main contributing factors to ethnic 
conflicts is the existence of severe disparities and inequalities in societies, especially 
those that are blatantly along ethnic lines,  Gurr (2000) argues that the salience of a 
specific identity (ethnic or religious), and subsequently, its mobilization potential, is a 
function of the degree to which that identity is a major determinant of the groups’ 
security, status, material well-being and access to political power. For Gurr, economic 
disadvantages, such as poverty and economic discrimination, are “consistently 
correlated with economic and social grievances and with demands for greater political 
rights” (Gurr 1993:188). Where a group is treated differently in terms of privileges and 
power, this identity can be strengthened as a unifying force and consequently provide 
mobilizational appeal for aspiring political elites competing in popular elections. 
Grievances308 about differential treatment and the sense of a group identity provide the 
essential bases for mobilization and shape the kinds of claims political elites make.  
  Langer (2005) and Østby (2008) assert that horizontal inequalities, particularly 
at the elite level, represent an aspect of relative deprivation which can facilitate 
mobilization. According to Østby (2008), group-based inequalities (economic, political, 
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or social) can create a sense of common grievances, increase intra-group solidarity and 
reinforce a sense of separation between in-group and out-group. The greater the 
differentials between groups the stronger the mobilizational appeal and the more likely 
it is that elites will make political appeals to ethnic or ethno-regional differences.   
Applying this theoretical framework to the Ivoirian Crisis, Langer (2005) argues that 
there exists in Côte d’Ivoire, the simultaneous presence of severe political and socio-
economic horizontal inequalities which not only generated strong incentives for  
political elites to mobilize supporters along ethnic lines, but also made it highly likely 
that ethnic constituencies would respond to such appeals.   
My research points to the evidence of wide disparities in the Ivoirian society. 
The case explorations in Chapter Four establish that one of the driving forces of 
inequality in Côte d’Ivoire is the wide socio-economic and political disparities between 
the north and the south.  With respect to direct investments and infrastructural 
development, the northern regions of the country have received very little investment 
relative to the south. Road construction, health and medical facilities, schools, small-
scale industries, access to running water and electricity and other key social services, 
have conventionally been more readily available in the southern regions of the country.   
What is also established in that chapter, however, is that the north/south 
disparities in Côte d’Ivoire existed even prior to independence in 1960- dating back the 
early colonial period.  If the assertion is that socio-economic disparities provide 
political elites with strong incentives to mobilize their supports among ethnic lines, how 
then do we explain non-politicization in Côte d’Ivoire between 1960 and 1990?  
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The general  assumption in the ethnic politics literature is that given the choice, 
political elites will  couch their electoral appeals and frame their political discourse in 
ethnic terms rather than make cross-ethnic appeals, and that groups will willingly 
following the directions of their leaders.  While this assumption is generally borne out 
in cases where political parties lack significant support from any one ethnic group (s), it 
often does not apply to cases in which the major political parties already enjoyed 
majority support among particular ethnic groups.309  In the case of the latter, one would 
expect party leaders would seek to attract cross-ethnic political support, especially if 
none of the ethnic groups was large enough to deliver an electoral victory to a political 
party.   This is indeed what I found in the case of post-1993 Ivoirian national elections. 
Data from interviews and a survey of the newspaper coverage of the national and 
presidential electoral campaigns leading up to the 1995 and proceeding elections, 
indicate that individually, each of the major parties (PDCI, RDR and FPI) promoted 
broad, cross-ethnic appeals a central part of its electoral campaign.  Each party also 
claimed that one or the other opposition party was covertly an ethnic party.  
The chapter argues that changes to informal institutional rules governing 
political representation and land and labor policies created the incentives for political 
elites to employ this kind of double-edged political strategy. While the official party 
platform espoused messages with cross-ethnic appeals, they also accused the other 
parties of engaging in ethnic politics. Within an already ethnically charged political 
climate, the claims and counter-claims of engaging in ethnic politics: (a) made ethnic 
identity not only a dominant issue in national political debate but also a divisive issue 
                                                 
309
 See Chapter Six for a discussion on how changes to informal institutional rules governing political 
representation and access to public goods and citizenship and land rights created a political environment 
in which ethnicity dominated the national political discourse.  
203 
 
that ultimately became the underlying basis of political competition;  (b) elevated 
otherwise   local grievances to national level politics in an ethnic framework   and; (c) 
increased the likelihood and chances of individuals and ethnic groups voting along 
ethnic lines.   
 
 
Côte d’Ivoire Electoral Campaign 1990s -2000 
Electoral polls and surveys indicated that Gbagbo had a majority support among 
individuals and ethnic groups from the south-west headed into the 1995 national 
elections.  Given this, one would expect that like the Diola political elites in Senegal, 
Gbagbo would have sought to extend his party’s political appeal beyond members of his 
own ethnic group or the groups from his own region.  Even with the total eighteen 
percent of the Bété vote, Gbagbo could not win a national election by appearing to 
represent a particular ethnic and/or ethno-regional grouping or being exclusive of other 
ethnic groups.  The challenge for Gbagbo and the FPI during the 1995 election, 
therefore, was how to highlight the specific grievances of his political support base (the 
Bété )310 while espousing a national cause or advancing an inclusive national agenda 
and image. In other words, the political puzzle for Gbagbo and the FPI was how to 
maximize cross-ethnic support while minimizing loss of political support among the 
party support base.  
That Gbabgo was the one to initiate the political strategy accusing the PDCI and 
Bédié of systematically favoring the interests of the Baoulé during the 1995 political 
campaign (Langer, 2007: 21) is consequential. His actions fulfilled the criteria of 
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broadening his appeal while simultaneously expressing the sense of grievance of the 
Bété. Given the centrality of ethnic identity in the national debate Gbagbo’s strategy311 
provided a way to use the issue to undermine the ruling party, all the while presenting 
himself and the FPI as the most qualified alternative. 312 Gbagbo’s political strategy was 
not lost on the other major political parties however. Ouattara and the RDR employed a 
similar strategic approach early on in the campaign.313   
While fairly secure in its support by the people of the north,314 the RDR was also 
aware that to win large scale political support, it was necessary to attract support from 
other ethnic groups and regions of the country.  One of the RDR’s immediate concerns 
was how to galvanize national support, develop a national image and prevent becoming 
stigmatized as the party of the Muslim northerners.  Like Gbagbo and the FPI, RDR 
party leaders chose to cast the opposition parties (mainly the PDCI) as ethnic parties. In 
fact, one of the points that the RDR leadership uses to justify its emergence is the claim 
that existing political parties championed the cause of particular ethnic groups at the 
expense of others.  The RDR leaders pledged to representative of the interests of all 
Ivoirians.  
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 A frequent charge of the FPI throughout the electoral campaign was that the PDCI favored the 
interests of the Baoulé at the expense of the other ethnic groups, particularly the Bété.  
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 Although, some would argue that in the case of the RDR and Ouattara, his strategy was more of a 
defensive strategy against claims by the PDCI that the RDR was the party of northerners and Muslims 
with sinister plans for the rest of the ethnic groups in Côte d’Ivoire.  
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 Especially as Bédié’s introduction of the concept of Ivorité ensured that the RDR had just such a voter 
base. The introduction of Ivorité, which sought to distinguish between true and quasi-Ivoirians and 
changes to informal rules of relatively balanced ethnic representation and the land belongs to whomever 
cultivates it affected northerners disproportionately.   Northerners were also drawn to the RDR because 
they viewed the disqualification of the party leader- Ouattara – as an attempt to disenfranchise all 
northerners, particularly those who were also Muslims.  
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 Not unlike Gbagbo and Ouattara, Bédié’s campaign strategy was also to point to 
the opposition parties-FPI and RDR as ethnic parties. Indeed, throughout the 1995 
political campaign, Bédié accused both parties of being the party of the Bété and the 
party of the “sinister Muslim northerners” respectively. Bédié and the top ranking PDCI 
elites believed that characterizing the other major opposition parties as engaging in 
ethnic politics would rally political support among Bédié’s own ethnic group while 
undermining the appeal of the FPI and RDR to the other ethnic groups.  
 While each political party and party leaders seemed to have employed a political 
strategy that would absolve them from accusations of engaging in ethnic politics, each 
had a significant role to play in the ultimate politicization of ethnic identity in post-1993 
Côte d’Ivoire.  By casting accusations against each other, the major political players in 
the campaign leading up to the 1995 elections directly contributed to a political climate 
in which ethnic identity became a politically polarizing issue in the country.  The 
political strategy had the effect of encouraging ethnic outbidding- as each party tried to 
label the other party the fear that another ethnic group would gain control of the 
institutional machinery of the state and use it to subordinate other groups and impose 
systems of ethnic stratifications drove ethnic groups to collective action.   
 
 
Party Agenda: national, issue-specific or regional  
   A survey of the party campaign literature, political speeches associated with 
the 1995 election, and interviews,315 indicate that as in Senegal, Ivoirian political party 
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leaders did not set out to become the party of a specific ethnic or religious group.  Each 
of the political parties316 endorsed broad cross-ethnic support. Party leaders in both 
countries317worked hard to combat the portrayal by the opposition and perception 
among the public that their parties were ethnic parties.  Party leaders often cite diversity 
among the top-level party officials and support among various ethnic groups in the 
country as evidence of their cross-ethnic reach.   The Secretary General of the RDR, for 
instance stated that one has only to look at the founders of the party to see that “it is not, 
nor has it ever been, an ethnic party:”318 Djény Kobina was from the south-east near the 
border with Ghana, and identified with the Nzimba people … three of the other eight 
founding deputies were from the southern and central towns of San Pedro, Sassandra 
and Bouake. And, Ouattara did not become the leader of the party until after it was 
established.  Herself among the Christian representatives from the Southern parts of 
Côte d’Ivoire, the General Secretary states that she views the RDR an open political 
party.319 
According to the RDR Secretary General party leaders did not set out to 
mobilize the nordists nor the Muslims: “[o]ur aim was to revert to the principles of 
Houphouëtism and to offer representation to all Ivoirians-to let everyone know that we 
are standing up against the establishment on everyone’s behalf.” 320 Pointing to the 
                                                                                                                                               
glean information about the political strategies that political parties and their leaders used to attract voters 
during the 1995 and subsequent elections in Côte d’Ivoire.  This section offers an analysis of the findings 
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 Interview with RDR party officials, at party headquarters, 2 Plataeu, Abidjan,  March 2008. 
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heightened salience of ethnic identity in the post-1993 era321, other RDR top officials 
argue that one of the early difficulties faced by the RDR and its leadership was being 
able to break-through the identity politics. One top level official stated that the political 
climate leading up to the 1995 elections cost the party votes in several regions of the 
country. This as: “many [people] believed the claims and rumors [that the RDR was an 
ethnic party] and decided that it was better to vote for their own ethnic groups… [i]n 
such a political environment, it is hard to dissuade people otherwise.” 322   
 RDR party manifesto and party documents generally support the Secretary 
General’s claims that the RDR attempted to make cross-ethnic appeals.   While there 
has been some reference to the Charter of the North323, there are no explicit references 
to ethnic or religious or even regional concerns directed specifically at attracting 
northerners/Muslim voters. The official party documents focus on economic issues and 
call for a revival of the old political principles of Houphouët-Boigny, which they claim 
was becoming corrupt under Bédié’s leadership.324 Also, when interviewed, most 
Ivoirians reported not ever having heard RDR leader(s) use ethnic rhetoric during public 
address at political rallies or in official statements to the press.  As one RDR party 
official explains: 
Given the vast number of northerners and Muslims that fled the PDCI for our 
party because of Bédié’s policies, which were no longer honoring our rules of 
ethnic balancing in the government and that discriminated against northerners 
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greater political recognition of the north’s political loyalty” and an end to “Baoulé nepotism” in 
recruitment to public jobs.” 
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 A survey of public speeches and newspaper coverage of the RDR activities during its formative years 
(1994- 1995), indicates that the rhetoric remained loosely based on accusations of corruption by the PDCI 
and suggestions of alternatives means of governance that the RDR would employ if elected into power.      
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with the introduction of Ivoirité, it was not necessary for us to direct our 
campaign messages towards them. 325 
 
  Indeed, many Ivoirian northerners indicate that the viewed the changes to long-
standing rules governing representation and land and citizenship rights by Bédié as 
systematic discrimination against Ouattara and by extension, all northerners/Muslims. 
Consequently, Ouattara and the RDR became, for many, a very powerful symbol for the 
grievances of the disenfranchised northern political, economic, ethnic and regional 
grouping. The more Bédié tried to delegitimize the RDR as a political party by 
describing it as a northern regional party with a sinister Muslim agenda, the more 
solidified the RDR’s electoral base became. Many felt, for instance, that by declaring 
that both parents (“le père et la mère”) of the candidates “doit ètre Ivoiriens”  was  a 
referendum against all northerners and Muslims and not just Ouattara as an individual 
and support among northerners grew exponentially.   
 As beneficiaries of instant political and economic support from northerners 
however they also became easy targets for the ruling party and the FPI to paint the RDR 
as an ethnic party.  Rather than attracting cross-ethnic support via campaign messages 
promoting the principles of Houphouёtism and the promise of more economically 
rational policies, the RDR  failed to expand its support base as it became embroiled in 
claims and counter claims of ethnic politicking.326 The problem as RDR leaders saw it 
was a difficulty in breaking through the identity politics and mis-perceptions to capture 
cross-ethnic support. An RDR party official stated:  
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 the RDR pointed out in campaign speeches and interview statements that it was actually Bédié that has 
been purging the PDCI and other important institutions, of northerners and Muslims, especially those in 
high-level positions 
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Although the central emphasis of our campaign was more on the problems 
facing the nation and the northerners all relate to these problems, they readily 
supported the RDR because the leader is himself a northerner. Sadly, this made 
it difficult to attract others as well. People felt that because so many northerners 
supported us, we were the kind of party that Bédié claimed us to be… Ivoirité 
made people here afraid. We were all afraid... We never thought to see this type 
of problem ici en Côte d’Ivoire.327   
 
 While the RDR Secretary General and other party officials were very careful to 
highlight the evidence of their cross-ethnic public and national campaign platform, as 
Chandra (1994) points out however, the political use of ethnicity is not always overt.  
Like Gbagbo (FPI) and Bédié (PDCI), the RDR and Ouattara adopted a strategy of 
accusing the opposition parties of engaging in ethnic politics, while advancing a 
political campaign encouraging cross-ethnic support. 328  The incentive to appeal to a 
particular ethnic group may not have been strong but the heightened salience of 
ethnicity presented an opportunity for the parties to seek to undermine the opponent via 
accusations of engagement in ethnic politics. The result is the prolonging and even 
deepening of ethnic politicization.329 
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 Although it is only fair to point out that the RDR did not initiate this political strategy, but got drawn 
into the political back and forth from having to defend against claims by Bédié and the PDCI officials 
that the party had a “sinister Muslim plot.” Nonetheless, before long, all three major political parties and 
leaders became embroiled in what can only be described as ethnic politicking, which served not only to 
heighten ethnic tensions and make ethnicity the dominant issue of the national discourse. It also divided 
the population along ethnic lines. Individuals became more likely to align with one party over the other 
on the bases of ethnic affiliation.  
329
 As people become more likely to align with a political party on the basis of ethnicity and become 
entrenched.  
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Political Parties and Ethnic politics in Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire 
As established in previous chapters, unlike the political parties in post-1993 
Côte d’Ivoire, the political parties in Senegal, have not had as much difficulty garnering 
cross-ethnic votes.  Indeed, while political parties such as And-Jëf  Parti pour la 
Democratie et le Socialisme and the Rassemblement pour le Socialisme et la 
Democracy/Taku Défaraat Sénégal(RSD/TDS) and their respective party leaders, 
Landing Savane and Robert Sagna, have had to battle claims of being ethnic parties,330 
the issue of ethnicity has never dominated Senegal’s331 national political discourse. 
 One of the primary reasons for this concerns the trans-ethnic nature and 
redistributive roles of the religious Orders. Political parties’ dependence upon the Sufi 
Orders for political support and their role as   redistributive intermediaries makes broad, 
cross-ethnic political support absolutely crucial to political success in Senegal. Fear of 
marginalization subsequently makes it very difficult for party leaders to use ethnicity as 
a primary mobilization strategy. Thus, while there were many snide remarks and 
dismissals of Robert Sagna’s political party by various party officials, such claims are 
rarely explicitly advanced as a means of rallying political support or used as part of 
general electoral campaigns.332    
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 Rassemblement pour le Socialisme et la Democracy/Takku Défaraat Sénégal(RSD/TDS)  is often 
referred to as the party of the Diola (largely due to the massive following among the Diola in the 
Casamance region of Senegal) despite diversity among party officials and cross-ethnic political support 
among the various ethnic groups across the country. These include Muslims, Wolofs, Serers and Peuls. 
Diolas are predominantly Christians. For some, a fairly large political following among the Diola in the 
southern regions of Casamance and the fact that the party leader himself is Diola seem to be adequate 
grounds for the claims.  
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 Again, the emphasis here is on Senegal north of the Gambia. The issue of Casamnace is dealt with in 
more details in the following chapter.  
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 Robert Sagna was one of the most frequently discussed party leaders whenever the issue of ethnic 
voting and ethnic parties were raised. While not one of the most influential Senegalese politicians 
Sagna’s is viewed as a strong political rival and he is often credited for his rise to prominence in national 
level politics via the PS.  The issue of his ethnicity and the regional support he enjoys is brought up as a 
swipe at his growing popularity. As indicated earlier however, party leaders for the most part are not 
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 For his part, Sagna often emphasizes his years of experience in politics, his 
close proximity to former President Senghor and downplays his role as mayor of 
Ziguinchor, which is 61 percent Diola. When Rassemblement pour le Socialisme et la 
Democracy/Taku Défaraat Sénégal’s (RSD/TDS) party leaders directly address the 
issue a variant of the following response is often offered:  
Zigunichor is a region that is more than sixty percent Diola and having served as 
the mayor for years, of course it makes sense that the people of Zinguinchor are 
going to vote predominantly for the Rassemblement pour le Socialisme et la 
Democracy/Taku Défaraat Sénégal(RSD/TDS) in the national elections. This is 
because they see the work and know that all the positives that having strong 
representation from the can bring to the region and to Senegal as a whole. The 
Senegalese people know us, and they know we are not driven by ethnic interests 
but by what is best for Senegal. 333  
 
Rassemblement pour le Socialisme et la Democracy/Taku Défaraat Sénégal(RSD/TDS) 
party leaders also point out that Robert Sagna did become the mayor of Ziguinchor 
because he is Diola but rather,  because he is the best person to get the job that needs to 
be done, accomplished. Also, while party officials of the Rassemblement pour le 
Socialisme et la Democracy/Taku Défaraat Sénégal(RSD/TDS) are mindful of bring 
national level attention to the problems of the region,334  they are also mindful of the 
fact that the  limited chance of success without cross-ethnic political support across the 
Senegalese population.   
                                                                                                                                               
willing to make the issue a part of any legitimate and or official political discourse. For the most part, 
each parties’ dependence on the Sufi Orders assures this.        
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 Field research interview, Dakar, Senegal. Dec. 2007. Notably, besides serving as  mayor of Ziguinchor 
from 1984-2009, Robert Sagna was a minister twenty two years; serving the presidencies of both Senghor 
and Abdou Diouf (1978-2000). An agricultural engineer, Sagna has served as: secretary of state for 
human promotion (1978 to 1980); secretary of state for maritime fishing (1980 to 1983); minister of 
equipment (1983 to 1988);  minister of tourism (1987 to 1988);  minister of information for the 
Sénégambia Confederation (1988 to 1989); minister of communication (1988 to 1990);  minister of 
equipment, transport and the sea (1991 to 1993);  and, minister of state for agriculture (1993 to 2000).  
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 The Cassamance region in Senegal receives very little in terms of governmental resources. Compared 
to the regions North of the Gambia, public investments in these regions are poor. Resources such as 
health care services, public infrastructure, access to running water and schools are much  less readily 
available in Ziguinchor than in St. Louis for example (this from personal observation having spent a week 
in each location and being taking around by the locals to observe just these elements).   
212 
 
 In the case of Côte d’Ivoire, a survey of the FPI’s campaign literature, party 
agenda, speeches and interview statements, suggests that Gbagbo made some attempt to 
promote a national image.  For example, the campaign literature dispersed to the public 
highlighted economic issues and made general charges of corruption and governmental 
inadequacies against the ruling party.  Interviews with top ranking FPI party officials 
also suggest however that having large Bété support335the party made the political party 
vulnerable to accusations that Gbago and the FPI were “hardliner Bété harboring ill-
feelings against the PDCI ever since the government troops quelled their rebellion and 
calls for secession in 1969.”336   
 Some argue that it was this political vulnerability that informed Gbagbo’s 
decision to initiate as a political strategy, accusing the PDCI of engaging in ethnic 
politics. The effects of the changes to the rules governing ethnic representation and the 
introduction of the concept of Ivoirité on the political climate, particularly the salience 
of ethnic identity, provided a key opening and opportunity to score political points by 
pointing to all of the ways in which the PDCI seemed to be moving in favor of the 
Baoulé rather than as the national party it proclaimed to be.  By preemptively shifting 
the focus of the “ethnic issue” onto the ruling party, the FPI felt that: (a) it could not be 
accused of making appeals to ethnic identity as a mobilizational tool; and (b) it could 
nullify the ethnic issue as a legitimate political issue, by pointing out that national party 
itself showed preference for one particular ethnic group.  
 The FPI’s party leaders did not seem to anticipate the effect that counter-charges 
would have on the issue of ethnicity. Rather than absolving the political party of 
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213 
 
charges of engaging in ethnic politics, the strategy would embroil Côte d’Ivoire in 
vicious battle of charges and counter-charges, at the center of which was the issue of 
ethnic identity.  The political strategy made the issue of ethnicity more politically 
salient.  Indeed, by asserting that the PDCI was a partial regime that systematically 
favored the interests of the Baoulé, the FPI did much more to advance the salience of 
ethnic identity as a mobilizational tool than it did to widen the party’s political appeal to 
other ethnic groups.  
 For many Ivoirians, the strategy seemed to confirm the perceptions that the FPI 
was more concerned about ethnically related issues than the more pressing issues facing 
the political nation. For instance, many Ivoirians felt that by making the land issues 
(grievances associated with the ethnic groups of the south-western regions, particularly 
the Bété) front and center of his political campaign at the national level, Gbagbo was 
advancing the interests of his own ethnic group (Bété), at the expense of other groups 
such as the Baoulé and the northerners.   Gbgabo’s continued agitation over particular 
local southwestern grievances gave many the impression that the FPI was less 
concerned with specifying the benefits that the party would bring to the different 
segments of the society and more concerned with advancing the cause of the Bété.337 
Many northerners felt personally affronted by what they perceived by Gbagbo’s 
“campaign against the nordists.”338 For one respondent:  “the barely veiled anti-Islam 
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religious undertones of Gbagbo rhetoric, not to mention his wife’s campaign statements, 
make supporting the FPI impossible.” 339 
  Of the major political parties involved in the Ivoirian 1995 electoral campaign, 
the PIT was perhaps the party with the least ethnic specific supporters and 
consequently, the broadest campaign appeal and national image since 1990.  The 
leadership of the PIT in Francis Wodié have explicitly refused to campaign on the basis 
of ethno-regional or area-specific issues. Rather, as a political campaign strategy, 
Francis Wodié, the Dean of the Faculty of Law at the University of Abidjan, Cocody, 
presents an agenda highlighting “principled leftist or social democratic alternatives to 
those currently being advanced.”340  According to a party official Wodié, “prefers to 
stay clear of the ethnic bating … [he] simply wants to devise and introduce constructive 
ideas of how to improve the socio-political and economic problems facing Côte 
d’Ivoire.”341 Yet, despite the effectively organized electoral campaign and national 
agenda, which many believed were effectively presented to the public at political rallies 
or via the media, Wodié  failed in his presidential endeavors –receiving a mere 3percent 
of the electoral vote in the 1995 election.   
 The PIT’s lack of success is consequential for a number of reasons. First, as the 
only political party that refused to invoke the issue of ethnicity as a part of his 
campaign, one would expect that the PIT leader would have received overwhelming 
cross-ethnic support. That the PIT was unsuccessful in its electoral bid therefore, speaks 
the degree to which ethnicity had become politically salient and a divisive issue in post-
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1993 Ivoirian national politics.  Crook (1997) asserts for instance that the PIT lack of 
success was directed related to the refusal or inability of the party leader to capture a 
local or ethno-regional power base. With party support clearly delineated along ethnic 
lines, there was little left to mobilize by 1995.     
 It bears pointing out here that it is not uncommon for voters/potential voters to 
delineate along sharp lines over emotive issues. Public opinion polls have shown that in 
general, emotive issues draw strong responses from individuals and, as such, one is less 
likely to sit on the fence or shy-away from taking one side over the other.  In terms of 
the RDR, there is a definite correlation between the changes to the institutional rules 
governing political representation, land rights and citizenship rights and the introduction 
of Ivoirité, and a large concentration of Muslim/ northerner support.  
 While there are no official numbers for membership to the RDR, it is estimated 
by party officials that more than 85percent of their supporters are northerners and 
Muslims. This is apparent from the 1995 legislative election results. The RDR either 
won all of the fourteen seats located in the far northern prefectures of Katinola, 
Dabakala, Odiénné, Seguela, Korhogo, Boundiali and Ferkessedougou.342 The RDR 
also won in Abobo and Abidjan, which, while relatively diverse, have a large 
population of northerners. Youpugon in particular, has a very large population of 
Muslims, northerners, and immigrants.  Many of the house workers and traders from 
this cartier have ties to the north, ethnically and/or religiously.343  Conversely, the RDR 
had little success garnering political support and ultimately, expanding its support base, 
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 While data on the actual population of Muslims/northerners are limited, this statement is corroborated 
by multiple interview sources and based on my own observations of the cartier. On my many visits to 
Yopougun I notice that the preferred attire is the grand Bobo (the garb that Muslims in general wear). The 
use of the Dioula language is also more widely used here than in Treichville for instance.  
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in the Southwestern or Southeastern regions. The party also had very little success in 
regions of Abidjan, such as Treichville, with relatively low northern/Muslim 
populations.  
 When asked how to explain why they voted for a particular party/candidate and 
not others, a majority of non-Muslim Ivoirians, regardless of class or educational 
background,  stated that they did not vote for the RDR because it was an ethnic party. 
This is significant because when asked to cite examples of the RDR leader’s use ethnic 
rhetoric during his public addresses at political rallies or statements to the press, no one 
seemed able to do so.  Some quickly noted their party leader insist that the RDR is an 
ethnic party, thus it must be so.  
 Furthermore, they point out, whether the party leaders are explicitly ethnic is not 
very important: “everyone knows and it is clear by looking at the party’s supporters that 
they are either all Muslim or northerners.”344 When asked which of the party leaders 
was the most qualified, and experienced to lead the country, the majority of Ivoirians 
chose Ouattara above both Bédié and Gbagbo. Ouattara had a stronger command of the 
economy and showed better proclivity towards good governance than Bédié. Some 
respondents felt however that whether he had the educational qualifications is hardly 
important.  According to one respondent: 
Regardless of his qualification, he is not Ivoirian and therefore not fit to hold the 
office of the Presidency.  He was Prime Minister yes, but nothing in the 
Constitution says that he cannot be Prime Minister, so let him be Prime 
Minister. But, by the constitution de la Côte d’Ivoire, he cannot be President, 
c’est tout.345 
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 Some interview respondents suggest that while they liked Ouattara and believed 
in his ability to run the country, they felt the need to vote for their brothers in order to 
ensure representation in the government. One respondent explained the reasoning: 
If you have first Bédié representing the Baoulé, giving them jobs and promoting 
them to higher positions in the government and other sectors. Then you have 
Gbagbo representing the Bété and their causes. Then you have Ouattara, who 
has this large Muslim/northern majority and himself a northerner, how else was 
I going to vote? If I voted for either Gbagbo or Ouattara, I would have voted 
against my own people and besides my own interests. Do you think that if 
Gbagbo or Ouattara were to win they would be fair to the Baoulé? They would 
take care of their own. In fact, look at us since Gbagbo has been in power; he 
has given all of the decent jobs to the Bété. Even the diplomat to France is now 
Bété. I have no doubt that Ouattara would do the same if he ever gets into 
power.346  
 
   
  
Grievances, identity construction and mobilization in Côte d’Ivoire: case of the 
northern “Dioulas” 
 
  
 As established in previous sections of this dissertation, the construction of a 
northern identity in Côte d’Ivoire dates back to the colonial period. Both the colonial 
and post-colonial economic policies have disproportionately benefitted the south. 
Incidents of poverty for instance, have been consistently higher in the northern regions 
relative to the rest of the country.  In 1999, between seventy percent and ninety percent 
of the population residing in the northern regions were classified as poor compared to 
fifty percent in the southern regions (Asante & Gyimah-Boadi, 2004).  Also, the vast 
majority of economic activities and production occurs in the Southern regions of the 
country.   
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      Also, historically, laborers in Côte d’Ivoire have come from the northern regions of 
Côte d’Ivoire, and neighboring countries such as Mali and Burkina Faso. As explored in 
previous chapters, the practice started during the early period of colonial rule in 
response to the problem of insufficient labor force among southern Ivoirians to work on 
European plantations. The French resolved the problem by introducing a system of 
indentured labor whereby a large numbers of workers were recruited from neighboring 
countries. 347 Houphouёt-Boigny continued to encourage the migration after 
independence, through an informally established rule of “the land belongs to he who 
cultivates it” (Dozon, 1985: 72).    This policy encouraged not just seasonal labor 
migration, but rather a full scale “open door policy.”  Entire families were brought to 
settle in southern Côte d’Ivoire and set up their own farms (Zolberg, 1964).  By the late 
1940s, many of the local cities had a majority of immigrants from foreign countries or 
other regions of Côte d’Ivoire. Similarly, in some rural districts, there are more 
foreigners than natives. The 1955 census indicates that foreign Africans made up nearly 
half of the total population of Abidjan. The original inhabitants, the Ebrié, constituted 
less than seven percent of the city’s total population as early as 1948. Houphouёt-
Boigny’s policy notably increased that figure. By 1980, about twenty-five percent of the 
city’s total population was foreign nationals.348  
           One impact of this policy is that it amplified strained relationships between 
original inhabitants and foreigners.  As more and more forest land had to be cleared for 
the increasing number of farms and migration started spreading from the west to the 
east, the migrant population was coming into constant conflict with the more recent 
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settlers. Disputes over ownership of the land were often brought by the Bété against   
those who inhabited the Western regions. According to Raulin, “…since the Bété knows 
that the population of Gagnoa is made up mostly of non-Bété foreigners, he fears, 
rightly or wrongly, the rule of the non-Bété and he rebels against the Dioula.”349These 
disputes were often settled by government officials in favor of the Baoulé and the 
Voltaic and Burkinabé migrant farmers, whose cocoa production contributed 
significantly to the government revenue.   One older Ivoirian explained that the Bété 
resented seeing the Baoulé and “Dioula” take over their land.350   
           Similarly in the Agboville region, the Abbey natives feared being eliminated 
from their own region’s development by the foreign townsmen.  During the 1920s and 
1930s, the native Dida and Divo were contemptuous of the Baoulé and Dioula migrant 
workers who engaged in work reserved for women in their own society. Except for 
exacting compensation payment for the use of their lands, the Dida had little to do with 
foreigners. As land became more and more scarce, the various ethnic groups involved in 
cocoa production began to view each other as competitors rather than partners.  
northerners as well as foreigners found themselves increasingly distinguished from 
those who considered themselves to have a greater indigenous right to land within the 
cocoa producing areas 
  Another implication of the colonial migrant policy and Houphouёt-Boigny’s 
open arm policy is that being northerner became synonymous with being a foreigner. 
There are many empirical accounts of the tendencies of Southerners to treat northerners 
more or less as foreigners from Burkina Faso, Mali or Guinea. Because of shared 
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geographic, regional and cultural traits between some internal migrant workers and 
foreign migrants workers, being northerner also became synonymous with being a 
Muslim.   Islam and northerner, the two broad groups became conflated in political 
discourse.  The growth of a specifically northern identity this developed not only 
through Mandé and Voltaic perceptions of themselves in relation to the power of the 
hierarchy in Côte d’Ivoire, but was also consolidated by the southern, particularly 
Baoulé, and Bété perceptions of people of northern origin as Muslims and immigrant 
farm laborers (Collette, 2006: 620). 
Over time, and despite the wide array of ethnic groups, the term “Dioula” came 
to be the mode of identification for the entire ethnic group (Maouka, Senoufo and 
Malinké) geographically located in the northern regions of the country. Many people 
from the north came to identify with being Dioula, because of a sense of shared family 
names and religion with the fellow northerners. This however, is also a primary reason 
that many northerners are perceived by other ethnic groups from other regions of the 
country, particularly those from the South, as foreigners (non-Ivoirian). Historically, 
northerners are genetically more closely related to citizens of neighboring countries 
(Burkina Faso, Mali, and Guinea) than they are to other ethnic group. Out -of -country- 
migrants also tend to be Muslims. In fact, Muslims account for 86percent of the 
immigrants in Côte d’Ivoire.  
 While grievances among northerners persisted throughout Houphouёt-Boigny’s 
leadership, and always held some mobilizational appeal, it was not until after 1990 that 
the northern identity became an axis of political competition. In general Houphouët-
Boigny enjoyed levels of support as a venerated moral authority and trusted political 
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leader.  Regardless of religion or ethnicity, Ivoirians generally thought well of Le 
Vieux. This holds true even for those of Bété descent, who otherwise carry a long held 
grudge for the massacre in 1957.351  The ability to seek out, gain political the support of 
and bring all of the major ethnic groups (at both the regional level and local levels) 
earned him the title of “master of chess.” Everyone was aware of Houphouët-Boigny’s 
interests, yet no one was really threatened by them, as he sought to get to his end goal 
via inclusion rather than exclusion. 352 
 As indicated in previous chapters, early on in his administration, Houphouёt-
Boigny employed a web of informal rules that historically helped to manage inter-
cultural relations in such a way that it became woven into the fabric of the state as it 
consolidated itself between 1960 and 1990. Thus, while there were no formal laws 
directing an exact quota of ethnic group representation, the cooption of the informal 
voluntary associations provided a certain ethno-regional balance in the political sphere 
that assured northerners of reasonable representation. In the June 1946 elections, the 
leading candidate from the northern Upper Volta region withdrew from the race in 
exchange for Houphouët-Boigny’s pledge of support for northern demands for separate 
status. 353  
Additionally, while the southern population continued to have better access to 
education and public facilities, Houphouёt-Boigny attempted to bridge the apparent 
inequality gap during the 1970s by increasing investments into the region.   Between 
1974 and 1977 Houphouёt-Boigny allocated a significant amount in public investments 
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towards the promotion of economic development. In fact, with the notable exception of 
the Southwest and Abidjan regions, public investments in the North greatly exceeded 
those allocated to other regions of the country and the amount in 1977 almost doubled 
that of 1974.   Houphouёt-Boigny also established six sugar-processing plants in the 
region.   
While the general sentiment among Muslims and northerners in Côte d’Ivoire is 
Houphouёt-Boigny favored the Southern regions and was not all the way successful in 
bridging the  developmental gap between the north and the south, many credit him for at 
least attempting to do so. According to one interview respondent:  
 Le Vieux, he did not give us everything, but at least he tried. He didn’t hate us 
the way this other president does. It was not until that other [president] started firing all 
of the northerners in the Legislature, dismissed Coulibaly [head of Ivoirian TV] Moussa 
[Editor of Le Soir], and Yacouba Kebe [managing director of Fraternité Matin], plus 
introduced  ivoirité and prevented Ouattara from running for president, that we came 
together as a political group. We felt that we were under attack from our own 
government. We had to support the RDR when it was established.”354 
  
A key factor to understanding the mobilization force that fused the northern and foreign 
ethnic and political identities into a single political voice concerns the effects of the 
introduction of Ivoirité on northerners.355  
 Given that internal migrants were often categorized and treated as foreigners 
/non-citizens, Ivoirité also posed a significant problem for issues surrounding Ivoirian 
citizenship. Having a name that signaled being of northern descent or Muslim became 
an albatross around the necks of many given the doubt raised  as to the underlying 
reality of their belonging to the Ivoirian nation (Akindès 2003:15).  As one interview 
respondent expressed to me:  
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I have lived all my life in Côte d’Ivoire. I have never lived anywhere else my 
entire life. My parents grew up here in Abidjan, and this is where I grew up. I 
raised my own children here, in this country; all of them grown.  I have no ties 
to the rural countryside. I know of no family members in any rural parts of this 
country…I have served my country well, yet now, when someone asks my 
name, I get to see them weigh whether or not I am Ivoirian. What else could I 
be?356 
 
 
The effects of the political use of Ivoirité on the massive shift of northern 
support from the PDCI towards the RDR, is also discernable from one of the popular 
music forms of the 1990s- Zouglou.357  In the song ‘Tu sais qui je suis’ (‘You know 
who I am’), Les Poussins Chocs, effectively highlights a fundamental dilemma in the 
discourses to national identity. The statements that “due to Ivoirité, [an Ivoirian] doesn’t 
know if he’ll always be Ivoirian, aptly describes and echoes the sentiments, that many 
Ivoirian, particularly northerners, felt about their sense of belonging.  Akindès (2003) 
notes for example that where as prior to 1993 having a name that signaled being of 
northern descent or Muslim would have brought little reaction, after 1993, this not only 
brought stigmatization of an individual as foreigner and not a true Ivoirian, it also 
                                                 
356
 Interview, field research Abidjan, 2008. 
357In Côte d’Ivoire, popular music genres such as reggae and Zouglou have served as a domain for the 
articulation of ideas about politicians, corruption, citizenship, national history and identity. A divisive 
debate over a particular Zouglous song as to whether it was politically instigative or merely reflective of 
what was happening in society prompted my including an analysis of the Zouglou and reggae forms of 
music in Côte d’Ivoire since the 1990s into the project. As a music form, Zouglou emerged in the 1990s 
and was developed by University students who carved out for themselves a media via which to make their 
socio-economic and political frustrations and aspirations public.  As the political situation became more 
tense and unstable, the commentaries on socio-political issues grew stronger, more descriptive and more 
direct. The messages are not meant just to voice the concerns of the people, but also direct messages to 
the political elites of the actual/possible effects of their policies and actions on the country and its people.  
The music in general serves as a kind of platform for criticism of the prevailing political and social 
conditions.  It provides commentary on and information about politicians, corruption, citizenship, 
national history and identity. In this regard, the songs offer keen insights into general public opinion as, 
well as particularly - university students and graduates- a key study population of this project.  For the 
purposes of this project I will focus on those songs offering commentary on socio-political issues that 
highlight the undercurrent of the massive shift of supporters from the PDCI to the RDR. 
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brought “a doubt as to the underlying reality of their belonging to the Ivoirian nation” 
(Akindès 2003:15).  The implicit message is that if one is not assured basic citizenship 
rights, particularly in a country in which more than thirty percent are immigrants, those 
directly as well as those indirectly affected, may mobilize to affect change or; an action 
that may lead (as it did) to social and political instability.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 This uncertainty of national identity and the use of nationality to disqualify 
political opponents are also mentioned by Tiken Jah in the song ‘Plus jamais ça’ 
(“Never again this”). The song reflect the problems faced by individuals such as 
Ouattara and RDR founder, Djény Kobina, who, after decades of having held high 
positions in previous governments and, in the case of the latter, having served as PDCI 
national secretary for external relations under Houphouët-Boigny, were denied the right 
Tu sais qui je suis ! 
Si l’ivoirien te dit ‘tu sais qui je 
suis,’ 
Il veut dire qu’il est ivoirien que 
toi. 
Tu sais qui je suis ! 
Nouveau millénaire arrive 
Où chaque pays prépare son 
bilan. 
C’est là l’ivoirien a la peur au 
ventre. 
Affaire de l’ivoirité, 
Parce qu’il ne sait pas s’il sera 
toujours ivoirien. 
Tu sais qui je suis ! 
Je connaissais un monsieur, il 
était ivoirien, 
Vers la fin il est devenu ghanéen. 
Il y a un autre aussi, 
Il était ivoirien et puis après il est 
devenu mossi. 
Même le chef du village, le gens 
ont commencé de dire 
Qu’il ne pas ivoirien aussi. 
You know who I am! 
If an Ivoirian tells you ‘you know 
who I am’, 
He wants to tell you that he is 
more Ivoirian than you. 
You know who I am! 
It’s the new millennium 
Where every country prepares its   
assessment. 
 
There, the Ivoirian feels sick with fear 
 of this  Ivoirité business , 
Because he doesn’t know if he’ll always be 
Ivoirian 
You know who I am! 
I knew a man, he was Ivoirian, 
And in the end he became Ghanaian. 
There was another one, 
He was Ivoirian, and afterwards he 
became Mossi. 
Even the village chief, people have 
started saying 
That he isn’t Ivoirian either. 
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to run for the presidency on the grounds that they could not prove that his parents were 
Ivoirians. The political nature of these accusations of foreign nationality at founding 
members of the RDR rallied more individuals who were having similar experiences and 
sentiments to the party.  
 
 
  
  
  
  
  
 Perhaps the most dramatically descriptive of the Ivoirian experience 
(particularly those from the North) is the Zouglou song “Quel Est Mon Pays” by Petit 
Yodé and Siro.  The song raises several scenarios that effectively portray the citizenship 
dilemma that many Ivoirians faced after 1993. The song questions the validity of 
considering individuals born in a particular country, even if it is to immigrant parents 
and non-citizens. 
 Like ‘Tu Sais Qui Je Suis,” this song portrays the peculiar dilemma of many 
Ivoirians, particularly northerners, who had not only lost access to their homes and 
livelihood, were prevented from passing their land on to their children, but also, their 
sense of belonging. The song reflects not just the situation at the societal level, but also 
at the elite levels and as such, provides some insights into why such a large number of 
northerners were mobilizable as a group in support of Ouattara and the RDR.  
 
Quand ca commence et tu 
changes de camp 
Tu deviens automatiquement 
libérien 
Ou bien ghanéen, sinon on 
t’appelle le burkinabé 
Tout simplement parce que tu 
change de camp. 
When it starts and you change 
camps 
You automatically become Liberian  
Or Ghanaian, or otherwise they 
call you Burkinabé 
Simply because you have changed 
camp. 
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De père ou de mère tu es Ivoirien 
Trop de frustrations à son égard 
 
Erico est né à Abidjan  
Sa mère est Ivoirienne 
C’est l’enfant de Kaboré 
Kaboré qui est Burkinabé  
 
A trios ans, il a connu le Burkina 
A cause de la tradition 
Erico Kaboré 
Il a été Balafré  
 
Orphelin de père 
8 ans grandit avec sa mère  
Erico yako 
Ivoirienne de mère donc tu es Ivoirien 
Pourquoi le refuse a reconnu 
 
Ma mère est guinéenne 
Mon père est malien 
D'où moi je viens? 
 
Mon père est tchadien 
Ma mère béninoise 
 D'où u moi je viens? 
De part et d’autre je suis reconnu 
Mais pas en tant que tel 
Quel est mon pays? 
Le pays du métis  
 
Quand je suis au Gabon 
On on m’appelle Ghanéen 
Quand je suis au Ghana 
On on m’appelle Gabonais? 
Au Burkina on dit viola Ivoirien! 
En Côte d’Ivoire viola Burkinabé 
 
De part et d’autre je suis reconnu Mais 
pas en tant que tel 
Quel est mon pays? 
Le pays de métis? 
 
Regard pas mon visage  
Pour m’attribuer une nationalité 
Mon accoutrement pour donner le nom 
de mon pays! 
Quel est mon pays? 
Le pays de métis 
Quel est mon pays? 
Le pays de la mère et le père. 
 
[If  by your] father or mother you are 
Ivoirian [you will have]  
A lot of frustrations in this regard 
 
Erico was born in Abidjan 
His mother is Ivoirian 
The child of Kaboré 
Kaboré who is from Burkina Faso 
 
At three years [old] he came to know 
to Burkina Faso 
Because of tradition 
He was scared [marked] 
Father died at 8 years 
He grew up with his mother 
Sorry Erico 
Your mother is Ivoirian therefore you 
are Ivoirian 
Why do they refuse to recognize 
My mother is Guinean  
My Father is Malian 
Where am I from?  
My father is from Chad 
My Mother is from Benin 
Where am I from? 
I am recognized by both sides  
But neither in and of themselves 
What is my country? 
The country of mixed [people] 
 
When I am in Gabon 
They call me Ghanaian 
When I am in Ghana 
They call be Gabonese 
In Burkina [Faso] they say there is an 
Ivoirian 
In Côte d’Ivoire there is a Burkinabe 
 
I am recognized by both sides 
But what is my country? 
The country of mixed [people] 
 
Do not look at my face  
To assign a nationality 
My dress to determine my country 
What is my county? 
The country of the mother and father. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
 While the Ivoirian party leaders did not make direct appeals to a particular 
ethnic group for political support, changes to informal institutional rules governing 
political representation and the introduction of Ivoirité created incentives for party 
leaders to choose as a primary political strategy, the undermining of political opponents 
via accusations of engaging in ethnic politics.  Indeed, since the period leading up to the 
1995 elections, charges and counter-charges of ethnic politics have dominated Ivoirian 
national politics.     
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
 
 
Informal Institutional change and ethnic politicization: beyond the cases of 
Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire 
 
 
 
Introduction 
  
 The measure of the portability of the argument advanced in this dissertation is 
how well it applies to other cases. We have already identified a few cases in which 
formal institutional changes (single-party to multi-party rule) have not resulted in 
significant changes in the salience of ethnicity or ethnic politicization. The question 
addressed in this chapter, therefore, is whether there are cases besides Côte d’Ivoire, in 
which changes to informal institutional rules, particularly those governing political 
representation and labor and land policies that have resulted in ethnic politicization.   
To address this question the chapter examines the cases of Casamance and Cameroon.  
The choice of the Casamance is two-fold. First, while the discussion has so far 
been centered on Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal north of the Gambia, as any serious student 
of African politics knows the salience of ethnicity and instances of ethnic politicization 
are significantly different in the regions south of the Gambia.   In fact, since the early 
1980s, Casamance has had spells of ethnic related violence and experienced outright 
ethnic conflict. There is a need therefore to account for the case of Casamance.   
Second, the Casamance provides a good test for the applicability of the 
argument advanced in this dissertation. Both regions— Senegal north and south of the 
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Gambia—transitioned from single-party to multi-party at the same time, yet while 
ethnicity became politicized in Casamance, the same was not true for the rest of 
Senegal.  Treating the Casamance as a single case allows us to isolate the distinguishing 
factors that may speak to the precise question addressed in this dissertation: under what 
conditions does ethnicity become politicized?   
The findings are consequential for the argument advanced in this dissertation. 
Drawing on the research of scholars such as Linda Beck (1996) and Catherine Boone 
(2003), the chapter finds that changes to informal institutional rules governing land 
rights during the 1980s played a significant role in the increased salience of ethnic 
identity and ultimately, the politicization of ethnicity. In her analysis of institutional 
variations across sub-Saharan countries and regions within the same country, Catherine 
Boone (2003) observes that while the formal rules regulating land rights were enforced 
and adhered to in Senegal north of the Gambia, this was not the case in the Casamance. 
In the case of the latter (at least until 1980), despite the formal rules stipulating that the 
transfer of land must be administered by an official of the state in 1964, the Senegalese 
government had never intervened in rural land-tenure relations in the region. Land had 
always been transferred on the principles of customary law-from generation to 
generation or (in the case of a stranger) at the word/promise by the individual that they 
had the right to farm, though not own, the land, and were generally  confirmed by elders 
and lineage heads.   
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Accounting for the case of the Cassamance  
 Applied to the Casamance, the argument advanced in this dissertation would 
lead us to expect that changes in informal institutional rules, particularly those that 
govern representation and access to government resources and land and citizenship 
rights, preceded the heightened salience of ethnic identity and ethnic conflicts in the 
region.  Abundant evidence suggests that it did (Beck 1996; Boone 2003). Catherine 
Boone’s (2003) analysis indicates this is precisely what happened in 1980.  Writing 
about the land riots of the 1980s, Linda Beck (1996) also observed that lands that had 
previously been communally owned were being expropriated to individuals outside of 
the region.  
 These land  expropriations ran counter to rules ( however informal) that had 
regulated land rights and tenure for generations ( Hessling 1994:251).The changes 
significantly altered  the Diola land tenure rules of communal land tenure rights 
significantly violated  Diola traditions and customs. As a result of the informal rule 
change, the Diola were no longer able to distribute their land in the way they had done 
traditionally.  What is more, the expropriated lands were being sold at great profits to 
individuals and corporations outside the region. For example, in areas such as 
Ziguinchor and Cap Skirring expropriated land was sold to religious marabouts and 
Wolof and Toukeleur migrants from Senegal north of the Gambia.  French firms also 
acquired land for groundnut production, orchards, and tourism.  Beck notes for instance 
that  by 1982 there were over two-thousand cases of land parcels expropriated and 
attributed non-autochthones358 in Ziguinchor alone (Beck 1996a:260). 
                                                 
358
 Autochthon is a French term meaning natives. Non-autochthon here refers to those who are not natives 
of Ziguinchor.  
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 Many locals saw their land expropriated and used in a way that benefit people 
outside of the region. Many felt that the altered communal land rights resulted in their 
marginalization.  The Democratic League/Labor Party Movement (LD/MPT) 
Memorandum on the Casamance crisis noted for instance that: 
During 1980-81, about 2,000 parcels of land were expropriated or allocated 
exclusively to non-indigenes in the Boucotte, Lyndiane, Peyrissac and Tilene 
districts of Ziguinchor. Driven to the outskirts of the urban areas, that is, to the 
underdeveloped areas where there are no electricity, running water, health units 
and trade…, the Administration has thus deprived them of their right to a city 
while they argued that, at the same time, the populations of the north enjoy that 
right.359 
 
 Local objections to farmers with insufficient holdings no longer being able to 
expand their plots by borrowing land from their mother’s brother or by clearing new 
land; borrowed land no longer being able to be inherited and the influx of individuals 
(strangers)360 from the Senegal north of the Gambia were widespread. While the 
political elites from the northern regions of the country tried to undermine the 
legitimacy of the objections to the changes in the informal rules regulating land rights 
and tenure, by painting the land conflicts as a Diola uprising, the changes had also 
provided large incentives for local Casamaçais politicians to galvanize political support 
among the Diola by (re)framing the issue as the need for the Diola to stand against the 
“dominance of northerners and marabouts.” 361 Some politicians went as far as to revive 
old abandoned calls for secession from Senegal.362  
                                                 
359
 Cited in Dykman (2000:8).  
360
 It should be noted that the culturally individuals and ethnic groups believe that they have more in 
common with neighboring Guinea than to their fellow Senegalese nationals. In fact, there have been 
demands by political leaders of the region to secede.   
361
 Boone (2003:133). 
362
 This was indeed the cause of the Movement of Democratic Casamance Forces (MDCF). The 
movement first called for independence from the Senegalese government in the early years after 
independence and once again at the outbreak of the land riots in 1980.  
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Accounting for the salience of ethnic identity in Casamance  
 
 While French activities in Senegal date back to the early seventeenth century, 
the region south of the Gambia, known as the Casamance, did not come under France 
control until the Berlin Conference in 1886.  Unlike the region north of the Gambia, the 
influence of Islam spread never quite took root in the Casamance. Indeed, as Catherine 
Boone (2003) has noted, the region has remained predominantly Christian and animist.  
In their discussion of Islam in the Casamance scholars such as Girard (1963) and 
Villalón (2006) note that, even in those areas of Casamance where Islam became 
adopted, it was less organized than in the north. This means that the influence of the 
religious Marabouts have not been as extensive in the region as they have been in 
Senegal north of the Gambia (Girard 1963; Boone 2003; Villalôn 2005). Consequently, 
the informal institutional configurations of the Sufi brotherhoods that notably helped to 
transcend historic ethnic and religious communities and blocked the use of political 
appeals to cultural differences as a mobilization tool in Senegal north of the Gambia 
also did not emerge in Casamance. Without the patronage ties of the respective 
brotherhoods to help de-emphasize ethnic identity, there were fewer constraints on 
political elites in the Casamance to use ethnic identity as a political tool.  
Scholars such as Boone (2004), Darbon (1988) and Beck (1996a) have 
highlighted significant differences in the state-society linkages and political 
administration of the Casamance from that of Senegal north of the Gambia.  Like Côte 
d’Ivoire, ethnicity in Casamance has remained a central element of the fabric of the 
society. Of the Senegalese students interviewed for this dissertation project for example, 
the majority of those who felt that ethnicity played a key role in Senegalese society 
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were from Casamance. One student stated that compared to the other ethnic groups, 
Diolas have to be more careful not to call attention to their ethnic identity lest it cost 
them a job or promotion.363   
While unlike Villalón, I observed no instances in which an individual introduced 
him/herself as belonging to one ethnic group only to find out later that their ethnic 
background is not as they initially declared, there is a general feeling among the people 
of the Casamance region of being discriminated against (or viewed less favorably) by 
the rest of the country.  Many from the region readily point to the lack of economic 
development of the region, the inferior state infrastructure, lack of adequate schools or 
access to running water as evidence that “no one cares about Casamance and its 
people.”364 For some, the discrepancy is directly related to political under-representation 
and, as such, a lack of Diola voices at the national political table.  One Diola respondent 
stated that: “without a strong Diola presence there is no one to look out for the interest 
of the Diola… [this is] why our region is as it is, and will remain so, unless something 
changes.”365  
 These statements suggest that individuals from Casamance are more likely to 
vote on the basis of ethnic identity than on the basis of his or her qualifications than 
other groups in Senegal. Many from the region believe that qualifications and ethnic 
affiliation are one and the same.  One respondent claimed that one simply cannot be 
qualified to represent the interest of the Diola if one is not a member of the ethnic 
                                                 
363
 Field Research Interview, Dakar, Dec. 2007. During my stay in Senegal, I was able to make a week-
long visit to Ziguinchor. My discussions with those living in the Casamance suggest that this view is 
more strongly held by those in the region than those living in Dakar. Many in Dakar felt that they were 
able to get their job because of the fact that they are Diola –whom many believe to be the most 
hardworking and dedicated individuals.  
364
 Interview, field research. Dakar.November 2007.  
365
 Field Research, Interview, Dakar, Senegal Dec. 2007. 
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group.366 This issue became a dominant issue during 1980s. Campaigning on the slogan 
of getting rid of the problem of “nonrepresentativeness” of elected politicians, about 
100 percent of the candidates for the Socialist Party’s regional list in 1980 and 1983 
were born in Casamance (Darbon, 1988:133-4).  Scholars of the region note for instance 
that Assane Seck was purposefully sidelined in 1983 due to the many objections to his 
not being a native of the region. Darbon (1988) notes for instance that while Seck was 
from the region, his roots were shallow. Not only was Seck’s father Wolof, Seck 
himself had spent most of his adult life in Senegal north of the Gambia and France.  
 
 
 
Demographics 
 
 In terms of demographics, the Casamance has some interesting similarities with 
Côte d’Ivoire. Like Kenya, certain regions in both Casamance and Côte d’Ivoire are 
ethnically concentrated.  As established in Chapter Three, the Casamance region is the 
only region (besides Dakar) with a significant ethnic concentration that can be 
considered in ethno-regional terms. Whereas the other administrative regions are 
relatively well represented, more than 60 percent of the population in Casamance is 
Diola.367  Unlike the case of Mackie Sall being voted into power despite being a 
minority, politicians from the region are generally from the major ethnic group.  A good 
example of this is Robert Sagna.  
                                                 
366
 Field Research, Interview, Dakar, Senegal Dec. 2007. This stands in contrast to the interview results 
from those students and individuals north of the Gambia, many of whom stated that their choice of a 
political candidate is based on the candidate’s qualifications and not his or her ethnic background or 
religion. 
367
 Other ethnic groups are the lower numbers of 5percent, twelve percent and fifteen percent 
respectively. 
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 Given its late integration in the French colony of Senegal 368the region has a 
historic distinctiveness that may, to some extent, be likened to the northern Côte 
d’Ivoire (Beck: 1999:5).  Like the northerners in Côte d’Ivoire that feel more akin to 
their Muslim neighbors to the north than to their fellow citizens from the South (who 
tend to be predominantly Christians.) the Diola are closer to ethnic groups in 
neighboring Guinea Bissau than to their fellow Senegalese citizens.  
 Physically, the Casamance is certainly closer to Guinea than it is to the rest of 
Senegal.  The geographic distinction is perhaps best depicted by the fact that to get to 
Casamance (Zinguinchor) from Dakar one has to cross two international borders by car, 
drive around the country of Gambia, or endure an eighteen hour overnight ferry ride on 
the high seas. Outside of these options, the only other means of travel between the two 
regions is via airplane. Casamance is also very lush, green and fertile compared to the 
Sahelian nature of the rest of Senegal.  As in Côte d’Ivoire, the geographic differences 
have contributed to differences in developmental policy initiatives and attitudes towards 
people from these regions by the rest of the country.  
 Over time, these disparities and grievances have taken a particularly ethnic 
resonance. In the case of Côte d’Ivoire, the Dioulas feel that they are treated less 
favorably by the Ivoirian government because of their origins in the north and because 
they are predominantly Muslims. In the Casamance, the Diolas feel that they are treated 
less favorably by the rest of Senegal because they are physically cut off from the rest of 
the country and tend to be culturally different.369 In conclusion, northern Côte d’Ivoire 
                                                 
368
 Casamance was not officially a part of Senegal until the French turned over control in 1960. Until 
then, much like Senegal, the Casamance was treated as an entity of France.  
369
 While Senegal is about 94 percent Muslim, more than 90 percent of the Diolas in Casamance are 
Christians.  
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and Casamance have more in common with each than they do with Senegal north of the 
Gambia. In both cases, changes to these informal institutional rules governing land 
tenure have resulted in the politicization of ethnic identities.   
 
 
 
 
The Cameroon: Democratic transition: Instability, changes in the salience of ethnicity 
and ethnic politicization? 
  
Based on the formal institution model, one would expect that the political 
transition to multiparty elections in Cameroon in 1992 would increase the salience of 
ethnic identity politically and increase the odds of Cameroon experiencing ethnic 
politicization and/or conflict. While the period leading up to and during the multiparty 
elections in 1992 was violent, particularly in the Anglophone areas and in the northern 
regions, the main central appeals during the electoral contest did not concern ethnic 
identity. As in Senegal (north of the Gambia), the political salience of ethnic identity 
and the use of ethnic identity as a mobilizational tool have remained relatively low in 
the Cameroon since democratic transition in 1992.   
This raises the question of why, in their bid to create and establish new political 
parties, have Cameroonian political elite not appealed to ethnic differences?  As one of 
the most of the most ethnically diverse African countries370, why have these differences 
not been exploited by political elites seeking electoral success?  
                                                 
370
 Cameroon is made-up of approximately 250 different ethnic groups and is one of most ethnically 
diverse countries in sub-Saharan Africa.  Region, religion, ethnicity, language and colonial heritage 
provide several potential political cleavages in Cameroon. Many of these cleavages coincide with 
disparities in income and have given rise to grievances. Perhaps the two most politically salient social 
cleavages are language and colonial heritage (Anglophone vs. Francophone) and region (North vs. 
South). Like Côte d’Ivoire, northern Cameroon is poorer than the South. Also, the Ivoirian Muslims/ 
north and Christian/south divide are mirrored in the Cameroon. It is generally accepted that the north is 
less ethnically diverse than the south.  As Kofele-Kale, (1986) point out however; northern Cameroon is 
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TABLE XI 
 Ethnic Diversity in Cameroon 
  
Applied to the Cameroon, the argument articulated in this dissertation would 
lead us to expect that the answer lies with there being little or no changes to the 
informal institutional rule governing representation and access to public goods despite 
shifts from single-party to multi-party rule. This is indeed what the evidence indicates.  
While the constitution of Cameroon officially prohibits the formation of political parties 
on the basis of ethnicity371, Cameroonian citizens and political elites have adhered to the 
informal institutional rule of “regional balance.” The rule ensures that the ethnic groups 
in all regions of the country enjoy reasonable representation and access to state 
resources and apparatus.   
 Indeed, ethnic balancing was a prominent feature of the Ahidjo’s372 regime. For 
about twenty-three years Ahidjo made significant efforts to maintain regional balances 
in his cabinets. For instance, he ensured that assignments to the more important 
ministries were rotated among southern ethnic groups (including Anglophones) and 
                                                                                                                                               
also divided along ethnic and ethno-religious lines. The Fulani (of Fulbe) are the dominant group in the 
north despite being a minority (25 percent) in the region (Kofele-Kale, 1986: 55).  A majority of the 
others in the region are the non-Muslim Kirdi. Southerners are divided by language and colonial heritage. 
The two Anglophone provinces (North West and South West) make up about twenty one percent of the 
population and about nine percent of the land Cameroon (Kofele-Kale 1986: 62). 
371
 A ban was placed on all ethnic associations in 1967.  
372
 President Ahmadou Ahidja rose to power in 1958. Throughout his tenure (1958 to 1982 when he 
relinquished the presidency) Ahidja has continuously advanced ethnic balancing. 
 
Ethnic Group  Location Size 
Western Highlanders/Grassfielders (Bamileke, Bamoun)  Northwest 38% 
Coastal Tropical Forest Peoples (Bassa, Douala, etc.) Southwest 12% 
Southern Tropical Forest Peoples [Ewondo, Beti (Bulu 
and Fang subgroups) Maka and Pygmies/Bakas]  
South 18% 
Fulani (Islamic northerners) Sahel/N.Desert 14% 
Kirdi (non-Islamic northerners).  N.Desert/C.Highlands 18% 
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those from the north. Ahidjo also made sure that the more important ethnic 
constituencies were always included in governmental distributive loops.  
While there was a change in the office of the presidency in 1982 when Ahidjo 
handed the government over to his Prime Minister Paul Biya Ahidjo, the informal rule 
of ethnic balancing has persisted.  An increase in the number of southern ethnic groups 
relative to northerners holding offices in the Biya government has led some to lay 
complaints that Biya’s own ethnic group has benefitted more from his presidential reign 
than the other ethnic groups. Scholars such as LeVine (1996) and Krieger and 
Takougang (1998) argue however, that for the most part Biya has been careful to retain 
a regional balance. 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The chapter shows that where the rules of the games governing representation 
and access to governmental resources are established more by informal institutional 
rules than formal institutions, shifts in informal institutional rules may affect ethnic 
politicization in the way that the argument would predict. In the case of Casamance, 
changes to rules governing land tenure altered incentives for local political leaders to 
use ethnic identity- Diola- as a mobilizational tool.  In the case of Cameroon, the 
chapter shows that because Biya has continued the trend of ethnic accommodation and 
ethnic balance, the changes brought about by shifts from single-party to multiparty rule 
have not significantly affected the political game- at least not enough to bring the issue 
of ethnic identity to the forefront of Cameroonian politics.  
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CHAPTER NINE 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
Conclusions 
 
 
  
Under what conditions does ethnicity become politicized in multi-ethnic 
societies?  When and why do political elites take advantage of their country’s ethnic 
multi-dimensionality? Under what circumstances does ethnic politicization become an 
attractive political option for elites? What factors check the use of ethnicity as a 
political tool? These are some of the questions addressed in this dissertation. This 
project does not attempt a comprehensive explanation of all the possible factors that 
may affect ethnic politicization. Rather, its objective is to show the effects of societal-
level institutions on the political salience of ethnicity and highlight some of the 
incentive structures that systematically influence the use of ethnic identity as a 
mobilizational tool.  Conceived narrowly, this dissertation is about the role of informal 
institutions and institutional rules in attenuating or accentuating ethnic differences in 
sub-Saharan Africa. While the empirical focus is on African cases, its implications 
extend well beyond the African continent.  
The specific argument the dissertation advances concerns how changes to 
informal institutional rules can significantly affect the salience and politicization of 
ethnicity in heterogeneous societies. The logic of the argument offers an alternative 
analytical framework for considering when and why political elites make appeals to 
ethnic identity in heterogeneous societies.  Following the example of several 
outstanding scholars, the dissertation explored the colonial and historical legacies of 
Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire in Chapter Four. The Chapter examined when, why and 
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which ethnic identities become prominent.  Building on the assumption that institutional 
setting helps to define the incentives for and constraints on political behavior, the 
chapter also explored the institutional incentives and constraints on the use of ethnicity 
as a mobilizing vehicle by political elites. Rather than focus on formal institutions of the 
colonial state however, the chapter focuses on societal-level informal institutions.   
My argument in this chapter is that societal-level institutions such as the Sufi 
Orders in Senegal and Voluntary Associations in Côte d’Ivoire that emerged as a result 
of colonialism may significantly affect whether and to what extent ethnicity becomes 
politically salient.  In some cases, these informal institutions have as much, if not more, 
impact on ethnic politicization as formal institutions. As intermediaries between the 
state and society in the provision of public goods Sufi Orders and Voluntary 
Associations may become the primary mechanisms through which members of ethnic 
groups derive their ideas about politics and the relevance/non-relevance of ethnicity to 
them. Where the redistributive system is based on ethnic identity, as in the case of Côte 
d’Ivoire, ethnicity is likely to be more politically salient than in countries such as 
Senegal, Cameroon and Tanzania, where resource distribution is not based on ethnic 
identity.  
Chapter Four goes only as far as to account for the variation in the salience of 
ethnicity between Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire and does not directly explain why ethnicity 
became politicized in one of the countries but not the other. However, it explains the 
origins of much of the contemporary ethnic landscape and points out that societal-level 
informal institutions and institutional rules may be consequential for the politicization 
of ethnicity.  
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Chapter Five details how informal institutions such as the Sufi Orders and 
voluntary associations have operated as redistributive intermediaries between the state 
and society, and in effect, have helped to attenuate or accentuate ethnic identity. Set 
within the framework of the prominent debate on religion and ethnic politics, this 
chapter shows that ethnic political behavior and ethnic politicization are not necessarily 
determined by religious differences.  A better indicator of ethnic politicization is 
whether the functions and nature of the informal institutions help to accentuate or 
attenuate ethnic differences.    
The chapter demonstrates that while religion is indeed important in shaping 
behavior, it does not determine political actions. Islam is able to mitigate ethnic 
politicization in Senegal not because of the religious doctrine or theological 
foundations, but because of the extent to which the religious structures encourage the 
facilitation of informal institutions like the institutions of social integration: (a) 
attenuate ethnic differences, and (b) serve as an effective counterweight to the state, in 
terms of goods provisions.  
Chapter Six assesses the hypothesis that ethnic politicization results from formal 
institutional changes. By comparing the effects of shifts in the electoral rules (from 
single-party to multi-party rule) and instances of ethnic politicization in Senegal and 
Côte d’Ivoire, this chapter demonstrates that formal institutional changes do not 
necessarily cause ethnic politicization.  Conversely, a comparative analysis of the 
persistence and changes in informal institutional rules indicate that informal institutions 
may account for instances of ethnic politicization in a way that formal institutions 
cannot.   
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Chapters seven and eight examine data from a number of cases, including 
Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire and the Casamance to test the applicability of the findings in 
Chapter Six.  Exploring cases beyond those named as primary for this study shows that 
informal institutional rule change can result in shifts in the level of political salience and 
the politicization of ethnicity.  And, while the findings in Chapter Seven that political 
parties had few incentives to directly appeal to ethnic identity initially seemed contrary 
to the argument articulated in the dissertation,  closer examination of the political 
strategies employed by party leaders in the elections leading up to the 1995 election 
indicates that changes to informal institutional rules such as ethnic balancing and the 
land belonging to whoever cultivates, altered the incentives for party leaders to use 
ethnicity as a political tool;  only, rather than direct appeals, the party leaders accused 
each other of engaging in ethnic politics as a means of garnering political support. 
Overall, the dissertation provides an analytical framework that addresses 
questions regarding, when, how and what kinds of institutions matter and our 
understanding and explanation of political outcomes in societies in which informal 
institutions play key roles.  The findings suggest that current theories of formal 
institutional change offer an incomplete story, particularly with respect to the transition 
from single-party to multi-party rule and add to the growing evidence of the importance 
of informal institutions for political outcomes in Africa and beyond.  The implications 
of the analysis and the applications of the argument and framework are potentially far 
reaching.  
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Informal Institutions  
 One of this dissertation’s central premise is that level of salience and ethnic 
politicization will depend on the nature and role of informal institutions, particularly as 
they relate to how access to public goods and representation are determined (for 
example on the basis of ethnic affiliation or ethnic transcendence.)  A key corollary here 
is that changes in the informal institutional rules, more so than changes in formal 
institutional rules, may generate changes in the political salience of ethnicity and 
influence whether or not ethnicity becomes politicized.  In Chapters six, seven and 
eight, I provided some illustrations of how changing the informal institutional rules 
governing representation and access to public goods have led to changes in the political 
salience of ethnicity and incentives for political elites to use ethnic identity as a 
mobilizing vehicle.   
 While arguments of the role of informal institutions in African politics are not 
new, this dissertation marks the first attempt to examine the implications of informal 
institutional rule changes on ethnic politicization.  
 
 
Empirical Implications for sub-Saharan Africa 
  The theoretical proposition developed in this dissertation is that contrary to 
conventional wisdom, formal institutional rules do not adequately account for variations 
in ethnic politicization in heterogeneous societies.  Once the argument that the use of 
ethnic identity as a mobilization tool is due to formal institutional changes was 
examined,  this dissertation identified new and interesting testable hypotheses about 
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ethnic politicization and informal institutions.  Chapters six, seven and eight tested the 
formal and informal institutions’ hypotheses and their implications.    
 The strength of the findings of the influence of informal institutions on ethnic 
politicization leads me to propose that where informal institutions that attenuate 
ethnicity persist, particularly in their redistributive roles and continue to establish the 
rules of the game to a greater degree than formal institutions, the use of ethnicity as a 
political tool will remain relatively low, despite significant changes to formal 
institutions.   
 Furthermore, there is little empirical evidence that depoliticizing ethnicity via 
formal institutional rules such as elite bargaining over consociational mechanisms 
(Lijphart,1999) or suppression of the issue through the use of plurality rules and 
gerrymandering for ethnic equality (Horowitz,1985), promotes political stability.  What 
does seem to promote political stability is maintaining (where they have successfully 
existed) informal institutional rules governing representation and access to public 
goods. The claim here is not that this will entirely and successfully depoliticize 
ethnicity, but rather that, if maintained, they will continue to attenuate rather than 
accentuate ethnicity and thereby help to constrain the use of ethnic identity as a political 
tool. After all, if the informal rules governing political representation and access to 
public goods have provided constraints on the political use of ethnicity, the incentive to 
use ethnic identity as a mobilizational tool will remain relatively low if they are allowed 
to persist. 
 The dissertation findings call for more detailed institutional analysis. For 
example:  What institutions other than electoral institutions influence ethnic 
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politicization in heterogeneous societies? When are individuals more likely to be 
susceptible to ethnic appeals and voting along ethnic lines, or joining an ethnic party? 
What institutions create incentives to, or deter the use of ethnic identity as a 
mobilizational tool? How can formal institutional rules be crafted to reinforce rather 
than undermine existing informal institutional rules that have successfully attenuated or 
contained the salience of ethnicity over time?  
 This direction of research also calls for greater incorporation of nuances in 
institutional analyses.  The examples in this dissertation show that identical formal 
institutions often produce dissimilar outcomes because the underlying informal 
institutional rules are very different. Also, we need to account for why and how 
institutions rules change. It is often theoretically unclear how an individual can change 
the very institution within which she is embedded and that defines the boundaries 
within which she operates.  It is quite possible that questions of legitimacy may initiate 
institutional change.  In such cases, threats to political power can induce a political 
leader to institute change in the political rules of the game and consequently the rules 
governing representation and access to state goods.  
Empirically, it is possible that shifts in the relative access to goods and 
representation may result in individuals more likely to support elites and political 
parties that seek to champion her grievances via ethnic appeals and for political elites to 
use ethnic appeals as a means of tapping into the grievances of a particular ethnic 
group(s). While Fearon and Laitin (2003) have found that grievances such as income 
inequality and cultural suppression inadequately predict ethnic conflict, scholar such as 
Stewart (2000) and Langer (2005) have found that where grievances fall along ethnic or 
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ethno-regional lines, individuals are likely to vote along ethnic lines, where political 
elites or political parties have sought to emphasize them. Also, sensing political 
vulnerability to appeals to ethnic related grievances, political elites are likely to try to 
garner votes by tapping into and emphasizing these grievance, whether explicitly as 
ethnic appeals, or more covertly as mere grievances.  
 
Additional Implications and Theoretical Extensions 
 The implications of the arguments developed in this dissertation go beyond sub-
Saharan Africa. They are applicable to studies on other regions of the world, especially 
heterogeneous societies. For example, there is the general question of the political 
function of ethnicity and the role of political institutions in providing incentives or 
constraints on ethnic mobilization.  Are ethnic groups simply mobilizing vehicles for 
political elites and political parties? If so, to what extent is this dependent on the 
political institutions in place? According to the argument developed in this dissertation, 
the political institutions that govern access to public goods play a significant role in 
influencing whether ethnicity is politically salient and likely to be used as a 
mobilizational tool.  Often times, these institutions are not the state-level formal 
institutions that are generally the focus of much of the academic literature but rather 
societal-level informal institutions such as the Sufi Orders in Senegal and Voluntary 
Associations in Côte d’Ivoire.   
 The informal institutions argument can also help address questions regarding the 
types of political parties we can expect to emerge in a particular country (for example, 
ethnic parties).  Considering societal-level informal institutions and their role in 
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establishing the political rules of the game, particularly as it relates to the use of ethnic 
identity politically can help in this regard.   
Lastly, this dissertation demonstrates the importance of considering informal 
institutions as independent variables in their own rights rather than mere as residual 
variables that are considered only after formal institutions are no longer able to account 
for the variation in outcomes.   The central argument is capable of generating many 
more testable implications and can even be extended in interesting ways to explain 
instances of ethnicity politicization, or the lack thereof, in heterogeneous societies 
beyond sub-Saharan Africa. The implications of the analysis and the application of the 
argument and framework are potentially far reaching well beyond the African continent.  
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APPENDIX A  
 
Research Instruments  
 
 
 
 
Participant Code:______________ 
 
Interview Questionnaire 
Questions for Political Elites 
 
 
Date of Interview:      Language of Interview: 
 
Country:      Location:  
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                          Male__________           Female__________ 
In what year were you born______________________________? 
Where were you born___________________________________? 
Where else have you lived____________? For how long_______________________? 
 
 
 
1. Besides being a _______(insert nationality), which specific group do you identify 
with first and foremost?  
 
2.  How do you self-identify? 
  By nationality then ethnicity   
  By ethnicity then nationality   
 
3. How do you or your party seek to attract voters? Why? 
 
4. In what ways does your party differ from other political parties in _____(insert 
country) 
 
5. What are some of the factors you believe voters in _________ (insert country) 
consider when choosing which political candidates to vote for?  
 
6. Using a scale of 1 -5 (where 1 is the lowest and 5 is the highest) to what extent do 
you think that voters in _________(insert country) choose political candidates on the 
basis of: 
(a) Their abilities                      1   2   3    4    5  
 (b) Their ethnic affiliations      1   2   3   4    5 
 (c) Political ideology/platform 1   2   3   4    5 
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(d) Their religious affiliations   1   2   3   4    5 
(e) Are there other reasons? How would you rank these?  
 
7. What types of political appeals do you think voters in ________ (insert country) 
respond to the most? On a scale of one to five (1 being the lowest and 5 the highest) 
a. ethnic appeals 1   2    3   4   5    
b. class and social status  1   2   3   4   5    
c. national issues and concerns 1   2   3   4   5    
d. abilities  1  2  3  4  5 
e. political ideology  1  2  3  4  5 
f. religious affiliations   1  2  3  4  5 
g. Are there other appeals? Using the same scale, how would you these?  
 
8. How would you rank the order of importance of the following factors voters consider 
when choosing a political party or candidate? Use a scale of 1-5 (1 is the lowest and 5 is 
the highest).  
 (a) Party or candidate that emphasizes socio-economic issues 1   2   3   4   5  
  (b) Party or candidate that advocates women’s rights 1 2 3 4 5   
            (c ) Shared ethnic affiliation 1  2  3  4  5   
            (d) Party or candidate that advocates Health issues 1 2 3 4 5  
           (e) Party or candidate that advocates human rights issues 1 2 3 4 5  
(f) Are there other factors? Using the same scale, how would you rank these? 
 
 
10. To what extent do you think that voters in ______ (insert country) would respond to 
the following appeals during periods of economic growth? Use a scale of 1 (lowest) to 5 
(highest).  
(a) Appeals to the free-market and privatization 1   2   3   4    5 
(b) Appeals to the women’s issues 1 2   3   4 5 
(c) Appeals to religion                      1 2 3 4   5    
(d) Appeals to a particular ethnic group 1   2   3 4 5 
 
11. If faced with economic decline describe the types of strategies you would use to              
attract votes? 
 
12. During periods of economic decline what types of political strategies are most 
likely?            
      to win you political support? Why?   
 
13. How do you think that the change from single-party system has affected the types of 
strategies that you or your party employ to attract votes? If no affect, can you tell me 
why there is none? 
 
14. Do you think that enough/adequate measures are in place to stop/prevent appeals on 
ethnic basis? Do you know of any such measures? If so, can you tell me more about 
them? 
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15. What do you think about your judicial system? 
 
 
16. How would you rate its overall effectiveness/performance? 
(1) excellent 
(2) fair 
(3) weak 
(4)  poor 
 
 
17. On a scale of 1-5 (1 is the lowest and 5 is the highest) how would you rank your 
confidence in your judicial system?  
  (1) Extremely low  
 (2)  Low  
(3) Neutral  
 (4) Medium 
 (5) High  
 (6) Extremely high 
 
 
Ethnic affiliation of mother ______                       Ethnic affiliation of Father 
_________ 
 
 
Religion____________                                       Brotherhood_____________ 
 
Thanks for your participation.  If there are any further questions or concerns, I may be 
contacted at shanjani@ou.edu. You may also get contact my advisor via email at 
mps@ou.edu.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
Research Instruments 
 
Participant Code:______________ 
 
 
Interview Questionnaire 
Questions for Professionals/Experts and Students 
 
Date of Interview:      Language of Interview: 
 
Country:      Location:  
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                          Male_____            Female______ 
In what year were you born________________________? 
Where were you born____________________________? 
Where else have you lived_______________? For how long____________________? 
 
 
1. Besides being a _______ (insert nationality), which specific group do you identify 
with first and foremost?  
 
2. How do you self-identify? 
   By nationality then ethnicity        
 By ethnicity then nationality   
 
3.  Have your ethic affiliations led to any benefits or problems?  
_______Yes                                                                         No_______ 
 
4. In your opinion, do people from your ethnic group get their fair share of government 
services?  Why/why not? 
 
______Yes  ________No            Not sure________ 
 
5. Do you think that your ethnic group gets a fair chance at government appointment?  
    Why or why not? 
 
6. Do you think that the government favors other ethnic groups more than yours?  
1. Strongly agree 
2. Agree 
3. Don’t know 
4. Disagree 
5.   Strongly Disagree 
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7. Some people think that if people do not support members of their own group then 
they will be dominated by people from other areas who do. What is your opinion? 
 
8. Do you think that this is truer of the past?  At what times in the past has this been 
truer? Why has this changed? 
 
9. Do you support a political party? Which party?  Why or on what bases do you 
support this particular party?  
 
10. In what ways is the party that you support different from the other parties?  
 
11. What are some of the factors that you consider when choosing which political 
candidates to vote for?  
(a) Their abilities                      1   2   3    4    5  
  (b) Their ethnic affiliations      1   2   3   4    5 
 (c) Political ideology/platform 1   2   3   4    5 
(d) Their religious affiliations   1   2   3   4    5 
(e) Are there other reasons? How would you rank these on the same scale?1 2 3  
 
12. Some people these days are saying that citizens in countries with multiple ethnic 
groups are motivated mainly by ethnic appeals. Do you think this is true of   ________ 
(insert country)? Why/why not? 
 
13. How would you rank the order of importance of the following factors when 
choosing a political party or candidate? Use a scale of 1-5 (1 is the lowest and 5 is the 
highest).  
 (a) Party or candidate that emphasizes socio-economic issues 1   2   3   4   5  
  (b) Party or candidate that advocates women’s rights 1 2 3 4 5   
            (c)  Shared ethnic affiliation 1 2 3 4 5   
            (d) Party or candidate that advocates Health issues 1 2 3 4 5  
           (e) Party or candidate that advocates human rights issues 1 2 3 4 5  
(f) Other? If yes, what are they and how would you rank these? 
 
14. To what extent do you think voters in ________ (insert country) respond to the 
following types of political appeals? Use a 1 to 5 scale, where 1 is the lowest and 5 the 
highest), 
(a) Ethnic appeals 1   2    3   4   5    
(b) Class and social status 1   2   3   4   5    
(c) National issues and concerns 1   2   3   4   5    
 
15. Do you think that enough/adequate measures are in place to stop/prevent 
mobilization on the basis of ethnicity?   If so, can you tell me about them? 
_______Yes                          No _______ 
 
16. What do you think about your judicial system? 
 
269 
 
17. How would you rate its overall effectiveness/performance? 
(a) Excellent 
(b) Fair 
(c) Weak 
(d)  Poor 
 
18. On a scale of 1-5 (1 being the lowest and 5, the highest) how would you rank your 
confidence in your judicial system  
  (1) Extremely low  
 (2) Low  
 (3) Neutral  
 (4) Medium 
 (5) High 
 
  
19. If faced with economic hardships (eg. unemployment) would this affect your choice 
of political candidate or party?  If yes, in what way (s)? 
 
20. If faced with economic hardships (eg. unemployment) which candidate would you 
most likely support? Use a scale of 1 -5 (1 being the lowest and 5 the highest).  
   (a) One who advocates continued privatization 1 2 3 4 5 
   (b) Socialist based party member 1 2 3 4 5 
   (c) One who is from a particular ethnic group 1 2 3 4 5 
  (d) One who is highly educated but from a different ethnic group than your own 12345 
 
21. How do you think the introduction of the multi-party system has affected the 
strategies that political elite take to attract votes?   
 
 
Ethnicity of mother __________                        Ethnicity of Father ____________ 
 
 
Religion____________                                       Brotherhood_____________ 
 
 
Thanks for your participation. If there are any further questions or concerns, you may 
contact me at shanjani@ou.edu. You may also contact my advisor via email at 
mps@ou.edu.  
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Maps: Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire and Cameroon  
 
Map I: Senegal located on Map of West Africa 
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Map II: Côte d’Ivoire located on Map of West Africa 
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Map III: Cameroon located on Map of West Africa 
 
